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I. Introduction
A. Economic Significance of the Subject
would still not drop below $100 billion and the national
government succeeded in curbing expenditures under the
however, threaten national and international welfare to such
thereby
federal
billion,
on the one
necessary to
$212.3
(not quantitative)
indeed,
Congressional leaders
Even if the
in fiscal year 1985 the
the accumulation of past
consequences of deficits,
1
the deficit for fiscal year 1988
deficit amounted to
The economic
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
the principal qualitative
exceeded the $2 trillion mark in 1985,
budget
The national public debt,
crisis.
Recent budget data are alarming:
budget
point out
This paper focuses on the legal aspects of the world-wide
1
pressures of
1. Impact of the budget deficit on the United States economy
effects of public spending on the economy.
federal
an extent that it is appropriate and,
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
disagree whether tax cuts and defense buildup,
debt would grow in absolute numbers.
deficits,
reaching about 50 percent of GNP.
Control Act of December 1985 (PL 99-177), popularly known as
swallowing 5 percent of that year's gross national product
a) domestic disturbances
(GNP) .
2hand, or uncontrollable social entitlement programs, on the
Conditions are now in place for a sustained era of
necessary programs must be made a compelling guide to
money supply, proposed by Milton Friedman).
the
1987
If this
In any event,
The need to cut
there is a major threat
result will be a leaner,
the Federal deficit.
But,
The
more streamlined Federal Govern-
particularly according to John Maynard
is not brought under control, we risk losing
neither of these two theories is able to define
have caused this dilemma.
deficit
national prosperity.
better integrated,
1
all we've achieved - and more .•.
our policy choices.
looming on the horizon;
ment.
However,
unnecessary Federal spending and improve management of
promised to balance the budget had to admit in his
budget message after five years in office:
other,
President who won his first election partly because he
All theories on optimal public sector size, whether norma-
2
tive or factual, agree that the government may legitimately
the proper size of the public sector. Regardless of abstract
expenditure levels,
influence and regulate private market forces
Keynes' theory of deficit spending),
(2) or by means of monetary policy (modification of the
(1) either by means of fiscal policy (change of revenue or
3disputes about the role of government in a market-oriented
return drives up the interest rate in the capital markets
areas of environmental protection or investment incentives.
it
an
the
When
to be
in
governmental
Consequently,
This vicious
deficit,
to pay higher
the
activity
its
If the new deficit grows
will have
strangles
Secondly, these payments again
the new deficit adds to the already
for corrective
borrowers
indebtedness has reached a degree of
long run,
Unfortunately the public hardly ever
3
this "[p]rocess feeds on itself" in a
the
needed
Firstly,
that a majority of economists predicts three
public
the demand in the credit markets.
in
than GNP (true for the last few fiscal years),
High deficits entail high interest rates.(1)
the freedom of governments to use fiscal policy in a
4
countercyclical sense has virtually disappeared."
flexibility
even larger share of next year's budget will have
must be financed through more extensive borrowing which in
making deficit spending more expensive.
"[G]iven the present and persistent size of fiscal deficits,
existing national public debt.
circle,
double way.
interest rates to induce potential lenders to put new money
government borrows money to finance
increases
faster
spent for interest payments.
recognized that
competing private
society,
distinct consequences of continuing federal deficits:
on the market.
importance
4projected fiscal year level of $2.5 trillion [realistic even
This monetary ease inevitably entails a higher inflation
the
But
at
financial
inflation.
"The government will, by
over 70 percent of net
the process described under
a one-percent age-point change
absorbing
always have first claim on the
skyrocketed,
Fighting the negative consequences of permanent
that with the publicly-held federal debt
As can be easily foreseen,
Deficits do not necessarily stimulate(3)
resources available, and the private sector will have to
6
settle for what is left. " "To put this into perspective:
In current dollar terms, the increase in public debt
(2)
"For example, CBO [Congressional Budget Office] has pointed
thereby increasing the supply of bank reserves and money.
rate.
to "monetize" the debt by purchasing Treasury securities,
in the face of mounting interest rates and dropping domestic
investment represent the branches particularly affected.
investment - if not offset by higher private saving or
foreign capital influx - the Federal Reserve will be tempted
out,
private saving in fiscal 1982 and more than 100 percent in
7
fiscal 1983." Inventory, housing construction, and foreign
its very nature,
in interest rates would add $26 billion per year to the
5
deficit."
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings],
since
years 1970 to 1974, and less than 25 percent in 1979; it has
averaged just 16.4 percent of net private saving during the
(1) crowds out private investment.
provide the liquidity to offset heavy credit-market demands
used to stimulate a depressed economy, monetary policy is
1979/1980, when further fueling inflation could be justified
in
5
the
"When
innovative
these nice
When used to
So why care about
they will have to be paid
seems to disprove
This was different during the
capital stocks and
is only a choice among several evils,
skyrocketing deficits over the last
however,
growth of
(high unemployment plus high inflation)
despite
therefore,
to have inflationary consequences.
the
inflation, and unemployment.
deficit?
theories:
rates,
reality of 1986,
hamper
of persistent deficits will be,
Whatever the steps taken to mitigate the negative impacts
(1) Roughly 50 percent of the federal budget deficit is not
9
temporary but structural. "Structural" means uninfluenced
public deficits and debts :
quality, the other of time - which reveal the real threat of
There are two aspects frequently neglected - one of
activities, thereby diminishing future economic growth. The
years, all "negative" economic indicators are down: interest
either by inflation or by reduced investment which will
however, the inflationary potential of monetary policy does
8
not take long to make its unwelcome appearance."
in a strong, debt-driven business expansion [like nowadays],
deficits,
as a measure against double-digit unemployment rates.
unlikely
stagflation
not between good and bad.
6any more lest inflation rates should explode, or
portion of the projected deficits is structural, more rapid
future
limits
tend to
some
taxpayers
Government can raise
Three possible
that
"This allows one to isolate the extent
the deficit may become intolerable
is not without restraints.
Once one of these limits has been reached,
revenue on four different avenues:
is mainly caused by the fact
underestimate their future tax burden.
enough money to repay even the interest on its debt.
taxpayer will have to compensate for today's deficits. This
13
"undesirable intergenerational redistribution of wealth"
(b) relaxed monetary policy,
(a) tax increases,
deficit
can be conceived:
economic expansion will not eliminate the bulk of the
1 1
projected deficits." Hence, the United States economy can
to which budget deficits are a result of an underlying
(c) practically, as soon as the government cannot borrow
by cyclical fluctuations, usually at an assumed unemployment
not simply grow its way out of the deficit.
rate of six percent.
imbalance between tax and spending policies, independent of
10
the state of the economy." n[S]ince a continually rising
(a) politically-psychologically,
(b) economically, because the deficit can not be "monetized"
(2) The second phenomenon may be denominated the "generation
12
fraud" or the dangers of "fiscal illusion". Even a public
7margin - and not increasing productivity.
entirely the result of financing public consumption ••. The
to
in
is
for
third
tight
wrong:
The
budget
instance
mechanism
Therefore domestic
for
government is almost
federal
The objection is true:
This growth, they assert,
its premises are
financing
the
invests,and
part of
in his fiscal 1987 budget message
power plants etc., thus enhancing business
The Fed's chairman, Paul Volcker, seems not
interest rates because they have no profit
consumes
the deficit of the U.S.
the appropriiate
14
investment." But
the President made clear that he would veto any
is
roads,
investment
In contrast to private sector borrowing, loans given
At this point supporters of deficit spending argue that
The first and the second avenues are temporarily blocked.
On Feb. 5, 1986,
public
to the administration are price inelastic - governments can
borrowing offered the only feasible avenue for financing the
tax increases.
bridges,
interest rates have substantially exceeded those of the
government
debt.
Congress,
infrastructure and productivity.
government
monetary policy lest inflation should reoccur.
inclined to abandon his mix of loose fiscal but
avenue has been an easy way out only as long as the American
"[D]ebt
"Currently,
afford higher
United States' major trading partners.
also benefits future generations.
(c) foreign borrowing, and
(d) domestic borrowing.
b) foreign trade imbalances
Therefore American internal fiscal and monetary policy
led to a "free lunch" at the expense of our children, unless
8
and
len-
Deficit
trade with
This fact trig-
We are not entit-
equivalent.
on the one hand,
These are - with the excep-
higher interest rates in the United
in the future like transportation
on the other, may result in differentspending,
The rising demand for dollars improves the exchangeders.
gers a chain reaction:
States capital markets attract foreign investors and
the deficit raises internal interst rates.
billion have an ever increasing impact on the
other nations.
cents of every dollar are earned by imports and exports.
The dollar plays an important role as the major world
decisions resulting from a federal deficit of over $200
tion of military research - precisely the areas proposed for
17
cuts in the President's fiscal 1987 budget.
As mentioned earlier, domestic public borrowing to finance
interdependent system of international trade relations. Ten
The United States economy forms part of an increasingly
currency for international transactions and store of value.
routes and research facilities.
we fund investments
spending now will harm future taxpayers.
deficit
nce and debt finance are basically
short term impacts on the economy, in the long run - accor-
16
ding to the Ricardian "equivalence theorem" tax fina-
15
shrinking." Although tax increases,
this failure to invest rather than to consume the borrowed
generations.
disequilibrium.
of
9
to say,
borrowing
international
As a consequence,
of
Hopefully a new GATT round
Thus American products be-
levels
trust in the American economy:
and
He therefore suggested a $300
persistent deficits might evoke an
Reagan acknowledged the futility
in recent years foreign borrowing has often
this circle of retaliations and counter-
financing
besides the alarming trade deficit of $148.5
in the country, especially when the
18
unproductive expenditure." Needless
in 1985,
President
foreign
Secondly,
finances
confidence
billion
money again shifts the burden of endangered growth to future
In his economic report transmitted to Congress on Feb. 6,
been used to finance current or unproductive expenditures.
purchasers of American products.
indebtedness are high, they may eventually threaten external
If
"Unfortunately,
retaliations.
international crisis of
grants - known as mixed credits - to potential foreign
protectionist measures.
economy and led to a historical record balance-of-payments
million trade war chest to provide low-interest loans and
the deficit harms the export sector of the United States
will interrupt
rate against other currencies.
1986,
come less competitive in foreign markets.
10
economy
Although mitigated by the recent drop of domestic interest
Oil
in a
from their
shrunk.
or even feasible,
for example the Federal
"[S]ince world incomes are
a negative American balance-
to become competitive
These countries were enabled to
incomes, that lost capital does have a
their ability to inject new funds into the
their economic growth and thereby to reduce not
major trading partners,
Hence,
deficit spending does not only drain domestic but
increase
Republic of Germany.
States'
equation always has two sides:
drying out world credit market.
the developing countries among them do not dispose of the
United States for its budget and trade deficits. An
It would be oversimplistic, however, merely to blame the
Oil exporting countries receive lower returns
The recent oil price drop has aggravated this dilemma.
of-payments meant a positive balance for many of the United
importing nations admittedly pay a smaller oil bill now, but
necessary financial reserves
economically and politically appropriate,
already feeble world capital market has
sales.
generally below U.S.
for the richest country in a capital-short world to expect
20
others to so finance its budget deficit."
high social value (higher than the crowded-out capital in
19
the United States)." The question arises "[w]hether it is
2. Impact of the United States budget deficit on the world
rates,
also international loan markets.
ternational net debtor for the forst time since World War I,
mutual responsibility. The United States, in 1985 an in-
should cut its budget deficit for three reasons relevant to
11
Given
interest
especially
productivity,
study "[t]he
22
deficits."
Internationalthe
like West Germany or
fiscal
like
thoroughly
could more easily repay their
it would increase the
This would strengthen the American export
compatibility of
(IMF) should more
Thus
raise tax revenues, reduce the budget deficit and
should therefore try to rebalance the United States
in the Third World,
transnational organizations
Already deeply indebted foreign countries,
International credit markets would lower their
International cooperation is a public good that requires
b)
countries.
a)
those
flexibility to promote investment programs in Third World
this reason one may agree with Mr. de Larosiere who proposed
c) The United States budget would regain the necessary
rates because of decreased demand and thereby permit more
industry,
loans under a lower general level of interest rates.
that
trade deficit.
thus stabilize the world-wide financial and monetary system.
affordable loans to developing countries.
Countries with a huge trade surplus,
international
these interdepedencies, a worldwide "[u]nanimous vote for
21
fiscal rectitude" helps little to solve the problem. For
only their trade but also their budget deficits.
Japan,
world-wide prosperity and development:
Monetary Fund
of federal deficits and the national debt, we may move
B. Delimitation and Description of the Subject
1. Non-legal aspects of the budget crisis
12
this
trade
should
psychology.
This narrowed
though equally
the legal aspects
in my eyes, the only
accounting, political
the advanced developing
can not shoulder the entire
should become a subject of
Despite its limited size,
surprisingly enough,
Finally,
Community and Japan should open
however,
and,
skips four different,
South Korea or some OPEC members,
and finally the export chances of these
Making export profits is,
like
however,
taxation,
is alleviated.
The European
Budget analysis, therefore,
interdisciplinary concern.
budget-relevant research disciplines:
science,
approach,
involved in controlling public expenditure.
Having established the far-reaching economic consequences
legal thesis will consequently allude to non-legal issues
directly to the core of the thesis:
playa bigger role in international decision-making and aid.
burden.
deficit
The United States,
their markets until the distorting United States
back its debts.
countries,
and responsibilities of the advanced developing countries be
23
adjusted to the realities of the world economy."
"With size comes responsibility; it is time that the rights
countries.
competitiveness,
realistic way in which the Third and Fourth World can pay
13
are current and correct and that have pertinence and meaning
want to highlight them now, at the outset of the thesis:
It
for
both
these
their
budget
of
base
accounting
and
of
Should "off-
data
of such a central
To what extent must
effectiveness
however,
to fulfil both tasks.
essential
Some of the aspects within the
implementing and auditing these
"The
the
- controllable execution of
fiscal responsibility consists
only
rational and transparent accounting procedures
Accounting helps
to making decisions about programs
auditing
not
Public
several practical problems:
interrelation between budgeting and
expenditures:
This
implies
advance pragmatic administrative planning?
programs.
Although despised by some as a system of meticulous
budget" agencies and public enterprises be subject to
budgeting and accounting processes be compatible in order to
public
the ability of the accounting system to produce data that
decision-making and of
decisions.
furnishes
- through
as guides
24
costs."
administrative programs but also guarantees an efficient and
calculation,
administration depends to very considerable extent upon
importance for the understnding of the budget crisis that I
four above mentioned areas are,
are crucial to efficient budgeting and thereby to reducing
virtual questions of law.
whereever necessary or helpful to clarify or classify the
a) accounting
b) political science
carrying governmental activities completely?
According to V.O. Key, Jr., the basic budgeting problem
words of
budgetary
the budget:
the
14
the
since they are
Finally, it enables
In
in
"On what basis shall it
Can accounting help to decide
implicit
spending.
is reasonable to privatize certain deficit-
Until 1974, when the Congressional Budget and
"pork barrel"
it
from the controls
financial burden must equally be carried by the out-
Obviously there are two ways to balance
rules during its implementation, expresses political, not
legal choices. It reflects what a political majority thinks
26
"[b]ring[s] the maximum return in social utility. " It
taxation.
c) taxation
boosting
curbing spending or increasing revenue by means of higher
strong pressure groups and constituencies to induce deficit-
A. Premchand, "[t]he budget represents a central vehicle
27
through which policies are converted into actions."
Impoundment Control Act (PL 93-344) was passed, Congress had
whose
voted minority of sometimes 49 percent.
also permits a majority of legislators to authorize programs
be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of
25
activity B?" Hence, the budget, although following legal
culminates in a simple question:
appropriation procedures?
whether
stricter accounting and auditing scrutiny,
freed
rate would largely eliminate the justification of these
Given all these negative implications - the controversy
certain groups of taxpayers cost the Treasury billions of
and
for
15
severe
indirect
subtle, as
presidential
governmental
identifiable
distributive
should not be
carry the risks
These
of
however,
and the burden on future
they benefit
higher tax-rates will become
indicates.
A less progressive, flatter tax-
straightening the tax codes
Because
to abolish them encounter
from present consumptive
thus
The 1974 Act forces the Legislature to
28
the totals of revenue and expenditure.
plans
third time it cannot be left unmentioned that
Progressive tax-rates,
"tax expenditure"
A mere structural tax reform will not suffice, if
profit
in the form of tax exemptions and deductions
all
these two sides of the budget as totally separate
every year.
the
the impact of a structural tax reform,
not
an ever broadening tax-base and
term
For
resistance to increase tax-rates,
about
inevitable.
deficits continue to increase;
do
spending.
consequences to the detriment of the poor.
of
entirely leveled, since pure flat tax-rates
steadily growing public deficits burden future taxpayers who
relieving the revenue side of the budget from individual
interests.
tax loop-holes.
groups,
oppasition from lobbyists.
dollars
the
But the links between taxes and outlays are more
subsidies
and unrelated.
regarded
adjust at least
2. Focus and goal of analysis
This thesis seeks to develop procedural and substantive
legal rules which restrain public spending and help to
d) psychology
The budget deficit touches aspects in mass and individual
psychology, too.
Firstly, the deficit, by its simple existence, may raise
inflationary expectations, because many people believe that
part of the debt will be "monetized." If this anticipated
finance the debt by partial "monetization." Secondly, the
citizen might wonder, why he or she should live up to
his/her budget, if the administration fails to do so.
Mounting private debt and bankruptcies will follow.
The individual legislator, finally, must choose between
personal priorities (reelection, "pork barrel") and national
priorities (reducing the deficit). What will he/she do in
the election months of fall 1986, if the United States
Supreme Court invalidates Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings in
July 1986, thus forcing Congress to make the hard choices on
its own?
to
16
Is it not easier to stop
thus making it harder to
the government would haveto occur,
spending cuts appear as the most simple and
restrain the monetary supply,
inflation were
politically feasible tax reform.
giving than to start taking?
generations ,
its expenditure curbing efforts or to profit
other countries have already learned.
Controlling public spending implicates three distinct
aspect deals with the classical theory of checks and
balances: What degree of separation between Congress and the
President is constitutionally mandated and what degree of
political branches of government - the Legislature and the
Executive - capable of managing the budget crisis or are the
internal forces of either branch neutralizing or even
hindering themselves in the process of deficit cutting?
two
17
the
Are the
This second
from lessons
The following analysis
statutory and administrative
internal organizational structures of
indebted national budgets.
"interinstitutional" separation of powers:(2)
present
balance
questions of separation of powers:
(1) "intrainstitutional" division of powers:
procedures to cut the deficit of the federal government of
the United States. Other market-oriented, federal systems
of government like Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Switzerland, as well as the 50 member states of the
United States face similar problems of limiting their annual
deficits and their aggregated national debts. A chapter on
foreign and state anti-deficit measures will therefore try
to suggest comparative balanced-budget approaches which the
United States government could adopt in order to accelerate
will emphasize constitutional,
reelection gifts to the local and national constituencies?
of power between the two political branches of government
independent regulatory agencies like the Federal Reserve
I I,
the
the
18
some
I,
relieve
in the
interest
lobbying.
The will
in detail,
Besides
a disorganized
pragmatic
is constitutionally
(Congress andwhich are directly
indicates the high-water mark of the age of
is another institution operating outside
II. - IV. are designed to provide some background
extent have well organized,
there
III of the Federal Constitution.
government
"extraconstitutional" separation of powers:
Formulated provokingly, one could therefore ask
whether the budget deficit symptomizes
Before chapter V. addresses these issues
chapters
(3)
lobbying (extraconstitutional aspect)?
c) whether it
a)
Congress and/or Executive (intrainstitutional aspect),
30
b) whether it will or already has disturbed the balance
groups contributed to the "pro-spending bias
29
budgetary process?" What can be done to
to democratic majority voting as laid down in Art.
constitutional framework of separation of powers:
legislators and the chief executive from the pressures of
of
Board,
permitted in order to resolve the budget dilemma?
cooperation among these two branches
To what
and
of the American people is represented through three branches
President) or indirectly (the federal judiciary) accountable
(interinstitutional question), or
functioning of federal budgeting in the United States.
about the constitutionalinformation
historic development, the concepts,
foundation,
and the
19
the
basic
20
A. The Constitutional Provisions
Constitution does contain two provisions of substantive and
sec. 8,
than by
I ,
constitutional
responsibilities,
In stark contrast
The United States
"The
Being more detailed and
the Basic Law of the Federal
The American system of public
4 and 5).
the German approach is also more
and its limits (Art. I, sec. 8, c1. 1;
cl.9,
intergovernmental fiscal
shaped by fiscal realities rather
however,
sec.
is
and
Amend. XVI)
"sparse" does not mean silent.
I ,
But
budgeting.
procedural importance for the scope and means of federal
the Federal Budget Process
1
The "informal American fiscal constitution" comprises few
explicit,
to this pragmatic attitude,
provisions on federal expenditures and on state taxing and
2
when fiscal flexibility is needed.
state,
vulnerable to amendments and might even hamper development
Republic of Germany includes a whole chapter on federal,
provisions about the federal taxing power (Art.
listing no less than 14 articles.
constitutionally prescribed procedures.
finance
spending are even sparser."
Art.
c1. 1;
II. Constitutional Foundation and Historical Development of
21
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 2-18.
of specific powers .•. Under such circumstances, the
to
enumeration
cites the main reasons
"[t]he Congress shall have
The controversy was finally resolved
in his commentaries,
and unnecessary the subsequent
Congress may undertake anything it deems appropriate
portant
further the general welfare.
According to this provision,
constitution would practically create an unlimited
3
national government.
If the clause •.. is construed to be an independent and
The first construction has never been taken seriously.
substantive grant of power, it ... renders wholly unim-
by funding its enumerated legislative powers under
general welfare.
1. The federal spending power, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1
power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
b) Congress may only appropriate money to provide for the
a)
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and
three possible interpretations:
general Welfare of the United States ..• " The clause permits
c) Congress may appropriate money only insofar as required
supported the third.
Story himself espoused Alexander Hamilton's position which
4
favored the second interpretation, whereas Madison
Justice Story,
for this rejection:
the Tenth Amendment.
fines are set in the clause which confers it, and not
While .•• the power to tax is not unlimited, its con-
the
scheme
compensation
9
grounds, but
to 3 majority
22
5
Butler decided in
first constructionthe
tax-and-expenditure
It results that the power
its
is not limited by the direct
to pass unemployment
to farmers who agreed to acreage
the spending power "[i]s as broad as
not broader as
states
Butler was distinguished on several
tax,"
and not narrower as the third interpretation by
1933 because
the
In joining Hamilton's view, a 6
to
of
for public purposes
grants of legislative power found in the Constitu-
6
tion.
lative powers of Congress.
of Congress to authorize expenditure of public money
in those of sec. 8 which bestow and define the legis-
8
Only one year later, in Steward Machine Co. v Davis, the
in the landmark case of United States v.
power
statutes.
suggests,
spending power, limited only by the general welfare clause,
the Court in Butler invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment
Act
induced
declared:
restrictions intruded upon rights reserved to the states by
authorizing payments
1936.
Supreme Court upheld a federal tax-credit system which
Madison asserted. Despite this assumption of a rather ample
In other words,
7
23
follows:
Justice Story explains the object of this provision as
the
If it
that
the spending
of all public
but in Consequence
of the United States
welfare,
makes clear
and a Regular Statement and
cl. 1
c1. 1,
except for the restraints imposed by
sec. 8,
so-called "power of the purse," to the
the power to decide, how and when any
sec. 8,
the discharge of the expenses and debts
the
not to the executive branch of government: "No
Consequently,
expressly confers the final control over federal7
Whereas Art. I,
should possess
applied to
money should be applied for these purposes.
As all the taxes raised from the people ••• are to be
of the government, it is highly proper, that Congress
power.
power under Art. I,
2. The appropriation requirement, Art. I, sec. 9, c1. 7
expenditures,
the Bill 'of Rights and the notion of providing for the
1 1
has never been explicitly overruled. Yet, as recent
10
decisions indicate, the Tenth Amendment nowadays does not
serve as a specific limit to the congressional spending
general as opposed to the local
Constitution stands as a vast, unlimited federal power.
Money shall be published from time to time."
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
federal government may spend as well as tax, Art. I, sec. 9,
of Appropriations made by Law;
money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
legislative,
cl.
A provision of a substantive character is Art. I, sec. 8,
Prophetically predicting President Roosevelt's New Deal in
3. Other budget-related constitutional provisions
24
peace
facile,
to meet
of
"backdoor
an un-
mode of
procedural
war times.
appropriation
commentaries,
either
times
in his
regular
supply,
the
constitutional
of
that "[e]ven in
executive would possess
this
the public purse of the nation; and
12
money resources at his pleasure.
which render a loan the most
requires "Appropriations made by Law."
Justice Story,
anser the question whether
the
circumvents
7
as "[t]he least burdensome
14
debt," especially during
ready means
will
cl.
Story added
which
power over
violates
and
9,
otherwise,
IV.E.
empowering Congress "to borrow money on the credit of
United States."
1930s,
sec.
bounded
were
might apply all its
exigencies may occur,
this broad interpretation, Congress' power to borrow money
16
appears as "general and unlimited" as its spending power.
I,
the
economical
expenses, or to avert calamities, or to save the country
15
from an undue depression of its staple production." Given
process,
cl. 2
the
Chapter
contracting a
accepted loans
requirement.
Secondly, "[t]o secure regularity, punctuality, and
13
fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money," Art.
spending",
represents one of the most important legislative checks on
the scope of executive policy-making. On the other hand, the
the purpose of this provision by the fact that House members
as
25
and
and
cl. 1
budget
7 ,
Committee
tool for
thus being
Process - A
sec.I ,
18
impeachment and of
its power to set the
in the annual
Representatives ... "
of
19
of
planning his programs,
But who is to initiate and to review
the appropriation requirement in Art.
"[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall
History of Shifting Powers
the House
May the House Appropriations
the President as an essential
expenditure levels
the heads and chiefs of departments
Congress's powers
the procedural rule in Art.
that
in
serves
budget?
The Development of the Federal Budget
Besides
As mentioned above,
Finally,
prescribes
B.
the
increased federal taxes.
represent smaller constituencies than senators,
the budget procedure that is founded on a "textually
20
demonstrable constitutional commitment" to the legislative
budget
branch of government.
controlling
originate
overriding a presidential veto,
opposed to the Senate which "may [only] propose or concur
17
with Amendments as on other Bills." Justice Story explains
revenue and
closer to the will of the local people who usually object
I, sec. 9, cl. 7 forms the only part of the spending side of
agencies.
formulating his policies,
to carry the prime responsibility in public finance.
few lump-sum appropriations which allowed him to direct and
characteried by two different budgetary philosophies: the
26
were
his powers
The British
The Federal
time of the
separation of
government
the
federal
since Congress passed only a
infancy at
the first Secretary of the Treasury
"The American budgetary process should
thereby enabling the executive branch
favored and exercised a central role in
in its
shift of budgetary powers from one political
its appropriation bills to an extent which leaves
first decades of the
Alexander Hamilton,
The
to review and oversee the use of appropriations,
Today's public budgeting, therefore, must be understood as
the budget process,
be viewed as a working example of the
21
powers."
Although the Treasury Act of 1789 did not authorize Hamilton
doctrine of "executive discretion" (Hamilton) and the theory
from 1789 to 1795,
the result of a 200-year-old evolutionary process in which
1. Hamilton versus Jefferson
branch to the other:
Congress' jealous watch over its power of the purse and the
Constitution remains silent on these questions.
of "legislative restraint" (Jefferson).
budgetary system,
were practically unfettered,
"itemize"
American Revolution, could not provide any guidance either.
President's efforts to maintain executive flexibility led to
no more discretion to the administration?
a constant
27
Secretary of the Treasury was not allowed to coordinate the
transfer the appropriated money to any object of executive
to
not
The
discretion
(1795,
legislative
Instead he
"legislative
Thomas Jefferson
discretion.
In his first message
doctrine of
administrativein
absence or sparsity of
to strengthen its internal structure by
implemented detailed appropriation bills
legislative oppposition even after he had
to every specific purpose susceptible of
latitude
Jefferson proposed to "[c]ircumscrib[e]
22
powers over money" "by appropriating
In addition to this presidential restraint,
The
w i:d e
victory of Congress'
This
This
preference.
choices.
encountered increasing congressional criticism which finally
the Congress
been elected President in 1801.
specifications left it to Hamilton to make the actual policy
Congress managed
led to Hamilton's resignation from office.
discretionary
permanent until 1802) which controlled tax and expenditure
supported this
specific sums
23
definition."
bills simultaneously.
budget requests of the several departments.
restraint" influenced the whole 19th century budget process.
appointing a House Committee on Ways and Means
which drastically narrowed executive
The President had no direct impact on the budget.
The Legislature
could only transmit their "Books of Estimates" to Congress.
28
instance defense and foreign affairs, were taken out of the
went a similar procedure which caused a third fragmentation.
for
bills.
in 1876
Committee
totals - a
of constant
In the face of
The Senate under-
revenue
because
six major areas,
appropriation
Appropriations
in
In 1885,
A change of the House rules
underfunding
but it lost sight of the
regarded as irrelevant
the outside factor of "coercive deficiencies"
The newly created
therefore, could specialize in the spending side of
surpluses.
Finally,
(1865) ,
the budget,
danger then
function.
budget
permitted this new committee to insert general legislation
in the appropriation bills. The jealousy of the legislative
committees resulted in the second major fragmentation of the
Several measures of congressional reorganization, however,
brought forth a significant decline in legislative budget
control during the outgoing 19th century. The increasing
complexity of governmental activities made Congress strip
the old House Ways and Means Committee of its appropriating
Appropriations Committee's jurisdiction.
House's fiscal committees.
deliberate
weakened congressional budget supervision.
permanent budget surpluses, the administration became more
and more upset about Congress' overspecificity and frequent
"Deficiencies" were created when agencies entered into
contracts in advance of appropriations or when they spent
the money provided for the entire year within the first
three quarters. They were made "coercive" by threatening to
29
appropriate the money necessary to cover these deficiencies.
24
curtail services drastically (used by the Post Office) or
in
1906
set
fiscal
monthly or
in its perti-
Congress had to
Despite a
agency heads made
passed the Antide-
All appropriations
Resentfully,
Congress
to prevent undue expenditures in
or involve the Government in any
The Act prescribed
to complete the service of the
failed for two reasons:
and all such apportionments shall be adhered to
for contingent expenses or other general pur-
stop these practices of evading the limitsTo
poses •.. shall ••• be so apportioned by
obligation is authorized by law •.•
for that fiscal year,
made
appropriations
other allotments as
any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress
No Department of the Government shall expend .•.
contract or obligation for the future payment of money
one portion of the year that may require deficiency
except when waived or modified in specific cases by the
ment .•.
in excess of such appropriations unless such contract
The Act
written order of the head of the Executive Depart-
26
year;
to delete the whole program.
25
2. The Antideficiency Act of 1905
excessive use of the waiver provisions.
appropriation legislation,
nent parts:
ficiency Act of 1905.
30
In the 20th century, this evil of excessive itemization of
appropriation bills was first challenged by the Commission
in
the
overspecific
Congress did not
became true: "Since
in all its details,
meticulous,
Secondly,
appointed by President Taft
the warnings of Jefferson's Secre-
Albert Gallatin,
at variance with the general theory
It proposed to give the executive branch a
that "coercive deficiencies" were only the conse-
1909.
quence of -a deeper-roted evil:
amendment which narrowed this exception clause to "some
27
extraordinary emergency," deficiency appropriations could
not be curbed substantially.
recognize
tary of the Treasury,
itemization of appropriation bills "depriving the government
28
of the benefits of executive judgment." "[T]he practice of
itemization was ..•
underlying the Constitution which makes Congress responsible
for determining policies involving the expenditure of money
29
and the Executive responsible for executing them." Thus,
it would be impossible to foresee,
executive departments ±a reasonable discretion' by avoiding
30
too detailed appropriations."
on Economy and Efficiency,
more accountable role in the federal budget process, thereby
after one hundred years,
necessary application of funds ... , Congress should grant the
laying the foundation for the Budget and Accounting Act of
31
1921.
December
31
the Act required the President to submit an annual executive
created the new Bureau of the Budget (BOB) to assist the
to
the
also
Since
to list
or other
The head
Its main
systematic
1921
shall make
He was "the
In 1939 the
of
in
loans,
To that end sec. 201 of
reduce or increase"
This document had
to fulfil this new task
revise,
first milestone
202 even provided that in case of an
the
several departments as well as
Sections 207 and 209 authorized the BOB
the concentration of budgetary decision-
sec.
the Director of the Budget, was appointed by
the
set
correlate,
the Budget and Accounting Act
the efficiency of other agencies.
of
deficit "the President in the Budget
Act
President was not able
This
budget proposal to Congress.
reorganization of the federal budget process.
3. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
making within the executive branch.
present, and future fiscal years including "[a]ll essential
achievement was
revenue and expenditure figures and estimates for the prior,
the
personally,
recommendations to Congress for new taxes,
facts regarding the bonded and other indebtedness of the
32
Government." In order to encourage executive fiscal
imminent
responsibility,
of the Bureau,
appropriate action to meet the estimated deficiency."
BOB moved from its original location in the Treasury
the President and directly responsible to him.
estimates
to "assemble,
investigate
President's man."
President with the necessary staff and expertise.
accounting and auditing functions of the Comptroller of the
appropriation process in a more indirect way. However, one
Office (GAD) with the Comptroller General as its head. The
a
of
In
32
from
could
decided to
influence,
respective
The number
the President,
their
last decades.
in 1922,
to
it was renamed "Office of
[and appropriation] by Congress,
thereby discarding the fragmented
establishments.
and the Senate,
the creation of the General Accounting
The Act of 1921 thus "streamlined" the
first time in our national history we
appropriation bills
in 1920,
1885.
to the Executive Office of
authorization
administrative
all
under President Nixon,
"[F]or the
As a counterweight to this augmented executive
executive,
the House,
executive budget preparation in a direct and the legislative
process of
employees has risen steadily over the
1970,
execution under the direction of the President, and
34
independent audit as a means of legislative review."
change which symbolized its increasing independence
other
Department
Comptroller General removeable only by joint resolution of
33
both Houses. The Act assigned to the GAD all the
counterweight against executive dominance was provided for
refer
appropriation committees,
in the Act itself:
speak of a budget process comprising formulation by the
Management and Budget" (OMB).
GAD was made responsible solely to Congress, with the
Treasury and of the six auditors of the Treasury Department.
33
Senate Finance, and the two Appropriations Committees) had
referral of the appropriating function from the old House
1865
1948
the
the
recommended a
looming danger
Sec. 138 of the
(House Ways and Means,
As explained earlier,
idea of a "legislative budget."
this Joint Committee had to present a report
1946 Act tried to avert this
1947 budget resolution was deadlocked in a
innovative
Congress recognized that the mere strengthening
committee of House and Senate,
the loose appropriation practice of World War II
15 ,
The
The
After
maximum level of appropriated money, included deficiency
reserves, and suggested reductions in the public debt.
36
If not a "[f]iasco," the 1946 Act was at least a
had ended,
totals.
spending efficiently.
through the
35
4. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
Committee, but simply ignored on the floor.
Ways and Means to the new Appropriations Committee ran the
risk of neglecting to compare revenue and expenditure
resolution - the first congressional budget resolution at
of its fiscal committees had not sufficed to control public
congressional fiscal committees
to meet as a Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget. By
overall federal receipts and expenditures,
failure:
accompanied by a concurrent resolution, which compared
conference
all - was accepted by the Republican majority in the Joint
February
During the opening weeks of each regular session the four
34
since.
overridden by floor amendments.
a
in
Firstly, it
Secondly,
the constitutional
enacted an omnibus appropriation bill.
regular Statement and Account of the
future enforcement provisions would have
15 deadline was too short.
Rep. William S. Cole admitted that the 500
"[a]
on the statutory level,
that committee proposals could not be easily
in 1950,
Thirdly,
that
spending bill in order to examine appropriations
the- Feb.
then the new concept has been ignored in the same way
This Act achieved two significant goals:
But Congress learned important lessons which benefited
to assure
Legislative Reorganization Act has never been followed
Congress,
In 1950, Clarence Cannon, one of the House opponents of
37
the 1946 Act, suggested an "omnibus appropriation bill" or
time;
later budget reforms: a special budget committee needed more
their totality.
conglomeration of four committees hindered quick decision
provided that the Federal Government shall "full[y]
40
disclos[e] ... the results of financial operations." Thus,
it realized,
mandate
as the "legislative budget."
making.
single
Since
pages document had "perplexed, bewildered, befuddled, and
38
amused" him. Nevertheless, for the first time since 1793,
39
5. The Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
35
Hollings,
form the basis of the present federal budget process and are
it
and
two
and
(budget
review of
the Budget
four major
Secretary of
Congress
Chapters IV,
the Act established a
Bureau of
analysis of these
"From our present point ofauditing) •
budget planning and execution),
(accounting of all fiscal operatiOns),
and more importantly,
importance of the Act lies in the emphasis
the close relation that should exist between
in· the federal fiscal process:
the
to
Secondly,
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
41
published from time to time."
higher degree of synchronization between the
the Treasury
gives
authorization and appropriation),
General Accounting Office (Comptroller General:
therefore of no historical significance.
7. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
44
Dec. 12, 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-
actors
accounting systems,
view,
V.B. will furnish an in-depth
statutes.
accounting for the past, administrative management [for the
42
present], and programming for the future."
6. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
43
1974 and
(today OMB:
36
A. Budget Functions
III. Budget Theory
and
Past
fiscal
Budgets,
and the
governmental
this year's
to do.
last year's budget
present action reliable,
"Compared to party platforms and
although usually limited to one
expenditures and revenues of a
budget resolution for the upcoming year
operate on three time levels:
lequel sont pr~vues et autoris~es
2
re~ettes et depenses annuelles de l'Etat ••. " The best
Public budgets,
budget tells the administration what it has to do;
There are numerous ways to define the term "budget". The
standard definition describes a public budget as "a formal
indicates what the Executive is expected
1. The "time" function
budget proposals] carries a higher probability of concrete
4
action."
controllable factor in governmental decision-making.
les
reveals what the Executive actually has done;
method of understanding the many facets of a public budget,
3
however, is to analyse its different functions.
listing of the
1
unit" or as "l'acte par
most ••. laws, inclusion in the budget [even in the executive
future action predictable.
congressional
action becomes accountable,
with their retro- and prospecitve aspects, make "time" a
year,
37
3. The economic function
2. The political function
the
priorities
serve an
The budget,
in what areas
These governmental choices
showstherefore,
unless the public has adequate means for knowing
actual, and planned activities of the government:
They define the size of the public sector in the
document,
protection of minorities or other disadvantaged groups
The budget mirrors political compromises emerging from the
degree of state intervention into the free play of private
economy. More importantly, however, budgets circumscribe the
prevailed over majoritarianism.
essentially democratic purpose: they inform the public about
benefits.
expressed,
currently how governmental affairs have been conducted in
struggle of political parties and countless pressure groups
the past,
the past, what are the present conditions and what program
7
for work in the future is under consideration."
budget
for a maximum share of scarce public resources and revenues.
however, can also help to redress inequalities by distribu-
5
ting public funds to "discrete and insular minorities." The
clarify the third political function of public budgets: they
Budgets determine the provision and distribution of public
8
and social goods like defense, fire protection, and welfare
"[T]he popular will cannot be intelligently formulated nor
It expresses the choices of majority interests.
are the "most operational expression of national
6
in the public sector." Fourthly, budgets
5. The legal function
or statutes, are legally binding mandates of the Legislature
the degree of efficiency actually achieved.
to
38
is the
the basic
intend
In the United States
in this way reflect
the historical chapter has alreadyAs
to spend certain amounts of money for
Subsequent accounting and auditing reveals
Budgets,
the crucial point in this context
and by listing the pertinent figures they show
budgets allow officials to compare various alter-
in order to find out the most promising program at
forces.
they make clear what the administration wants to
market
items
Budgets help fulfil both the primary and the secondary
Budgets, whether passed in the form of resolutions, bills,
economic concept of the administration ranging from "laissez
planning,
faire" to a planned economy.
function of executive planning. By including certain program
the lowest cost. Therefore, budgets may increase administra-
implement these programs. As a central tool for governmental
accomplish,
tive efficiency.
4. The planning, accounting, and auditing functions
how and to what extent the several departments
to the Executive
natives
demonstrated,
degree of administrative discretion.
this means particulary the presidential powers of vetoing
9
the budget or impounding some of its items. Thus, the
specific purposes.
39
B. Budget Concepts
The purpose of this section is to describe various
ces, the budget forms a central check, helping to guarantee
the mutual balance of powers.
following
What fi-
as different
The
In a system of checks and balan-
of computing budget deficits.
operations of the federal government should be
All the previouly listed budget functions,
concepts
included in the budget ducument in order to provide the
public with a clear understanding and a full disclosure of
the budget's size, growth, and impact? A completely
different set of budget concepts deals not with the accoun-
ting but with the planning function of budgeting: Which
budgetary theory is most apt to define administrative pro-
grams so that they can be funded and implemented
nancial
analysis tries to answer a question of accounting:
departments and agencies.
as they may seem, can be traced back to a single idea:
control. Budgets allow people to control the government,
Congress to bind the Executive, and the President to survey
budget process indicates the allocation of powers between
the two political branches of government.
Secondly, in contrast to long-term financial planning
(future development of receipts and outlays), the
preparation of next year's budget follows legal rules which
can be changed only by Congress and not simply by
presidential directives.
- the credit budget;
- the current services estimates,
- the unified cash budget,
40
As budget
(national
elucidate one
these purposes
in appropriation bills,
budgets serve both static-
Four static and three dynamic
and dynamic functions
one basic difference in approach
theory is able to
The static concepts depict present
(ceilings
second issue of effective executive
is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line
This
auditing)
is useful to maintain this distinction for the
functions
budget concept can satisfy all
Each budget
it
As explained in subchapter A.,
Although it
efficiently?
- the administrative budget,
- the capital-, investment- or divided budget, and
- the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and
- the full- or high-employment budget.
descriptive
decision-making will be discussed later in Chapter V.F.
priorities, governmental interventions, market regulations).
accounting,
specific aspect while usually neglecting others.
budget theories are commonly debated:
"No single
10
fully."
dynamic,
functions can be divided into two major groups - static and
analysis of budget concepts.
b) dynamic concepts:
a) static concepts:
between the two groups,
governmental activities and their quantitative relation to
should be pointed out:
41
The unified cash budget consists of two major groups of
1. The static-descriptive concepts
for
see as
such as
This concept calls for
equals the deficit for the fiscal year,
The new unified cash budget eliminated these
the foundation for its budgetary analysis and
the federal funds for general spending purposes and
funds)
trust funds earmarked for specific programs,
instance $221.6 billion in 1985.
trust
the
trust funds) and the total outlays (again federal funds plus
transactions.
transactions (fiscal relations to the public).
an example the unified budget for 1987 in Appendix B, Table
fore "cash" and "unified") while cancelling the interagency
the budget to include all of the Government's fiscal
12
transactions with the public." Thus, the federal govern-
presentation since the 1969 budget.
social security and unemployment insurance benefits;
two defects by including the trust fund money flows (there-
crucial defects: it excluded the receipts and outlays of the
funds:
concept as
economy on the budget.
I. The difference between the total receipts (federal plus
a) "The Federal Government has used the unified budget
ment discarded the old administrative budget which had two
GNP, whereas the dynamic theories "relate the budget ... to
11
the business cycle" and try to evaluate the qualitative
social security trust funds and listed purely interagency
mutual impacts of the budget on the economy and those of the
42
------------------------------------------------------------
totals results in a decreased federal deficit for 1985 (the
201 (a)since sec.
- $212.3 billion.
- $266.6 billion
+ $9.4 billion
+ $45.0 billion
1985, known as Gramm-
Since trust funds are usually
picture of the unified budget. The Balanced Budget and
The budget totals do not comprise transactions of private-
ral publicly owned agnecies that have been moved off-budget
14
since 1971: These off-budget agencies , together with other
15
off-budget activities distort the otherwise complete
ly owned, government-sponsored enterprises, such as the
13
Federal home loan banks. However, there are numerous fede-
Emergency Deficit Control Act of Dec.
Rudman-Hollings (hereinafter G-R-H), resolved this problem
insurance trust fund (OASI) and the disabilitiy insurance
17
trust fund (DI) as off-budget entities. G-R-H thereby did
total federal deficit (rounded)
at least partially by putting all the previously off-budget
16
federal entities (back) into the budget. It is true that
G-R-H simultaneously classified the old-age and survivors
in surplus, an adding of on-budget totals and off-budget
regarding off-budget agencies):
on-budget trust fund surplus:
following figures are already adjusted to the G-R-H changes
not defeat its deficit-cutting purpose,
federal funds deficit:
off-budget trust fund surplus:
amount allowed under G-R-H.
DI shall be included in calculating the maximum deficit
(1) provides that the receipts and disbursements of OASI and
total federal deficit.
problems of classification:
like education, research etc.?
by
43
instead of
- government
the capital-,
should be financed
"[T]he idea of a capital
Table II showing that total federal
tax burdens) and of unduly burdening
the capital budget is useful, which can be
or divided budget does not aim at completeness
in 1985 was $41.1 billion lower than that year's
from capital accounts or investment accounts,
centers on one fundamental concept
the local jurisdiction uses for current
In contrast to the unified cash budget,
Nonetheless,
b)
budget
investment-,
benefits,
but at a separation of current accounts, which yield current
federal funds deficit and only $12.2 billion higher than the
seen from Appendix B,
if not to avert the dangers of "fiscal illusion" (underesti-
grant
expenditures will be paid for by current taxes and future
19
benefits by future taxes." Admittedly, the concept imposes
investment
borrowing while all other outlays should be financed by
18
current taxation." The capital budget helps to point out
investment purposes?
outlays of an investment type
which yield long-term benefits.
mation of present
future generations, because "current benefits of government
(2) How to assess the long-range benefits of "intangibles"
(1) How to qualify a federal community development block
44
are uncertain liabilities contingent upon default, and
acquisition, or rehabilitation of any physical asset that is
the
intro-
Credit
In his
concept
These esti-
time:
for two reasons:
Table III. "It measures and
the President shall submit an
levels and future capital in-
the federal credit budget
"The credit budget is a necessary
service
[that] will be used for the construction,
for major civilian and military capital
see Appendix B,
the unified budgetto
describing is
The fourth and final static-descriptive budget
the end of 1985.
advantages of the new theory for the first
budget proposal to Congress,
analysis of current
investment programs over a period of ten years.
vestment needs
"appropriation ...
c)
mates may not exceed the maximum deficit amount prescribed
21
by G-R-H. A civilian capital investment is defined as an
In passing the "Federal Capital Investment Program
20
Information Act of 1984," the government ackowledged the
capable of being used to produce services or other benefits
22
for a number of years .•• "
duced in 1980,
controls the volume of new loans and loan guarantees
23
extended to borrowers." This volume surpassed $1 trillion
worth
at
supplement
unified budget does not include loan guarantees because they
neither loan guarantees nor direct loans can be fully
24
controlled by appropriations of budget authority." But
credit authority is not completely beyond control.
45
percent sequestration cut ordered by sec. 252 of G-R-H.
they provide a base which embodies the cumulative effects of
see
economicthe same
for example from 1987
These estimates have two
they are being provided for the four
as the presidential budget proposal,
Credit authority outside the regular appropria-
and they include off-budget receipts and outlays.1991,
new credit.
for individual budget accounts by ceilings on the volume of
programs subject to the appropriations process are limited
a) The only dynamic budget mandated by federal statute is
tions process encounters de facto limitations through a 4.3
2. The dynamic budget concepts
on ..• at the same level as the fiscal year in progress and
25
without changes in such programs and activities." Hence,
simply assume that "all programs and activites were carried
all past congressional and presidential budgetary choices,
the current services estimates. These presidential estimates
compared. The current services concept answers the question:
a base against which future budgetary alternatives can be
What happens if we do nothing? As displayed in Appendix B,
amount to $103.9 billion in 1991, whereas G-R-H orders a
26
balanced budget for fiscal 1991. Consequently, the current
Table IV, the deficit computed under these assumptions would
to
services estimates prove that the budget cannot be balanced
without drastic policy changes.
years beyond the present fiscal year,
additional advantages:
The current services concept uses
assumptions
dix B, Table VI. On the expenditure side, "the accounts show
the deficit calculated with the unified budget method.
policy on aggregate economic activity than does the unified
46
like
on a
fiscal
assump-
not
it would be
the accounts
factors
deficit-related
economic
side,
and in that it excludes
cyclical
fiscal policy choices influence
[receipts]
because otherwise
a figure $22.2 billion lower than
As mentioned earlier, budget and
differences in
the most interesting
on the
it works on an accrual basis,
Table V,
to separate the effects of policy differences
activities, whereas
offers
The NIPA approach produces a deficit of $190.1
in that
tions.
Appendix B,
concept,
economy affect each other:
economic
the market values of the currently produced output of goods
budget
from the effects of
b) The second dynamic theory is called the National Income
impossible
measure and classify the stream of income generated in the
27
process of producing GNP ... " NIPA differs from the unified
c) The full- or high-employment budget, as the third dynamic
billion for fiscal 1985,
budget.
and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the United States, see Appen-
NIPA provides a better measure of the impact of the
and services ..• ,
current basis as the cash budget,
approach of calculation.
net lending that represents only an exchange of one asset
28
for another. Because of these accounting differences
47
percent, the structural deficit will be lower than the total
structural plus the cyclical deficits.
the
sig-
full-
h ighe r
(6.25)
the
see Appen-
introductory
In order to
and
1972 budget
therefore,
Thus,
revenues
"help[ing] to achieve
29
imposing restraint."
(OMB) •
tax
thereby
total federal deficit consists of the
smaller
the
For this reason, the high-employment deficit
in surplus,
(CBO) or 6.25 percent
because
Hence,
is
stability by automatically
in tax revenues and welfare payments.
beyond this hypothetical benchmark of 6
Table VII. The cyclical deficit indicates the margin
measure the impacts of fiscal policy alone,
levels
As long as the unemployment rate in the United States
employment budget insulates the budget totals from cyclical
is also called the structural deficit whose economic
unemployment or inflation affect the budget through changing
by calculating the deficit at a constant unemplyment rate of
cyclical components must be eliminated. This is usually done
fluctuations.
chapter.
economic
On the other side, during times of boom, the full-employment
dix B,
nificance has already been explained in the
deficit,
stays
the full-employment concept in his fiscal
unemployment payments create a cyclical deficit,
6 percent
of stimulative fiscal policy in times of high unemployment.
concept
This logic was advanced by Presidnet Nixon who introduced
message to Congress: The new theory "imposes the discipline
30
of an upper limit on spending," because "expenditures must
48
budget planning.
into account as useful supplemental information for future
taken
included in the
They should always be
if off-budget acitivities are
theories provide comparative methods of defining the
In summarizing the preceding discussion, we can regard the
calculation. The old administrative budget is out-dated. New
deficit,
unified budget as a reliable way of computing the federal
size and impact of deficits.
budget
never be allowed to outrun the revenues that the tax system
31
would produce at reasonably full employment."
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c) fall review.
calendar years:
did not
and Impoundment
This Act, however,
Congress completely reformed its role
In order to stay in the chronological sequence of
passing the Congressional Budget
1
In
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings - Characteristics and Criticism
This first budget phase has three major stages itself:
b) summer sophistication, and
A. Working of the Federal Budget Process
b) congressional action,
branch.
1. Executive preparation and submission
d) review and audit.
consists of four phases which stretch over a period of three
in the federal budget process.
Control Act of 1974 ,
Act will be described together with the second phase.
The federal budget process or, more accurately, budget cycle
a) executive preparation and submission,
c) execution and control, and
IV. Functioning of the Federal Budget Process prior to
a) spring planning,
actions, therefore, the far-reaching innovations of the 1974
alter the first phase of budget-making within the executive
agencies and other executive instrumentalities.
memoranda on the economic outlook and revenue estimates.
makes his first overall budget decisions regarding programs,
receipts, outlays, and deficit targets. The "letter of the
OMB Director" transformes these presidential decisions into
guidelines and special analyses addressed to the budget- and
then
budgeting
Office of
and Council of
the President
Treasury,
and the several departments,
the President with parallelEconomic Advisers provides
The three major actors in this initial phase of
are the President of the United States, the
influential "troika" of OMB,
50
2
Thus, for fiscal year 1988, beginning on October 1, 1987,
the administrative planning process began in spring 1986,
about 18 months before the third budget phase of execution
and about 2 1/2 years prior to the fourth phase of review
and audit.
Management and Budget (OMB),
Relying on this bundle of information,
a) In early spr~ng, agencies start to plan their program
objectives by reviewing current operations and estimating
future needs and goals. Thus, the single agency or depart-
ment triggers the whole budget cycle. After the budget
offices of each agency have revised these plans and pro-
jections, the agency reports are submitted to the OMB which
discusses these proposals with the heads of the several
departments. Then, the OMB informs the President about the
preliminary objectives of agencies and departments. The very
programs flexible.
the presidential guidelines and new economic conditions. In
several departments leads to the submission of formal esti-
51
the
presi-
federal
however,
the OMB
to keep their
The letter thus
It is generally
whole range ofthe
and lobbyists to receive hints on
by Congress and the OMB that agency budget
for future fiscal years, whereas aiming too low
the agency of necessary reserves
to the departments which are supposed to play the
requests across
second stage of sophisticated analysis within the
review. The OMB compares the agency submittals with
to the OMB in late fall. "Agencies .•. are expected to
The
program bureaus of the various agencies.
b)
mates
be advocates of increased appropriations.
accepted ..•
dential advisers,
The fall opens the final stage of executive budget prepa-
agency chiefs already get in touch with Congressmen,
actual referral of these requests to the OMB,
offices will have a strong interest in justifying their
3
program decisions and appropriation requests." Before the
precedents
general "taxing-and-spending climate." This method of pre-
terminates the spring planning stage in early summer.
deprives
Aiming too high results in deep cuts which may be taken as
checking protects department officials from "aim[ing] too
4
high or too low" in their demands for budget authority.
ration:
contrast
serves as the neutral guardian of the purse trying to weigh
egotistic role of expanding their appropriations,
"budget
2. Congressional Action
and coordination within the executive branch that had no
Economic Advisers) and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
52
the
formal
thus giving an excel-
the President presents
fear that one party will appeal
He or she then refers them to top staff
who may accept them or discuss them once more.
a specialized OMB examiner analyses the
The President's conclusions are sent back to each
First,
departments on the other,
5
activity." Since both parties, OMB on the one side, and the
OMB and agencies restrain each other,
agency requests.
Board.
to the President or make "end runs" to Congress in order to
gain supported by the advice of the "troika" (ONB, Treasury,
The increasing size of the federal government's activities
the Budget Director. Finally, the agency documents reach the
members who prepare the "director's review" together with
third and highest level of review by the President who is a-
get an unfavorable decision of the other party overruled,
lent example of intrainstitutional checks and balances.
After last-minute adjustments,
agency head,
official budget document for the upcoming fiscal year to
6
Congress within 15 days after it convenes in January.
and the lack of executive responsibility in the drafting of
Budget (later the OMB) and by requiring an executive budget
budget proposals necessitated the passage of the Budget and
7
Accounting Act in 1921. By creating the Bureau of the
submittal, the 1921 Act guaranteed a degree of concentration
commend
Committee of its appropriation function in 1865. Both Houses
established a joint committee of 32 members that had to re-
as
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fully
Congress
Congress
First,
First,
including proce-
Congress never esta-
issues.
Later legislative reform efforts,
but it could not make up its mind
The huge, often negative budget balan-
improving congressional control of
in Congress.
Second, President Nixon's aggressive impoundment
after it had deprived the old House Ways and Means
failed shortly after their implementation.
the legislative budget or the omnibus appropriations
budgetary outlay and receipt totals,
the purpose of
of each year's budgetary outlays which is
In the early 1970s, however, two defects in the old legis-
"the procedures which should be adopted by Congress for
dures for establishing and maintaining an overall view
policy aroused even moderate legislators.
8
Public Law 92-599, passed in 1972, expressed Congress's
counterpart
bill,
growing concern about these two
emphasized in the historical chapter,
totals,
could afford this practice under the small surplus budgets
lative budget process became so obvious and threatening that
for a radical restructuring of its budget procedures.
blished a mechanism of comparing revenue and expenditure
had learned its lessons,
immediate action could no longer be postponed.
like
ces of the post-World-War-II period called for better coor-
dination.
of the 19th century.
I.
executive branch in a manner that will assist the Con-
expenditures; •••
budgetary process;
54
impoundment
Title X is of no
the anticipated
Sec. 1 defines Titles I -
legislation.
required the President to report
and reasons of any
402, amending the Budget and Accounting
period,
sec.
date,
coordinated with an overall view of
9
revenues for that year .•• "
(2) to provide for the congressional determination each
(4) to establish national budget priorities; and
year of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and
gress in discharging its duties."
(5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the
Sec. 2 cites the purposes of Titles I - IX:
"(1) to assure effective congressional control over the
Secondly,
Chapter V.D.2.
been considered in separate
the "Impoundment Control Act of 1974", which originally had
promptly to Congress and the Comptroller General.
In April 1973, The Joint Committee issued its final
report. In June 1974, both Houses approved the "Con-
10
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974"
significance at this point, but will form the center part of
signed into law on July 12, 1974.
IX as the "Congressional Budget Act of 1974" and Title X as
amount,
Procedures Act of 1950,
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"(1) to report the matters required to be reported under
titles III and IV •.. [in particular the first and second
concurrent resolutions and the budget which will be
discussed below];
SBC of 16 members. They are recruited from the fiscal and
legislative committes of each House to coordinate the
taxing, spending, and the general legislation of Congress.
The jurisdiction of both committees is circumscribed by
their functions and duties. sec 101(c) and 102(a):
The HBC consists of 23 members, the
make continuing studies of the effect on the
outlays of relevant existing and proposed
(2) to
budget
as standing committees.
a) The participants in the congressional budget process
Before 1974, the four fiscal committees and to some extent
the GAO had been the major actors in legislative budgeting.
In order to achieve the goals of the budget reform, Congress
went beyond mere procedural improvements and created three
new budget institutions:
(1) the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives
(HBC, sec. 101);
(2) the Budget Committee of the Senate (SBC, sec. 102); and
(3) the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, sec. 201 - 203).
The jurisdiction and functions of these new participants in
legislative budgeting are as follows:
(1) and (2): the Budget Committees
The Congressional Budget Act establishes both committees
56
Office of its functions and duties."
legislation and to report the results of such studies to
tax
total
form of
therefore,
They are
is,
a major defect
that
initiative,
one of the central provisions of the
two Budget Committees.
to devise methods of coordinating tax ex-
306,
the HBC or the SBC except in the
revenue, and debt levels. No other committee
The legislative budget
important to note the distinct nature of the
It prohibits any consideration of budget resolu-
to request and evaluate continuing studies of
is
the Congress performs these tasks,
outside
(3)
of
"It
expenditures,
the House on a recurring basis;
functions of the
prior to the establishment of the new congressional
1 1
budget process."
penditures ••• with direct budget outlays ••• ; and
created to guide Congress in the new tasks of setting
national fiscal policy aggregates;
spending,
(4) to review ••• the conduct by the Congressional Budget
The CBO is headed by a Director who is appointed by the
These ample powers of the two Budget Committees are
Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the
enforced by sec.
tions
1974 Act.
lies in the hands of the new Budget Committees.
amendments.
(3) the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
resolution, sec. 201(a)(4).
spending limits.
bills and resolutions for the following four fiscal years.
57
fiscal policies,
and future revenue
including alternative
Either House may remove him by
tax legislation,
202(a),(b). Furthermore, it has to provide
201(a) .
sec. 403 directs the CBO to prepare an estimate
the CBO assumes all the duties of the Joint
specifies the duties and functions of the CBO.
by April 1 of each year, the CBO has to submit a
sec.
sec.
to both Budget Committees,
202
Fourthly,
Thirdly,
Secondly,
Sec.
national budget priorities under various
sec. 202(f).
report
levels of total revenues and outlays and a discussion of
relating them to the budget authority and outlay targets
13
established in concurrent resolutions on the budget."
whether pending legislation harmonizes with taxing and
of costs which would be incurred in carrying out proposed
the tracking of Congress' numerous spending decisions and
Through this method, Congress is periodically being informed
Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures created in
12
1941. Consequently, the CBO became responsible for "score-
estimates,
keeping," an important budgetary function which "involves
all the information particularly requested by Congress.
Committees· of both Houses by furnishing information on
appropriation bills,
Senate,
Its prime task is to assist the Budget and Appropriations
(hereinafter: first resolution) by the May 15 deadline.
arm of Congress with wide-ranging responsibilities in the
participant to take certain actions at specified dates. The
the
the
58
300.
items.
budgetary
Appendix A,
to this meticulously
eleven months before
than 25 different
605(a), the President must submit the
15
estimates to Congress by November 10.
in November,
the CBO operates as an essential, nonpartisan
has to present the formal executive budget
18
which is based upon the unified budget concept.
starts
services
first stage encompasses all actions leading to
I displays the precise timetable set up in sec.
following analysis will adhere
According to sec.
The
In summary,
This proposal contains no less
President
17
document
current
beginning of the new fiscal year on October 1.
completion of the first concurrent resolution on the budget
changes as it examines the budget for the upcoming fiscal
16
year." Then, 15 days after Congress meets in January, the
"The purpose of these projections is to provide a neutral
baseline against which the Congress can consider potential
devised schedule.
The
procedure
totally reorganized legislative budget process, forcing each
Table
procurement of alternative data relevant to
Title III, comprising sections 300 to 311, forms the core
14
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. It prescribes a
b) The first concurrent resolution on the budget
choices.
59
both committees by April 1, sec. 202(f).
information on fiscal policy choices flows from the Joint
of
In
the CBO
Further
Secondly,
sense:
(Nov. 10 to
by March 15,
sec. 301(c).
and representatives
time frame
Additionally,
as mentioned above,
301(d).
Finally,
sec.
informed by offices and committees of both
and proposed appropriations "necessary to support
refined mechanism of consultation and information
are
15) to prepare the first budget resolution.
This
Shortly after the submission of the President's budget,
political branches about estimated receipt and outlay totals
tures,
contrast to their 1946 ancestor, the Joint Budget Committee,
both Budget Committees begin hearings with administration
Economic Committee.
Apr.
The most important ones are the estimated revenues, expendi-
interest groups,
they
issues a comprehensive report on all budget-relevant data to
improved congressional budgeting in a double
each congressional standing committee has to submit to the
the Government in the fiscal year for which the budget is
19
submitted and the 4 fiscal years after that year," infor-
20
mation about the national debt, and finally a comparison of
HBC and the SBC detailed analyses of legislation affecting
future revenue and spending totals,
HBC and SBC use a five-months
officials, members of Congress,
last fiscal year's receipt and outlay estimates with the
21
actual receipt and outlay totals of that year.
60
ditions .•. ;
Appendix A, Table II illustrates these requirements for the
in
the
15,
however,
the Budget Com-
Technical budget( 2) •
not including,
After that date it shall not be
This first concurrent resolution on
of the surplus or the deficit in the
the passage of the first resolution by April
the appropriate level of total budget outlays and
301(a) and (f).
category ... ;
(3) the amount ...
Equipped with such wealth of information,
"(1)
budget which is appropriate in light of economic con-
The final deadline of the first stage in congressional
(4) the recommended level of Federal revenues ... ;
22
(5) the appropriate level of the public debt •.• "
(2) an estimate of budget outlays and an appropriate
of total new budget authority;
level of new budget authority for each major functional
budgeting is May 15.
order to report any bills allowing for new budget authority.
terms like "budget authority," "outlays," "authorizations,"
functional break-down under clause
fiscal year 1976 resolution,
process:
the budget shall set forth:
"appropriations" etc. are explained in Appendix C.
and thus about the size of an eventual deficit. Congress has
mittees are prepared to do the major step in the new budget
learned these lessons well.
sec.
Since the functional break-downs in the first resolution are
this May 15 deadline.
motions to recommit or reconsider the resolution) make sure
61
from
first
301 (a) •
The second
sec.
target-totals,
prohibition of
Secondly, which
15,
budgeting answered
determines the amount
legislative committees
Violations of these
in contrast,
after floor consideration of the
What programs shall be authorized for the
stage of congressional
thus prohibits
totals,
binding but only guide Congress in its future
considerations.
firstThe
It should be kept in mind, however, that this resolution
23
is only a "tentative budget. " Its 19 functional categories
as well as its five major budget aggregates (revenues,
penditure
Sec. 402 (a)
that House and Senate conferees and each floor actually meet
authorizing new programs which would change revenue and ex-
Stingent procedural rules (debate limits,
budget authority, outlays, deficit, and public debt) are not
resolution had been finished also by May
therefore, are not subject to points of order.
budget
c) The appropriation process
two questions:
of budget authority provided for every single program. These
decisions are made by the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees and Subcommittees in the same way as before 1974.
legally
not necessarily identical with the Appropriation Committees'
revenue and expenditure totals are appropriate?
upcoming fiscal year starting on October I?
or appropriation phase,
62
expenditure totals.
jurisdiction, a special accompanying report allocates the
310(a) .sec.
even if Congress
first resolution
a technique called
the impacts of proposed legislation on revenue and
second stage so that Congress stays up-to-date con-this
is not in session on the day of submission,
compared with the spending limits of the
than spending bills reported on a piecemeal basis. Further-
more, the CBO issues periodic scorekeeping reports during
all appropriation bills and to report them jointly to the
floor. This appropriations "package" can more easily be
spending totals to each committee,
"crosswalking."
On or before the 7th day after Labor Day (early September)
all spendirig legislation must be completed, sec. 309. Sec.
307 requires the House Appropriations Committee to bundle
cerning
reaffirms or revises the first resolution,
This document contains the revenue and spending totals held
appropriate by the Budget Committees and directions to the
fiscal committees of both Houses to adjust their bills to
the new revenue floors and spending ceilings of the second
d) The second concurrent resolution on the budget
After all fiscal legislation - guided by the totals and
categories in the first resolution - has been finished,
Congress enters the third stage which leads to the passage
of a second resolution by September, 15. Both Budget Commit-
tees submit to their floors this second resolution which
approved or amended these corrections in the form of a re-
second resolution, sec. 310(b).
Budget Committees which bundle them and transfer them to the
the
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sec.
to the
that
are usually
totals andthe new
two weeks before the fiscal
the fiscal committees
Consequently,
By September 25, Congress must have
Congress must have completed action on the
By September 15,
on the floor.
directions toThese
Two essential enforcement provisions assure
resolution.
e) Reconciliation
approved
year begins,
floors, sec. 310(c).
conciliation bill or a reconciliation resolution,
several committees report their corrective actions
categories of the second resolution must be reconciled with
the totals and functions of all fiscal legislation imple-
mented between the passage of the first and the second
budget resolution. This fourth and final stage of congressi-
onal budgeting is therefore called "reconciliation". The
310(d).
second and the reconciliation resolutions become binding
upon Congress:
(1) Sec. 310(f) forbids any adjournment sine die before the
completion of these resolutions. Thus, Congress cannot
escape by mere inaction.
(2) Sec. 311(a) subjects to points of order all legislation
which, if implemented, would exceed the spending ceilings or
fall short of the revenue floors set forth in the
allotment.
administration retains some, but not unlimited discretion in
budget process established smaller committees with more time
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the
the
but
impedes
is
the OMB
it
Thus,
"Apportionments
regulation
the various agencies
The subsequent breakdown
by a sales contract),
This
the money had already been obligated
resolution.
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 elimina-
third phase of federal budgeting,
first case,
In summary,
In this
When the appropriation bills are enacted in conformity
Outlays can be financed by old and new budget authority.
reconciliation
ted the three major short-comings of the 1946 Act. The new
effectively and equally over the whole year,
executive branch which reassumes responsibility.
floor inaction or overruling.
spontaneous, unreflecting floor amendments.
the disbursement of public money.
for deliberation and stricter enforcement rules against
3. Execution and control
request the OMB for apportionment of funds.
may be defined as the rate at which budget authority may be
24
used." To ensure that appropriated money is spent
of apportionments within the individual agencies is called
during the old fiscal year (e.g.
it had not been disbursed before the actual delivery during
25 26
the new fiscal year. For this and other reasons, budget
In the
apportions the funds usually by quarters.
with the reconciliation process,
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of the old Act:
from it by excluding the loopholes which caused the failure
proposed
but they differ
Congressto
"Federal disbursing officers
every federal officer is legally bound by the
the Antideficiency Act of 1905,
"The President may submit
Finally,
(2 )
twelve Federal Reserve Banks.
phase stems from three presidential reporting duties:
deficiency and supplemental appropriations [he thinks] ne-
A minimum of congressional control during the third budget
provisions of appropriation bills. The following restraints
Bank accounts on the basis of vouchers approved by
27
certifying officers of the various agencies."
Outlays are generally covered by Treasury deposits at the
payment of money - differ in every fiscal year.
make payment by issuing checks against the Federal Reserve
authority - the right to obligate money - and outlays - the
must submit to Congress an up-dated budget stating changes
28
in budget requests and estimates.
resemble
be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.D.2.
cessary because of laws enacted after the submission of the
29
budget or that are in the public interest."
must be transmitted to Congress in a special message under
30
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This procedure will
(1) Twice a year, before April 11 and July 16, the President
(3) Envisaged rescissions and deferrals of budget authority
4. Audit
66
ment ... may not -
the
It also
for the
financial
established
If the GAO
the
The general audit
auditing
The third form of review,
of
it institutes recovery procedures
duties
including the Internal
34
and the Federal Reserve Board.
government in a contract or obliagation
the
The General Accounting Office (GAO),
the accounts of disbursing officers in order to
the legality of each transaction.
( B) in v 0·1v e •••
discovers irregularities,
against the liable officer.
examines
analyse
transactions of an individual agency.
"An officer or employee of the United States Govern-
for the payment of money before an appropriation is
31
made unless authorized by law."
ceeding an amount available in an appropriation •.. ; or
In the final budget phase budgetary power shifts back to
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation ex-
prehensive audit checks the reporting system and selective
Revenue
supervises the accounting systems of the general agencies.
35
GAO auditing can take three different forms. The com-
the books of all federal agencies responsible
custody and payment of public funds,
33
Service
empowered to "investigate all matters related to the
32
receipt, disbursement, and use of public money." It audits
transactions carried out by the executive branch. The GAO is
discharges
by the 1921 Budget Act and responsible solely to Congress,
Congress.
the information gap between the executive branch and
process proved that Congress had the will and courage to
current resolutions on the budget. Democratic sponsorship
38
guaranteed majorities in both Houses for the budget reso-
67
the
1974
1985,
threats
in the
that we
corporations
because
The new budget
and executed during
In the judgment of a
planned in spring
the resolutions encountered severe
Budget Act
will not be completely audited before
the most promising vehicle
applies only to government
the jurisdictional issues and the
the start of the new process, to May 1980,
is
its deadlines for the first and second con-
1987,
"[t]he budget process has survived ...
fiscal responsibility.
thus making the Legislature more independent of
a federal program,
Whereas half of the Republican Senators usually
it brings to existing power structures,
Criticism of the Federal Budget Process under the
Thus,
commercial audit,
and enterprises.
B.
fiscal year
authorized and funded in summer 1986,
spring 1988.
Congress,
that
In general, the 1974 Act was received positively as a
36
useful "step in the right direction." It helped to close
Congressman,
administrative data and policy choices.
From May 1976,
budget process
37
have."
Congress met
lutions.
supported this majority,
face of all •..
(re)assume
}.
rocketed from $6.1 billion in 1974 to $212.3 billion in
an integrated and expedited budget process and thus more
should make Congress aware of spending totals and deficits,
68
1974
When
to give
to give Congress
Republican oppo-
it is designed"Rather,
With rising deficits, however, Repub-
totals in the first or second resolution.
No single provision forced Congress to set up
condemning budget reform for failing to accom-
[the objective of deficit reduction] is like critci-
"But
resistance from Republican Representatives until 1980.
Critics argue that under the new Act the deficit has sky-
plish
but it left open the options of widening or narrowing these
balanced budget
sition decreased because of the deep tax and spending cuts
deficit gaps.
1974 Budget Act had one principal thrust:
1985.
balancing the budget.
Congress the means to examine the budget as a whole and to
41
establish whatever policies or priorities it wishes." The
Act.
"To increase spending, no coordination is necessary; to
42
decrease it, an enormous amount is required." The 1974 Act
licans became again suspicious of the virtues of the
approved by Congress.
President Reagan came into office in 1981,
adopted to promote any particular fiscal policy or set of
40
spending priorities," like curbing expenditures of even
zing Hamlet for not making you laugh - it wasn't necessarily
39
supposed to in the first place." "The Budget Act was not
weight in the control of ,federal spending. The new mechanism
69
lution entailed four unfortunate difficulties:
comings and loop-holes.
first
the new
itself.
floors,
low-prio-
clever sub-
to accomodate
44
expected."
however,
thus leaving to the
Therefore,
But none of these apportionments
the Budget Committees
Later they address mandatory (entitle-
included some clearly identifiable short-
In order to win majority vote on the
These committees then subdivide the allocations
tentative, and accommodating nature of the
and high-priority legislation,
"soft law"- or guideline character of the first reso-
From a perspective of fiscal restraint,
provide this form of coordination.
budget process
binding,
has never been expected and has never been drafted to
Most incentives for unlimited spending stem from the non-
target and does not actually provide the spending
budget resolution: "Fortunately, this resolution only sets a
most legislation that
As mentioned earlier, the Budget Committees - in a pro-
45
cedure called "crosswalking,j - allocate maximum spending
ations ... "
"first budget resolutions had been written
and Senate.
is binding in total or in function.
expenditure ceiling.
a) subcommittee extra spending:
ments)
That will be done in later actions through various appropri-
43
committee chairmen first deal with discretionary,
rity spending bills remaining well below the recommended
This
authority levels to the Appropriations Committees of House
among their subcommittees.
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and block the second resolution.
the limit set in the first resolution.
In
of
the
tough
As a
1.
floors
the
short-time
The
resolutions.
techniqueThis
last-minute,
although the 1974 Act had
Congress must resort to the
from July 1 to October
authorizing and approriating
are not mandatory,
loop-hole:
thus overloading the reconciliation
in the form of continuing
categories,
to control whether these committees actually
find it more and more difficult to cope with the
appropriation legislation is often not finished by
dangerous budget
to reconsider urgent legislation.
Since the totals of the first resolution, let alone
appropriations
process which was made for purely corrective action.
most
deferred it by three months,
the start of the new fiscal year,
order to keep agencies running,
d)
result,
decisions are delayed,
functional
committees
are unable
b) Fiscal ·committes work less concisely under a non-binding
directions contained in the second resolution.
adhered to the directions.
c) These delays reduce the short period left for reconcilia-
tion (Sept. 15 - 25). Hence,
time
first resolution. They engage in discussions with the Budget
Committees and party leaders for last minute bargains.
46
Thereby, they frequently miss their reporting deadlines
full committees and to the floors only a short period of
"coerced appropriations" leads to spending totals far beyond
71
the second resolution. Consequently, Congress had to turn to
the budget for a fiscal year has been agreed to pur-
of
of
re-
spendingthe
first budget resolu-
subjecting legislation
It revised the totals of the
same time,
budget resolutions starting with
and before the end of such fiscal301,
started to recognize that the second budget
continuing resolutions undermine
the two Houses may adopt a concurrent resolution
(or the tax floors if used for tax increases)
year,
suant to sec.
Congress
to."
These
the new fiscal year.
on the budget which revises the concurrent resolution
on the budget for such fiscal year most recently agreed
tion totals were made binding (i.e.,
breaching the totals to points of order) with the start
"At any time after the first concurrent resolution on
the formulation of second
48
fiscal year 1983. At the
10 for fiscal 1982), the Legislature decided to discontinue
tions too late. After a series of missed deadlines (Nov. 28
for fiscal year 1980, Nov. 20 for fiscal 1981, and December
solution overloaded the process and restrained appropria-
a fiscally dishonest practice:
old second resolution together with the passage of the new
47
first resolution of the upcoming fiscal year.
ceilings
This way of escape is offered by sec. 304:
; i
72
G-R-H. They will be thoroughly analysed in Chapter V.E.
"The shift from the second to the first resolution is much
the
one
II of
giving
appropriation
ceilings for
reconciliation
(authorizations)
first resolution
whose consideration
(bundled into
pending
As explained in Chapter
Thus, Congress was able to pass
involving "backdoor-spending" are
to modify
(budget authority granted outside
time
have recently been subjected to reconcilia-
Even authorization bills,
difficulties
these procedural issues, many critics blamed the
·more
Budget Reconciliation Acts
402(a)),
the first problem was solved by G-R-H that moved all
subject of Title IV of the 1974 Act and Subpart
Besides
[sec.
budget. The
Omnibus
the
package) already in mid-summer 1981 and 1982.
cuts spending twice by curtailing programs
1974 Act for neglecting off-budget agency supervision and
Congress
legislation.
off-budget agencies - except social security - back into the
III.,
"backdoor-spending"
more than a matter of timing: it also changes the focus of
49
reconciliation." Reconciliation now begins immediately
after the approval of the first budget resolution,
regular appropriation process).
should normally be completed before the
tion in order to reduce budget authority
50
certain programs. Applied in this manner,
and funds (appropriations).
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Constitution - Senate Joint Resolution 58
Federal Constitution. Provided that a motion to change or to
is
two
Con-
of the2
congressional
Act has made
5, cl.
1974
punish its Members for
to the United States
the
This option
2
904 (a) (2) of the 1974 Act.
and, with the Concurrence of
Budget surpluses or deficits were regarded as
conscious of budgetary totals and their impact on
expel a Member," Art. I, sec.
As pointed out earlier,
the Rules of its Proceedings,
The second flaw is inherent in every legislation.
a)
expressly reserved in sec.
two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present •• ,"
1
Rule XXVII of the House of Representatives.
disorderly Behavior,
thirds,
suspend the legislative rules finds the necessary two thirds
at its whim: "No rule shall be suspended except by a vote of
majority, Congress may depart from self-imposed restrictions
gress is the master of its own rules: "Each House may deter-
they were not judged as either desirable or detrimental. The
b)
mine
awareness of facts, not the approval of fiscal restraint.
new budget process was supposed to promote
the economy.
useful figures in the process of making fiscal choices, but
Congress
A. A Balanced Budget Amendment
to reduce federal spending, let alone to balance the budget:
For two reasons, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 failed
V. How to Reduce the Federal Budget Deficit?
74
An additional avenue for avoiding the enforcement provisions
[backdoor-spending] may be waived or suspended in the Senate
or IV
5
limit,
Senator
904 (b):
the United
a quorum being
"Congress reaf-
1974 Budget Act
As a matter of legislative
namely the national debt as the
that budget outlays of
title III [new budget process]
Congress has raised this ceiling every
of
instead of "obligation" and "may" instead of
however,
or by the unanimous consent of the Senate." This
second statutory restraint, the public debt
its commitment
first limitation is without any bite:
The
routine,
accumulation of past deficits.
tial budget aggregate,
"shall" the provisions remain unenforceable.
a concrete dollar amount which obligations issued by the
imposes a more precise ceiling on ptiblic spending by stating
this provision might have made Congress aware of an essen-
federal government may not exceed. Like the 1974 Budget Act,
"commitment"
the two existing statutory limits to public spending worked.
Yet a balanced budget amendment would be unnecessary, if
firms
250 waivers of just one section of the
3
between 1976 and 1984.
States Government for a fiscal year may not be more than the
4
receipts of the Government for that year." By saying
Barry Goldwater reported that the Senate has approved over
present,
The
by a majority vote of the Members voting,
waiver does not even require a qualified majority.
of the Congressional Budget Act is offered by sec.
"Any provision
75
year in order to adjust it to increasing annual deficits.
Since Congress did not want to cast an extra public vote on
is
the
scrutiny
This silent
its complicated
the appropriate
increasing .••
shall prepare an
Despite
the House of Representatives
it resorted to a "legal fiction"
Upon the engrossment of such joint
the debt limit automatically.
the enrolling clerk •.•
Rule XLIX of
The vote by which the conference report on the
the press and the public.
engrossment of a joint resolution •••
concurrent resolution ••• was agreed to in the House .••
the difference between such limit and such appropriate
from the amount of the statutory limit on the public
level.
statutory limit on the public debt by an amount equal to
resolution it shall be deemed to have passed the House
6
of Representatives ••• "
shall be deemed to have been a vote in favour of such
joint resolution •••
debt ••. ,
lution on the budget setting forth as
level of the public debt ••• an amount which is different
"Upon the adoption by Congress •. of any concurrent reso-
The public debt limit set by the most recent joint
7
resolution is $2.078 trillion.
of
diction,
therefore worth quoting:
method is deceptive because it operates beyond the
a higher debt ceiling,
which raises
the most drastic means to remove deficit control from the
majority. Appendix A, Table III quotes the text of SJR 58.
frequently that it severely impedes the enforcement of the
76
budget
amend-
federal
The only
a federal
found a two
is applied so
balancedimposing aamendment
all statutory provisions meant to control or
to changing congressional majorities.
only balanced budget proposal which has
In summary,
A new Senate effort to initiate a balanced budget
of order against alleged rule violations,
subject
requirement as a substantial limit to federal spending.
1. The working of Senate Joint Resolution 58 (SJR 58)
constitutional
uncertainties of simple legislative majorities:
exception, the two-thirds majority needed to overrule points
new budget timetable. The following discussion will analyse
reduce public deficits have a major flaw in common: they are
thirds majority in one House of Congress is SJR 58, approved
8
by a vote of 69 to 31 on August 4, 1982, but rejected in
the House of Representatives as HRJR 350 on Oct. 1, 1982, by
9
a vote of 236 to 187, 46 short of the required two thirds
Theoretically, there are four ways to reduce the
1 1
budget deficit by amending the Constitution:
b) a spending limitation amendment,
The
ment won a majority of 66 over 34 votes on March 25, 1986,
10
just one vote short of a two-thirds majority of 67.
a) a balanced budget amendment,
77
For these reasons, the Senate decided to adopt alternative
d) in the form of a balanced budget/tax limitation amend-
c) a tax limitation amendment, and
d) a combination of these three options.
Alternative a) eliminates future deficits, but it does not
It
in-
levels of
thus keeping
personal
should not be balanced at1
the level at which the budget must be in balance.
the crucial substantive limit by requiring that the
in sec.
Sec. 2 of the amendment should be read first.
or changes in the consumer price index,
budget
imposes
ment.
expected receipts for the upcoming fiscal year do not grow
faster than the national income in the last calendar year.
This limitation should then be read together with sec. 1
providing that the planned outlays for each fiscal year may
not be greater than the planned receipts calculated under
sec. 2. "Put another way, sec. 2 states that the balanced
public sector size stable in relation to the private econo-
my. Option b), however, may fail to balance the budget, if
the Legislature votes for tax cuts. Variation c) shares this
defect because it does not exclude government borrowing as a
source of revenue.
come,
link spending to a fixed growth rate of GNP,
Rising expenditures can be compensated by higher taxation,
particularly when higher inflation pushes an increasing
number of taxpayers into higher tax-brackets. Option b) is
able to achieve what alternative a) could not accomplish: to
prescribe
78
of both Houses may waive the requirement that actual outlays
To enforce the budget balance, the last sentence of sec. 1
to
to
This
number
actual
itself:
because
instance
spending
recessional
that
requirement,
according
sees
sufficient
income.
Again, this is
for
budget
Then,
the
This
the
actual receipts may
deemed
national
receipts,
recession.
outlays.
thethan
some light on how Congress
and the President to ensure
to be cut to balance
short of planned
smaller majority was
increases are more unpopular than new spending
sheds
fall
have
a
grow faster
does not work for receipts:
expenditures would only aggravate
do not exceed planned
Congress
a supermajority of three fifths of the whole
a majority of all members of both Houses may permit
an unpredicted economic
tax
to
not
the economy and since outlays cannot exceed receipts,
true for the receipt side of the budget:
programs,
Only
taxes
since
difference
sec. 2
trends.
not
shall not be greater than estimated outlays.
reduced
during
outlays
however,
very well
indirect spending limit.
balanced budget- with a tax limitation amendment implies an
directs
than
the proposed amendment will also establish the fiscal norm
that federal outlays cannot grow faster than the economy - a
13
de facto spending limit ... " Thus, the combination of a
would
receipts and outlays that consume an increasing proportion
12
of the national economy." "Since taxes cannot grow faster
79
of three-fifths of all members of both Houses. Remember that
repayments of debt principal from total outlays in order to
6,
to
in
for
not
For
Sec.
amendment,
spending
transactions.
exist.
other
purpose.
the amendment does
off-budget
amendment's
on- and
has created a pro-spending bias
Futhermore,
votes to increase spending would, under
a constitutional limit on the public debt
between
lobbying,
In the opinion of the sponsors of the
an evasion of the
imposes
of the amendment contains an emergency clause
this pro-spending incentives by a new anti-spending
consitutional balanced budget mandate was supposed
a simple majority!
the first time,
pro-spending votes that does not presently
increase taxes or by votes to reduce
14
programs commensurately.
Sec. 3
th e
by creating a countervailing political disadvantage for
"The ... amendment would reduce this bias toward spending
normal circumstances, have to be accompanied by votes to
prevent new taxes. This attitude of implementing new expen-
prohibit
distinguish
diture programs without concomitant tax increases, nourished
the statutory ceiling on the national debt could be expanded
by massive
by
bias:
finally,
Congress.
offset
which cannot be increased unless approved by a supermajority
war times. Sec. 4 excludes borrowing from total receipts and
Houses and have then been ratified by at least three fourths
b) constitutionalizing a controversial economic theory, and
a) assembling an unprecedented constitutional convention,
80
They
to be
through the
Never has the constitu-
and Rose Friedman ("free [s] the
17
taxation") , James Buchanan and
19
Wildavsky, and William A. Niska-
legislatures requesting Congress to call a
the budget and the economy. In contrast,
21
scholars, including Laurence Tribe, Gerald
23
James Ely, either reject or doubt the
like Milton
Art. V of the United States Constitution
risks of a constitutional convention according to
They all view the amendment as the most promising way
the several state legislatures.
The
of
several state
2 •
judiciary.
c) enforcing spending cuts or tax increases
tion been amended on the application of two thirds of the
been proposed by a majority of at least two thirds of both
All twenty-six amendments to the Federal Constitution have
alleged advantages of a balanced budget amendment.
fear the risks of
to stabilize
prominent legal
22
Gunther, and
The amendment has been endorsed by President Reagan in his
16
1986 State of the Union Address and by renowned scholars of
people ..• from excessive
18
Richard Wagner, Aaron
20
nen.
economics
Consequently, an off-budget deficit would have
15
compensated by an on-budget surplus.
tional convention to propose a balanced budget amendment to
majority of thirty-four states have applied for a constitu-
when the two still missing applications will be filed with
in
81
from
Representative Ed
the necessary two thirds
Yet for the first time
No one can predict, if and
but comes to a more radical
"With respect to the central
the convention really cannot be limited,
this view,
debating every political controversy
"If
Thirty-two out of
the risk of severely distorting the will of the
In a recent interview with the author,
runs
constitutional question - whether a convention could and
would be limited to a single object - I am convinced that
25
there is a serious risk that it would not. " Prof. Charles
Black supports
conclusion:
commisssion
of a "runaway" convention:
abortion to school prayers. Prof. Gunther sees the same risk
then an illimitable convention is the thing the states have
26
to ask for."
tional convention. Departing from the limited issue of ba-
b) Secondly, in Mr. Jenkins's opinion, the convention method
lancing the budget, the convention might turn into a roving
a) Nothing in Art. V limits the jurisdiction of a constitu-
Jenkins (D - Ga.), member of the House Budget Committee,
24
expressed his concerns about the convention process:
the United States Constitution.
Congress.
convention.
their history the American people are very close to such a
convention proposing amendments.
accepted a constitutional convention consisting of executive
the legislative process to balance the budget.
how to select the delegates of the several states. What if a
If
the
Who
its
82
equal
purpose
Congress
of
delegates,
alleging the
prescribe
and the state
30
errors ••• "
What if
why should a con-
to
bounds
favorite
Would the Framers have
the
his
however, to reject the convention
cites a passage from "The Federalist":
Mr. Jenkins would prefer a revision of
transgressed
As of yet there are no procedural rules of
simply appoints
equally enables the general,
to originate the amendment of
as "inapposite and unavailable for the
may propose limited amendments,
Gunther refuses to accept this notion of two
Gunther sees additional problems of procedure:
or vetoes the convention's proposals,
V] •••
Governor
Prof.
It would be too simple,
For these reasons,
Prof.
governments
stitutional convention be not allowed to do so?
amendment procedures. The argument he presents is of con-
31
siderable weight: The 1787 convention expressly rejected a
in his commentaries,
American people.
Congress
State
refusing to hold a general election?
ignores
alternative
"[Art.
of addressing a specific ••• shortcoming in the Constitu-
29
tion." In analysing the meaning of Art. V, Justice Story,
has the "Kompetenzkompetenz", the power
27
rules of procedure for the convention?
convention has
28
jurisdiction?
\
appointees like the German upper house, the "Bundesrat"?
83
Justice Marshall declared: "It cannot be presumed that any
vention which, after its assemblage, would be entitled to
was to
without
the Framers
effect
to be
The amendment ini-
second avenue for
32
v. Madison, Chief
it cannot be denied,
Instead,
intended
view this
neither language nor purpose
is not only not prohibited but
this conclusion by reserving all
Bator's
Gunther asserts that this difference
Prof.
however,
constitution is
Prof.
recourse if intransigent central authority
this difference in degree,
Founding Fathers opened a
the Constitution. In Marbury
to the States which are neither prohibited to them
the superiority of the traditional amendment process
Despite the mentioned risks,
tiative power,
powers
nor delegated to the Federal Government.
Xth Amendment confirms
represents a profound political protection for us, as a
35
people, against the tyranny of central government." The
proposal of a balanced budget amendment.
provide "some
explicitly granted to the States.
of Art. V forbid a constitutional convention limited to the
Despite
adamantly refuses to correct .•• a deeply felt constitutional
34
insufficiency or flaw." He "think[s] the Art. V convention
clause in the
33
effect .•• " In
that the
proves
amending
initiated by Congress.
make proposals.
conceeded only the right to apply for a constitutional con-
suggestion by James Madison to allow two thirds of the
states to propose an amendment.
similar to that established in the United States, was to be
36
attempted." The constitution as the "supreme Law of the
economic theory into the constitution
ence, rather than to open a way for experiments,
39
by mere speculation or theory."
a
a
of
to
of
84
later,
either
consti-
such
economic
security
power
suggested
dissent in
applying
Federalist:
"[A]
According
parliamentary
controversial
famous
that the
particular
incorporate
Thirty years
Lochner,
the safety valve to let
38
and excitements," "to
constitutional
amendments.
inserting a
wrote in The
to protect the Constitution
opinion, Art. V is "stamped
Holmes wrote:
In his
no
had struck down a New York
"believed,
and caution, and to follow experi-
regulation.
of the Federal Constitution, must be
Britain,
risks of
easy mutability and perpetuation
effervescences
Framers
unnecessary
In Madison's
37
propriety"
discussing the doctrine of
and
intended to embody a
majority opinion in
if one may say so,
both
and
balanced budget amendment
economic theory?
40
New York, Justice
in Great
not
The
was,
of strict scrutiny,
temporary
or could be obtained,
the
no constitution paramount to the government,
hasty
every mark of
Admissibility
Does
James Madison,
maximum working hours
standard
tution is
41
theory."
Lochner v.
speculative
secure due deliberation,
off all
discovered faults.
guarded against
from
amendment
with
Justice Story, the
3.
Land", Art. VI, sec. 2
existed
sovereignty
"Where
dealt with the right to vote and with issues of presidential
tution. Economic policies were held to be a governmental,
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
85
century
to adopt
Professors
the Nebbia
legislation
non-procedural
and enduring like
in Lochner,
Although Lochner has never been
44
Skrupa (1963)
dissent
fundamental,
and equal protection (Vth and XIVth
New York the Supreme Court affirmed
Unlike the Lochner majority,
in Lochner by upholding a New York milk
reject a balanced budget amendment:
Holmes'
Supreme Court in Ferguson v.
values proposed to become part of the Consti-
A balanced budget amendment, in contrast, would
the
in Nebbia v.
due process,
a tax and spending limit related to the growth of
dissent
welfare,
Justice
48
and Ely
refused to read a free market theory into the Consti-
however,
price regulation.
public
court
46
Relying on Madison's requirement of a "discovered fault"
Holmes'
tution must be general,
Eight out of eleven amendments adopted in the last
not a constitutional, domain: "[A] state is free
b) Secondly,
liberty,
burden the Constitution with a substantive,
a) They interpret "discovered fault" as a structural flaw in
49
the process of political participation and representation.
and to enforce that policy by
43
adapted to this purpose."
reaffirmed Holmes' opinion: "The doctrine that prevailed in
45
Lochner ... has long since been discarded."
overruled,
GNP.
mandate:
and on
47
Tribe
succession.
constitutional amendment.
government prohibited from depriving any person of his or
fiscal flexibility in times of recession and that it binds
to
the
86
the
less
federalthe
empower
51
taxes"
as well as
55
Confederation?
Isn't
theories about
collect even
52
several States,"
53
Does it not
and more specific than these
lay and
50
contested
Aaron Wildavsky rejects Tribe's and
sec. 4 not define the scope of the
"to
It is true that the amendment restricts
federal public debt?
Specific,
the
less structural,
government
and fiscal principles?
apportionment among the
the regular legislative process, not through a
For these reasons,
57
Ely's arguments.
economic
provisions?
through
But is the Federal Constitution really neutral in terms of
Amendments).
by the states? Why is a balanced budget requirement
spending and taxing limits can be waived by qualified con-
58
gressional majorities, and amendments can be repealed.
future generations who might be fiscally more liberal. But
fundamental,
her property without due process of law or from taking this
56
property without just compensation? Does Art. I, sec. 10
advantages of an annual budget balance should be enforced
regulate interstate and foreign commerce
54
bankruptcies, and to pay the debts of the
federal
"without
not forbid the "impairing of the Obligations of Contracts"
validity of
Does Amendment XIV,
therefore be hard to circumvent.
4. The risks of evading and enforcing the amendment
ses thereby a major accounting escape device. SJR 58 would
a
no
and
87
for
former
federal
included
and foreclo-
"uncertainty
Framers
a deep recession,
of
a declaration of war
by declaration of National
the minimum conditions
59
objectives," there is
a monster
a recession,
also requires a balanced budget,
a balanced budget amendment would
borrowing from receipts
into
however, would be an amendment as the one
considered
sec. 2
Congress may,
a series of terrorist acts? Under such a provi-
its
they
excludes
their limited fiscal
that
contains only one exception:
Kenneth Dam's warning "that the
responsibilities
what
House:
Sec. 4
More dangerous,
sion the amendment could be easily undermined, as
62
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has warned recently.
depression,
is a national emergency:
the
"except
proposed by Representative Alexander but later rejected in
Emergency, adopt a statement of receipts and outlays in
61
which total outlays are greater than total receipts." What
2 •
SJR 58
would allow Congress to suspend the provisions of sec. 1 and
a) Evasion
turn this minimum
60
inefficiency."
fiscal
achieving
reason to believe that in times of almost unlimited
only
Despite
88
shortly before a general election where the electorate can
cut new presidential spending programs or if the President
the
the
insti-
largely
second,
this occurs
if Congress
First, Congress and
Unless
Only as a final resort,
to monitor the actions of both of
Judiciary Committee which reported
for complying with the amendment;
taking any counteractions.
Senate
that both Congress - ignoring the necessary waiver
the responsible Congressmen or the President,
scheme of self-enforcement would work,
procedures
self-enforcing and self-monitoring.
these branches of government •••
The
public is expected •••
"[I]t. .. is expected that the amendment will be
This
Congress and the President each are expected to monitor
the President each are expected to establish appropriate
the activities of the other branch ..• ; and, finally, the
there anticipated to be a significant role for the
63
judicial branch."
and only under the most compelling circumstances ••• , is
b) Judicial enforcement
tution to mandate a rebalancing of the budget.
amendment bill saw no problems with the enforcement of the
amendment:
remove
assume
Supreme Court of the United States remains the only
majorities - and the President permit a deficit budget
without
succeeded in impounding excessive appropriations. But let us
funding parochial schools as violative of the Establishment
(1) Standing
to have standing:
89
the
type of
[he] must
the standing
the merits of an
Flast v. Cohen
67
Mellon (1923)
show that
Secondly,
In Flast the Court announced a
agree that law suits challenging a
the taxpayer must
65
status [as a taxpayer] and the
taxpayer must establish a logical link
the amendment would overcome
for the first time granted standing to a federal
[his]
the
commentatorsTwo
In order to compel the Court to address
between
this requirement,
legislative enactment attacked •.•
"First,
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under
establish a nexus between that status and the precise
(1) standing,
challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional
alleged violation of the amendment, a litigant would have to
64
clear three procedural hurdles of justiciability:
barrier announced by the Supreme Court in
66
(1968). In distinguishing Frothingham v.
violation of
taxpayer who had challenged a congressional appropriation
the Court
Clause of the 1st Amendment.
"double nexus" test a federal taxpayer must satisfy in order
(3) equitable relief.
(2) the political question doctrine, and
90
under the bifurcated Flast test.
an organization dedicated to the separation of church and
it
it
that
Congress
that
the court
taxing and
challenged an
imposed by a
1st Amendment.
Services Act of
it
secondly,
asserting
Therefore,
two reasons:for
recently proposed for Chief Justice by
1949 statute not under its
test
tax and expenditure limits
not a congressional action;
challenged the conveyance on the ground
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
a litigant would attack taxing and spending legis-
Federal Property and Administrative
the Flastof
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressio-
68
nal taxing and spending power .•• "
ty Clause of Art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2.
executive,
1949,
the
exceeded the
balanced budget amendment, he could show sufficient standing
had enacted the
spending power, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1, but under the Proper-
The Flast standard has been upheld in the recent decision
69
of Valley Forge College v. Americans United (1982). Under
violated the Establishment Clause of the
conveyed federal "surplus property" to petitioner church-
related college without asking for any payment. Respondents,
President Reagan, revised the Court of Appeals and denied
70
respondents' standing. Their claim failed the first prong
lation under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1,
state,
Justice Rehnquist,
Since
91
tual standing requirements.
Court has refrained from adjudicating ±abstract questions of
as
of
in
there
federal
exclude
litigant
standing
Rehnquist
favourable
calls for a
"injury
the federal
may
a
Justice Rehnquist
satisfied,
by
This
which
however,
the "case and contro-
71
III limit[s]"Art.
in Rehnquist's prudence analysis
general understanding of the
in Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1
be "likely to be redressed
If this minimum standard is
75
"prudential principles"
One passage
not under the political question doctrine,
At an irreducible minimum,
actual or threatened injury as a consequence
72
unconstitutional action.
issues of separation of powers under the standing
to be particularly relevant to a future
to a role consistent with a system of separated
still
In section II of his opinion,
This approach is completely innovative:
doctrine,
powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of
77
resolution through the judicial process. '"
analyses
personal,
becomes more concrete:
ces,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in
76
the respresentative branches." At another point Rehnquist
courts
appears
must
74
decision."
did not decide on the second Flast prong and further even-
doctrine.
wide public significance' which amount to ±general grievan-
attacking a violation of a balanced budget amendment: "[T]he
elaborated on his
are
the alleged
73
fact"
judicial power ±to those disputes which confine
standing.
versy" requirement
if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization
amendment would clear the hurdles of the Flast "double
prudential reasons founded on separation-of-powers concerns.
the
for
this
92
v. Carr
standing
the other
it is probable
representative
confrontations
Why, then, did he
79
Richardson in his
be beneficial to
to negative the actions of
seems likely or at least possible that
in order to be able to dismiss a claim at
The public confidence essential to the former
it
Rehnquist court will dismiss a law suit
the given Supreme Court rationale,
test and of the Valley Forge "irreducible minimum"
this passage from United States v.
between the life-tenured branch and the
Under
either.
of our power
80
branches?'"
branches of government will not ...
and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode
With Justice Rehnquist's restrictive approach to standing,
"'[R]epeated and essentially head-on
that a plaintiff attacking a violation of a balanced budget
future
however,
nexus"
standard. The threatened injury would consist of future tax
81
increases to compensate for presently excessive spending.
cite
early stage of justiciability analysis.
ongoing explanations about standing:
requirement
Justice Brennan did in the landmark case of Baker
78
(1962). Rehnquist seems inclined to expand the
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(3) Equitable relief
(2) Political question doctrine
the
decision
coordinate
manageable
by various
under which
and
to a
standards
issue
it could observe that it
pronouncements
three
discoverable
economic growth rates and fiscal
of the
Second,
to transform a court
emphasize that its recalculation of
it might avoid a decision on the
the Court could argue that the Taxing and
expresses a "textually demonstrable con-
Who would be the expert to doubt and refute
First,
taxes would increase "the potentiality of em-
data and its consequent orders to cut spending or
ciability analysis,
question.
stitutional commitment
82
political department."
Spending Clause
estimates.
"lack[ed] ... judicially
83
standards" to calculate
to raise
Supreme Court might
economic
merits by declaring the petitioner's challenge a political
Should the Supreme Court reach this second step of justi-
congressional and presidential computations? Third, the
barrassment from multifarious
84
departments in one question."
85
Thus, Baker v. Carr offers
the Supreme Court could reasonably dismiss the action as
involving a nonjusticiable political question.
the political branches
Would the plaintiff's asserted injury be "amenable to
86
judicial remedy?" Should the court order declaratory
87
relief as in Powell v. McCormack, thus leaving it to
priate than a constitutional amendment.
B. Gramm - Rudman - Hollings
and disturbing the balance of powers. To avoid this dilemma,
to
94
injunctive
if the Court
the balanced
fiscal legis-
it becomes heavily
the amendment cannot be
represents the first effortin the Senate,
law suits against alleged violations of the
or impoundments? Or should it devise
"Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act" of
1
1985, named Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (G-R-H) after its
Consequently, whatever the Court may hold,
The
balance the budget on the statutory level. Prior legislative
2
enactsments like the Antideficiency Act of 1905 or the Con-
3
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
intended to control public spending, but they did not aim at
budget amendment leads into a serious dilemma:
enforced by the judiciary, but can only be self-enforced. If
co-authors
entangled with issues of fiscal management, "matters beyond
89
[its] expertise," thus embarrassing the political branches
the Court decides on the merits,
dismisses
relief, thereby "fundamentally modif[ying] the tripartite
88
system of government?"
lation
upholding petitioner's claim into concrete
a statutory approach to balance the budget seems more appro-
under the foregoing considerations,
amendment as nonjusticiable - the more likely alternative
Dec.
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- for fiscal year 1986: $171.9 billion,
- for fiscal year 1987: $144 billion,
on1991
The most important
the federal budget
through presidential se-
divided into five Parts and
prescribes the maximum deficit
takes G-R-H may be drawn from a
251 - 257 (Part C) which contain the core enforce-
to zero with the beginning of fiscal year
thrust of G-R-H is to reduce
sec.
G-R-H comprises 31 sections,
How seriously Congress
The
October 1, 1990. Sec. 201(a)
the precise budgetary goal of an annual fiscal equilibrium
provisions "for the purpose of balancing the budget are
1. The operation of the amended budget process
first budget resolution immediately binding, and
statement by Senator Evans (R - Wash.) who tried to explain
questration orders.
1986: "Gramm-Rudman had a proper impact ••. There was a great
the required two thirds majority in the Senate on March 25,
covering 64 pages on the statute books.
b)
deficit
reluctance to amend the Constitution when Gramm-Rudmann let
4
us look at this statutorily."
Act by setting maximum deficit amounts and by making the
a) sec. 201 (Part A, Subpart I) which amends the 1974 Budget
ment mechanism in case of excessive expenditures: automatic,
amounts for the fiscal years until 1991:
of revenues and expenditures.
why a new balanced budget amendment proposal failed to win
across-the-board spending cuts
debt would grow by $531.9 billion up to a total of about
annual budget resolution was dropped; the first budget reso-
6
301(f)1I of the 1974 Act as amended. The revised G-R-H
guide
second
federal
to
the
the
unless a new
after G-R-H's
billions would
the second budget
a reconciliation
Later
However, there is one
even if
"sec. 311(a)1I and IIsec.
Therefore,
the first resolution becomes binding
But this first resolution became not
under the 1974 Act,
to pay the interest and principal on
the start of the new fiscal year on Octo-
the only congressional document
these immense reductions the national public
with its passage,
G-R-H leaves the basic structure of the budget
spent
became binding in the form of
5
or a reconciliation bill.
Under G-R-H,
to be
trillion by 1990.
1.
Otherwise,
immediately
ber
binding before
lution became
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- for fiscal year 1988: $108 billion,
- for fiscal year 1989: $72 billion,
- for fiscal year 1990: $36 billion, and
- for fiscal year 1991: $0 billion.
To attain· this goal, $36 billion have to be cut from the
annual budget starting with fiscal 1987. It should be noted,
fiscal legislation.
resolution
resoultion
important exception:
process under the 1974 Act untouched.
deficit ceilings will have expired.
law mandated budget surpluses for the time
this elevated level of national indebtedness,
have
government adhered to the G-R-H timetable,
that despite
$2.5
97
budget timetable requires Congress to complete action on the
provisions from the uncertainties of simple majority voting.
(2) The budget resolution is not only binding upon future
legislation but is bound itself by the maximum deficit
thus
Sept.
bills
resolution
early Septem-
the enforcement
30 (formerly:
took an important step to free
to be completed by June
ber) .
only concurrent resolution on the budget by April 15,
has
Congress
reconciliation must be finished by June 15 (formerly:
25), and House action on regular appropriations
preceding the old deadline by one month.
All other deadlines of reporting or deciding are also set
at an earlier stage of the budget process: most importantly,
amounts listed in "sec. 3(7)." Hence, the budget
The crucial points of reform, therefore, are the three new
functions assigned to the budget resolution by G-R-H:
(1) The budget resolution passed by April 15 restricts imme-
diately every subsequent tax or expenditure legislation.
This binding character of the budget resolution is enforced
by "sec. 311(a)" which subjects legislation departing from
the limits set in the resolution to points of order. The
enforcement of "sec. 311(a)" itself is assured by "sec.
904(b)" which requires a three fifths majority in the Senate
in order to waive or suspend "sec. 311(a)." Remember that
under sec. 904(b) of the original 1974 Act a simple majority
in the Senate was sufficient for any rule changes. Thus,
resolution the two Houses may adopt after the passage of the
declared war, or during a recession as defined in sec.
254(a) of G-R-H, may Congress resort to less stringent rule
waiver procedures, "sec. 301(i)(2), 311(a), and 904(b)."
2. The process of sequestration
If all these limits to deficit spending - outlay ceilings,
points of order, strict rule waiver requirements - turn out
to be ineffective, Congress imposes upon itself a process of
automatic, across-the-board spending cuts in the form of
98
to every budget
fiscal legislation to
fifths required for rule
"sec. 304." Only in the case of a
301(i)(I)(B)" applies
G-R-H oppresses the "coercive appropriations"
the tool which links
resolution,
supermajority of three
Finally,
The
April 15
(3)
waivers in "sec.
induced by subcommittee "maneuvering." "Crosswalking," i.e.
the allocation of limited budget authority to committees and
the subdivision of these allocations by the committees to
their subcommittes, is enforced through points of order,
"sec. 302(a), (c), and (f)" and equally reassured by "sec.
904(b)."
serves as
the overall deficit ceilings mandated for fiscal years 1986
to 1991. "Sec. 301(i)" enforces this mechanism in the same
way as "sec. 311(a)" enforces the binding nature of the re-
solution. ~'Sec. 301(i)" may be waived only by qualified
majorities of three fifths in the Senate ["sec. 904(b)"] and
House ["sec. 301(i)(1)(B)"].
cient to initiate automatic cuts.
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Directors of OMB and CBO, sec. 251(a)
is
(GAO) ,
total budget
This process
and reports by the
251 - 257) of G-R-H, entitled:
the amount by which the estimated
Consequently, the federal government
determinations,
about six weeks prior to the beginning of
"First,
sent for final revision to the Comptroller
to know that for fiscal years 1987 - 1990 a
(CBO) ,
submit a report to the Comptroller General "estimating
important
Initial estimates,
By August 20,
sec. 251(a)(3).
sequestration process.
deficit excess of $10 billion is needed to trigger the
The prime task of OMB and CBO is to calculate the spending
reductions necessary to eliminate the entire deficit excess,
could increase the public debt by another $40 billion until
7
1991 without violating G-R-H. For fiscal years 1986 and
1991 any sum exceeding the maximum deficit amounts is suffi-
any deficit excess for such fiscal year," sec. 251(a)(2). It
the budget base levels of total revenues and
the new fiscal year on Oct. 1, the Directors of OMB and CBO
is
outlays for [the new] fiscal year, identifying the amount of
must
a)
Office
and final~y issued by the President.
regulated in Part C (sec.
General as the head of the General Accounting Office
"Emergency Powers to Eliminate Deficits in Excess of Maximum
sequestration orders which are initiated by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget
Deficit Amounts."
"In the event that the Directors of OMB and CBO are unable
calculate the total amount of outlay savings from cancelling
certain programs like guaranteed student loans, medicare,
100
is to
fiscal
251 (a) (5)]
the extent
[sec.
special rules apply to
cuts must be made on a
indexed retirement and
256(c)-(f). Fourth, in the
four
sec.
Third,
One-half of the deficit excess
the maximum deficit amount for the
their estimates be averaged to
outlay savings to be achieved by cutting
standard against which all budget decisions
the
that
is calculated.
come from defense programs and one-half from non-defense
8
programs. " Representative Les Aspin (D -Wis.) "believes
that this -50-50 formula is taking on a life of its own,
to agree on any of these calculations,
requires
OMB and CBO must be based upon the budget concept of the
12
current services estimates, sec. 251(a)(6).
necessary to produce a single, consistent set of data that
11
achieves the required deficit reductions." The reports of
case of further reduction needs,
uniform percentage basis which is computed differently for
10
defense and non-defense programs.
and other health programs,
calculate
automatic spending increases for
disability programs.
becoming the
will be measured ..• 'The Gramm-Rudman legacy may be the
9
enshrining in stone of 50-50.'" Second, OMB and CBO
deficit exceeds
year
President may not modify or recalculate any of the esti-
mates, determinations [etc] ... set forth in the report" of
which it applies.
At the beginning of the new fiscal year, OMB and CBO (Oct.
5) and GAJ (Oct. 10) issue revised reports indicating to
c) Presidential sequestration orders, sec. 252
If the Comptroller General's estimates indicate that the
maximum deficit amount for a particular fiscal year between
1987 and 1990 will be exceeded by more than $10 billion, the
accor-
"[t]he
becomes
year to
that
their initial
The Comptroller
which states
This initial order
252(a)(3)
1 with the start of the fiscal
General.
entire deficit excess down to the maximum
The President must act in "strict
recent legislation has changed
by September 1, must issue an "initial order"
with sec.
extentwhat
the Comptroller
effective on Oct.
dance"
eliminating the
deficit amount.
President,
saving spe~ifications of OMB and CBO.
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b) Report to the President and Congress by the Comptroller
General, sec. 251(b)
By August 25, the head of the GAO shall submit a report to
Congress and the President, based upon the estimates and
General must take "due regard for the data, assumptions, and
methodologies used" by the Directors, sec. 251(b) (1). He is
entitled to make his own findings, but "shall explain fully
any differences between the contents" of his and the
Directors' reports, sec. 251 (b) (2).
253.
Within two days after the submission of the revised GAO
ments or indicating the respects in which it does not," sec.
a
the
102
initial
part
effective
if signed by the
This process is coordina-
and shall supersede
the President shall issue the
On the basis of the Comptroller
the Senate may initiate an accelerated
supersede in whole or in
its issuance,
10,
251(c) .
Senate Budget Committee and may lead to a
would
order." After the initial order had merely with-
sec.
this final order must be in strict compliance with
sequestration order on October 15. Like the
the final sequestration order "shall become
[initial]
reports,
General's revised report,
that
final
order,
on the date of
the GAO report, sec. 251(b)(l)(B). Sec. 251(b)(3) prescribes
General must present a compliance report to Congress and the
held budget authority, the final order "cancels budgetary
13
resources as required." On November 15, the Comptroller
and accurately complies with ... [the sequestration] require-
form of reconciliation for formulating a congressional
d) Alternative congressional plan. sec. 254 (b)
the initial order of September 1.
President , "either certifying that the [final] order fully
conference agreement with the House of Representatives. The
report on Oct.
presidential sequester order.
ted by the
alternative to presidential saving instructions contained in
resulting omnibus reconciliation bill,
President,
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one percent.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to
and the251(g),
Congress has
sec.
Representative Mike Synar (D -
and GAO,
interests of both active and
CBO,
the cons~itutionality of the automatic
economy enters a recession,
reduction process.
the
reports of OMB,
If
e) Special provisions in the event of recession or war
economic growth for the previous two quarters was less than
consider a suspension of the whole sequestration process,
14
sec. 254(a). A recession is defined in two alternatives:
the
the six-quarter period beginning with the prior quarter: or
A declaration of war by Congress automatically suspends
deficit amounts, "sec. 301(i)(2)."
Okla.), eleven other Representatives, and the NTEU, an asso-
deficit
In the consolidated cases of Synar v. United States and
15
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States the
requirement that budget resolutions comply with the maximum
ciation representing the
will be less than zero for two consecutive quarters during
had to address
retired federal employees, challenged the constitutionality
16
of the sequestration process on two grounds:
3. Constitutionality of the sequestration process
(1) a projection by OMB or CBO that real economic growth
(2) a report by the Department of Commerce that actual real
104
General moved for leave to intervene as defendants and also
Defendant United States filed a motion to dismiss the
the
Circuit
Since both
legislative branch,
Senate and the Comptroller
District Court on the ground
20
The judges concluded that
274(a)(I)and(2) of G-R-H allowing any
that jurisdiction was averred to exist
The United States
to sec.
it is unconstitutional.
18
The three-judge panel included Antonin Scalia,
officials (OMB. CBO, and GAO).
doctrine of separation of powers prohibits them from parti-
of legislative power to the President and other government
officers allegedly belong to the
cipating in the sequestration process.
that
saw the opinion, as well as courthouse sources, said that
19
the work was largely that of Judge Scalia," appointed by
Director of the CBO are executive in nature.
pursuant
standing.
claim on the ground that the congressional plaintiffs lacked
filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the Act is con-
17
stitutional.
Circuit. Although the court decided per curiam, "lawyers who
challenge the Act in the D.C.
(1) Part C of G-R-H contains an unlawfully broad delegation
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
President Reagan to fill the recent Supreme Court vacancy.
The court noted
Member of Congress and any person adversely affected to
(2) The powers assigned to the Comptroller General and the
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of its members who are federal retirees. The court concluded
a) Standing of the parties
of
the
but
at a
to
threatened
Forge Christian
plaintiff,
actual or
an officer removable by Congress,
show a personal,
the court invalidated the automatic deficit
constitutionally requisite separation
Rehnquist's opinion in Valley
23
Americans United that the
1986. As the judgment was directly appealed to
21
Court, its effect is stayed under sec.
the
the delegation of certain executive powers
the powers in question may lawfully be delegated,
that NTEU had thus made "a sufficient showing of injury to
22
On the standing issue, the court reiterated the standard
of-living adjustment ("COLA") benefits otherwise due those
possible prudential concerns limiting plaintiff's standing:
injury-in-fact. NTEU contended that the presidential seques-
satisfy Article Ill's threshold requirement of injury-in-
24
fact." The panel, unfortunately, did not reach the step of
ter order issued on February I, 1986, suspended annual cost-
274(b),(e).
"We disregard these prudential limitations because we think
(3)
(2)
College v.
minimum, must
of Justice
the Supreme
powers.
Consequently,
reduction process and the presidential sequestration order
of Feb. 1,
that
Comptroller- General,
violates
(1) plaintiffs in both cases have standing, that
passed according to U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 7. The court
provisions of the Act are unconstitutional on •.• [separation
saw no reason to elaborate on Justice Rehnquist's merger
in
106
that
expanded
challenged
however,
sequestration
[of G-R-H],
to reach this point
holding that "this claim
that we ±expedite to the
274
by enacting the judicial review
since we hold that the
We think it appropriate,
subsection 274(c) •••
outset of its analysis, the court declared
strictly unnecessary •.•
"The delegation doctrine is rooted in the principle
is
of ...
the
Congressional plaintiffs asserted that the
At
[delegation of powers],
provisions contained in sec.
it clear that Congress has,
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act to
25
the full extent permitted by Art. III." Hence, the court
process amended or repealed prior appropriation bills duly
of separation-of-powers considerations into standing issues
26
in Valley Forge.
found the plaintiffs had standing,
"[i]t
b) Unlawful delegation of legislative power?
of powers] grounds.
point:
of injury is 'specific' and 'discernible' .•. , aris[ing] out
27
of an interest ±identified in the Constitution. '"
greatest possible extent the disposition' of these cases,
28
and that ••• we ..• provide our views obiter dicta." It is
highly important to note the court's analytical starting-
of separation of powers that underlies the three-branch
29
system of government established by the Constitution." In
light
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
years the Supreme Court has only twice invalidated a statute
in
and
200
107
Jr. &
Hampton
last
delegated
intelligible
1933 National
in 1935, where
governmental
Hampton,
The two cases
32
United States
such legislative
the
[exercise
v.
of
Applying the J.W.
the District Court relied on
the Supreme Court held that
to emphasize that in the
±the extent and character of that
v.
necessities
is directed to conform,
Schechter Poultry Corp.
33
Ryan , both decided
and statements of purpose to guide the authorized
inherent
separation-of -powers principle does not prevent
"New Deal" legislation.
court continued
Court struck down portions of the
[T]he
person or body authorized to
the
authority]
coordinate branches;
The
coordination;' and so long as Congress 'lay[s] down by
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
31
power. '
the legislative branch from seeking the ±assistance' of
both cases Congress had failed to provide
test of Chief Justice Taft,
standards
the
Industrial Recovery Act, a part of President Franklin Roose-
velt's
Panama Refining Co.
are A.L.A.
on delegation-of-legislative-powers grounds.
outlining the governing test,
Chief Justice Taft's considerations in J.W.
30
Co. v. United States(1928)
(2) lack of standards, and
argument that the delegated power is too broad. As authority
nondelegable. In Lichter v. United States (1948) the Supreme
108
these
United States
scrutinize
cited Amalgamated Meat
In Yakus v.
and the power of the purse
Schechter criteria are still
functions" of Congress which are per se
Court proceeded to
undue delegation.
spending power
the District Court rejected plaintiffs' assumption
38 39
the Supreme Court affirmed a delegation "unless it
a delegated presidential authority "to issue such
the Court has never again invalidated a statute by
District
the
The
First,
upheld
constitute "core
that
supporting its opinion the court
Court stated that "[a] constitutional power implies a power
Cutters v. Conally (1971) where a three-judge district court
of delegtion of authority under it sufficient to effect its
40
purposes." Second, the panel refused to accept the
In Synar the plaintiffs raised three major arguments which
assertions separately.
in their view justified an invalidation of the sequestration
37
process as an unlawful delegation of legislative powers:
valid,
were impos&ible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether
36
the will of Congress has been obeyed."
34
officials. Although the
(1) Per se nondelegability
(3) preclusion of judicial review.
(1) per se nondelegability,
reason of
35
(1934)
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(2) Lack of standards
This argunment was offered the most serious and thorough
take
forth in
Plaintiffs
,intelligible
Congress may lawfully
context, and reference to past ad-
to decide when a statute should
the delegation was therefore "unnecessary."
process unconstitutional because Congress
definitions,
The sequestration process, which is only triggered
standards,
deliberation by the District Court: "The search for adequate
by defining the budget base and certain specific terms like
orders and regulations as he deems appropriate to stabilize
41
prices, rents, wages and salaries." Third, the Synar court
42
denied a "principle of necessity" which would render the
sec. 251(a),(b) of G-R-H, the court concluded that the Act
46
contains "constitutionally adequate legislated standards"
effect.
ministrative practice provides an adequate
could have made the budget cuts on its own.
standards to restrict administrative discretion lies at the
45
heart of every delegation challenge." After a detailed
sequestration
if certain deficit ceilings are exceeded, represents nothing
44
but a form of constitutional "contingent legislation."
outlays." In the court's opinion, "the totality of the Act's
authorize officials
analysis of the deficit calculation process set
"real economic growth," "budget authority," and "budget
Finally, plaintiffs argued that the delegated powers allow
43
administrators to "nullify" or "override" laws. The
asserted that
District Court refuted this theory.
110
ment.
discretion conferred is in the ascertainment of facts and
The
legis-
is that the only
shall not be subject to review in
and methodologies used by the Comptroller
274(h) Of G-R-H provides that "[t]he economic data,
lest it should become an administrative monopoly.
Sec.
policy decisions which constitute the essence of the
52
lative function."
ble
her Congress would approve a judicial review of economic
review provided no sufficient basis for finding the delega-
50
tion invalid."
Notably, this section of G-R-H raises serious doubts whet-
court decided that this narrow exception from judicial
total budget outlays .•.
data and predictions required under a balanced budget amend-
51
The Synar court concluded that "Congress has made the
argued that any delegated power had at least to be justicia-
any judicial or administrative proceeding." Plaintiffs
assumptions,
General in computing the base levels of total revenues and
the prediction of facts. The Comprtoller General is not made
49
responsible for a single policy judgment ... "
current facts and the predictions of future facts that the
48
statute requires [involve] a good deal of judgment." But
"[w]hat is -significant about this case ...
principle' to guide and confine administrative decisionma-
47
king." The three judges admitted that "the assessments of
(3) Preclusion of judicial review
III
Having upheld the sequestration process on delegation of
future facts that affect the application of the law
The
he allo-
the exer-
such executive
the Comptroller
secondly,
performs
the Laws be faithfully executed,'that
the doctrine of separation of powers.
removable by Congress,
first of these specifications requires
'take Care
The
cise of substantial judgment concerning present and
the sort of power usually conferred upon the executive
officer charged with implementing a statute. The second
The court answered both questions affirmatively.
specification requires an interpretation of the law •.. ,
It observed that the Comptroller General first determines
similarly a power normally committed initially to the
Executive under the Constitution's prescription that he
the gross amount to be sequestered by specifying levels of
anticipated revenues and expenditures;
cates reductions amounts to particular budget items:
officer,
functions?
powers grounds, the District Court reviewed it as a possible
S3
General exercises under the Act is ±executive power in the
S4
constitutional sense. 'I!
to the question whether the power that
c) Violation of the separation of powers?
violation of
judges had to answer two central questions:
(2) Does it violate the separation-of powers doctrine, if an
(1) "In this opinion, we are careful to direct our attention
remove the Comptroller General?
Like all civil officers of the United States, the
For developing the rule of law governing the scope of
112
In re
immediate
relied on
contravenes
but by the
case,
as incident
the Comptroller
has the
since
these [powers] cannot be
the District Court
In our view,
Art. II, sec. 4. But he may also be removed
the asserted evil of which the plaintiffs
removal powers,
cl.3 ...
of causing the Comptroller General to look to the
the court assumed that under G-R-H the head of the
Const.
I I,
Thus,
Art.
by a joint resolution of Congress for "permanent disability,
regarded as anything but executive powers in the constitu-
55
tional sense.
Comptroller General can be impeached by Congress according
to U.S.
effect •••
does this "double-functionality" affect Congress's power to
General Accounting Office performed executive functions in
56
addition to his traditional legislative functions. How
Congress's
General is not appointed by the Legislature,
[T]his •.• [is]
58
complain."
congressional removal authority,
remove embodied in the tenure statute ••.
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or
57
conduct involving moral turpitude." This "authority to
legislative branch rather than the President for guidance.
three principal Supreme Court cases. The first
59
Hennen (1839), declared "the power of removal
60
to the power of appointment." This approach
113
of the Federal Trade Commission had been removed without
interpretation of Justice Sutherland, the Federal Trade Com-
the
the
In the
If Congress
exercises no part
it would "infringe
62
United States(1926),
In applying the rationale of In re
he was dismissed by the President despite a
in the executive department and •.•
In the second case, Myers v.
place
to "purely executive officers." Justice Sutherland stated
tenure-of-office act requiring advice and consent of the
that a Federal Trade Commissioner, in contrast, "occupies no
plaintiff was a postmaster appointed by the President for a
of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the
President," but that he acts only "in the discharge •.. of
Const. Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
mission Act allowed removal by the President only for in-
65
efficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
drew to itself the power to remove,
cause by President Roosevelt. He sued for back pay.
the President's removal power unconsitutional.
61
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, u.S.
constitutional principle of the separation of governmental
63
powers."
four-year term;
The third and most significant case, Humphrey's Executor
64
v. United States(1935), weakened the firmness of the
Hennen, Chief Justice Taft found the limitation imposed upon
Senate for his removal.
seemingly well established In re Hennen rule. A commissioner
Myers was distinguished on the ground that it extended only
114
that makes one the master in his own house precludes
latter's will ••• So much is implied in the very fact of
is
the
deter-
and Hum-
For it
illimitable
departments by the
independence against
cannot be depended upon to
sound application of a principle
"for future consideration and
The
an attitude of
separation of powers of the[
[postmaster as purely executive officer]
[is] plain under the Constitution that
the Synar case "falls neatly between the two stools of
Constitution .••
the
maintain
the pleasure of another,
it
respect of officers of [this] character .•.
Since the Comptroller General is charged with both exe-
him from imposing his control in the house of another
67
who is master there."
power of removal is not possessed by the President in
quite evident that one who holds his office only during
panel diminished the authority of Humphrey's Executor as a
By applying various techniques, the Synar court accorded
71
this middle ground to the Myers rationale. First, the
phrey's Executor [commissioner having no place in the execu-
68
tive department]."
that
Myers
cutive and legislative duties, the District Court concluded
66
quasi-legislative of quasi-judicial powers ... " The Supreme
Court in Humphrey's Executor continued to observe that
115
congressional removal power. The judges, however, refused to
Congress could constitutionally provide for veto of •.•
as
the
that
to de-
powers
Secondly, the
agency action
75
majority. In
with hostility
"unthinkable
assertions were true,
far-reaching reduction
by conferring it upon an
the Synar court could have
mixture of legislative and
legislative veto of
adequate
in the hands of an officer removable by
"quasi-legislative" by the
Synar court regards it as
sequestration process by invalidating
the
who exercises one or more nonexecutive
They doubted whether Congress would have entrusted
the
invalidated the
so.
At this point of its analysis,
tions characteristic of its era and •.•
27 72
towards the architect of the New Deal. "
Court
described as
case "stamped with some of the political science preconcep-
determinations by an officer removable by Congress - the
76
Comptroller General, for example." Thirdly, the Synar
Synar court believed that the landmark case of Immigration
73
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983) presaged the
74
abandonment of Humphrey's Executor. In Chadha the Supreme
do
Congress could control almost every executive power, no
matter how significant it may be,
analogy,
judges argued that if defendants'
termine a still
executive powers
Fourthly, the District Court saw "neither judicially
78
manageable nor congressionally knowable standards"
the Comptroller General with the
saved
Congress.
official
77
well.
they referred to the G-R-H "fall back" deficit reduction
nal. The reports of OMB and CBO would then be transmitted to
in most of its parts, reveals severals points of weakness in
the
116
Secondly,
ruling •••
procedure,
its perception of
is at odds with
not to the Comptrol-
though elaborate and thorough
the doctrine of delegation of
The brief for the Comptroller
79
removable by Congress.
This process takes effect if any of
"the district court's
Most fundamentally,
that
history,
274(f).
The joint resolution of this committee would
Synar judges held that this fallback mechanism
sec.
argues
judicial precedent, and the practical needs of a
the congressional intent to drop the automatic se-
The
The Synar court's analysis,
process,
powers had he been not
powers,
questration process rather than to abandon Congress's power
80
to remove the Comptroller General. Since Congress itself
the "automatic" cutting procedures are found unconstitutio-
that seeks to prevent any intermixture of the branches of
82
government." Appellant's assertion is supported by
proved
ler General.
a special joint committee of Congress,
the doctrine of separation of powers
constitutional
order.
authority and logic.
functioning government.
reflect[s] an unduly rigid view of the separation of powers
General
provided for an alternative reduction
81
remainder of the Act stays intact.
serve as the basis for the final presidential sequestration
4. Critique and outlook
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three branches of Government from one another would
the checks and balances that they had built into the
control
case of
composi-
regarded
that the
the proper
the per curiam
self-executing
The Framers
branches of Government .••three •••
establishment of a Nation capable of
have no partial agency in, or no
84
of each other." In the landmark
85
(1976), which invalidated the
and from the Federalist Papers,
clear from the provisions of the Constitu-
the
Framers] saw that a hermetic sealing off of the
ought to
each of the[
the acts
[The
[I]t is ...
in determining whether the Act disrupts
of
preclude
tion itself,
governing itself effectively ..•
tripartite Federal Government as a
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this rationale in the presi-
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of
86
one branch at the expense of the other.
ring three airtight departments of government.' Rather,
an 'archaic view of the separation of powers as requi-
tion of the Federal Election Commission,
dential papers case of Nixon v. Administrator of General
87
Services (1977). The Court declined to accept
Buckley v.· Valeo
nment]
historical and judicial authority. According to Madison,
83
Montesquieu "did not mean that the departments [of gover-
over,
opinion of the Supreme Court held:
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balance between the coordinate branches, the proper in-
prerogatives? The power of the purse, the right to raise and
a
of
by
in
the
GAD
over
the
Office,
than
from a
the
not
executive
vested
sought
is
prescribed
the definitions of
Congress
functions,
The Synar court itself
public money,
assistance
of
on the extent to which it prevents
General functions as nothing more
computer aid." Congress has
89
counts in a separation of powers analysis.
Comptroller General to revise the reports
additional
the calculation formulae,
and the exceptions in certain areas of social
is true that the Congressional Budget
into an executive function merely because it is
the
the
that it is the control over
that
appropriations
9, cl. 7. This core power of congressional control
focuses
an "arm of Congress," avails itself of considerable
base,
the executive branch does not suddenly change
Comptroller
sec.
quiry
justify
Comptroller General and the unique familiarity of
allowing
clearly
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constituionally
88
assigned functions.
with government accounting and auditing procedures, however,
budget
But how do the powers accorded to the Comptroller General
budget expertise, too. The broad investigative powers of the
budget terms,
90
welfare. It
I,
"congressional
offices,
admitted
legislative
The
over
assigned to the Comptroller General.
Congress by express constitutional mandate, u.s. Const. Art.
decrease
in computing budget reductions interfere with the
apply the law by assessing complaints of individual citi-
troller General does not violate the separation of powers
The Comptroller General falls under the same category as
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that
dual
to legis-
function .••
in specific
of unfettered
exercising
of [his] quasi-
under the rule of
1986, the Court of Appeals for the
In their blend of powers and
Congress's power to remove the Comp-
create agencies
in the discharge ..•
92
powers ..• " Thus,
Under G-R-H the Comptroller General does not
the Comptroller General and the GAO closely
could
by issuing permits or injunctions
that [he] exercises any executive
the FTC and other "fourth branch" agencies.
so
On March 27,
In'the words of Buckley v. Valeo, he therefore "ope-
core principle of Humphrey's Executor was
nor does he enforce the law - the utmost executive
does
Congress
executive control.
resemble
functions and which were independent
The
functions,
[he]
OMB and CBO.
There is, therefore, little basis for distinguishing
94
Humphrey's Executor in the present case.
rates merely in aid of congressional authority
the Federal Trade Commissioner in Humphrey's Executor: "To
cases.
principle.
the extent
function
late ..• [,] sufficiently removed from the administration and
91
enforcement of public law ••. "
zens,
legislative •.•
Humphrey's Executor,
Third Circuit explicitly affirmed this conclusion in Ameron,
93
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
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stitutional:
Congress has never tried to remove a Comptroller Gene-
in the
in the
In uphol-
criticism.
opposed to
provision,
than
the Ameron court
the Comptroller
But the process of
two different approaches
The District Court would
of the removal
these
(legislative function)
the court held that
two additional points of
that only the broad factual as
While
the case was not ripe for adjudication.
provokes
constitutionality
logically inconsistent.
Synar court conceded,
The
Synar
ral and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Secondly, the Synar court's approaches to the doctrines of
reconciled.
preparation of laws
declared as not ripe for review the question whether Con-
delegation of powers and of separation of powers cannot be
policy discretion of the Comptroller General let it conclude
execution of laws (executive function).
gress's power to remove the Comptroller General is con-
enough to uphold them on delegation grounds, it deemed them
95
to be "substantial" enough to invalidate them on
that he performs executive functions.
separation-of-powers grounds. Since the "delegation doctrine
96
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers," as
the
General's powers of discretion and judgment were narrow
counterargue
ding the Comptroller General's automatic stay powers under
finding and evaluating facts is no less important
the Competition in Contracting Act '(CICA),
Firstly,
are
calculative determinations. Furthermore, in Chadha the House
the Comptroller General, we do not deem the constitu-
Nor has Congress ever tried to remove the head of an
to
be
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to
to remove
administrative
and because Congress
provision
[nullifying
[by the assertion of removal
removal
the district court judges stated:
result
there are legal obstacles rendering a
The fact that Congress can remove the
the
ex ante
same
has yet to be tested,
Synar's analogy to Chadha is not persuasive.
instead of ex post [through legislative veto],
to us no more constitutionally permissible
the
seems
therefore,
in this case [and in Synar] has not sought
tionality of
97
justiciable.
Secondly,
of Representatives had vetoed the deportation suspension
prescribing in advance the exercise of executive power,
100
instead of invalidating its exercise." This analogy
Comptroller General does not prescribe a single of his
"It
simply goes too far.
gressional two thirds majority if vetoed by the President.
achieve
determinations]
house legislative veto,
authority]
Comparing Congress's removal power with the invalidated one-
removal unlikely: Congress can dismiss the Comptroller
99
General only for five specific causes and only by joint
resolution which requires presidential approval or a con-
historical evidence,
independent regulatory agency since the creation of the
98
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. Besides this
122
then have to be declared constitutional.
Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Reserve Board. The
federalin the
Tribe's opinion, parts
creating exactly the danger
In Prof.
the Supreme Court should hold that
The G-R-H sequestration process would
would require a charge of irresponsible
may constitutionally assign deficit reduction
For all these reaons,
balance of powers.
purely political reasons - a major shift
Supreme Court might take the occasion to overrule Humphrey's
Executor. Then, the President could remove commissioners for
[Reagan] administration in its assault on the delegation of
101
power to agencies independent of the president," like the
The Synar decision may entail serious legal implications
of the decision provide "powerful ammunition for the
apart from the budget law.
calculations to the Comptroller General despite its power to
remove him for cause.
Congress
to remove. the Comptroller General for neglect of duty,
conduct over a longer period of time and could hardly be
based upon a single false determination of budget data.
granted Mr. Chadha by the Attorney General. This veto inter-
the separation of powers was designed to avert. In contrast,
another branch of government,
malfeasance etc.
fered on a case-by-case basis with the daily business of
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings works prospectively by imposing maxi-
the first sunset legislation in 1976, called the "Government
the
and
"was
theory
intended
a
terminated
introduced
they would
enactments,
4
reform."
legislative
reverse
Sunset
integral
congressional
cease to limit
to be
"sunset." Whereas
rather
sunset is
Senator Muskie
simply
strengthening
thereby become an
for
question whether particular program
certain activities are
legislation" or
be increased or freezed;
as "a logical follow-up to budget
Sunset would
federal spending was developed under
reenactment of federal programs.
part of the authorizing process and
statutory tool
to complement the two-step authorization/appropri-
"sunset
debates to the
should
functions
How does a sunset act operate?
Another
it
permanent
their
decide whether
traditional presumption of legislative continuity.
Authorizing congressional committees would
completely.
control of
funds
designed
to work retrospectively by means of a periodic
constantly revising the progeny of legislative
C. Sunset Legislation
review and
sponsor, Senator Muskie ( D-Me.), the new procedure is meant
2
"to make Government more effective" by enabling Congress
called
"to exercise greater control over the results of its legis-
3
lative work." Since sunset legislation provides a method of
ation process by which the Congress develops and funds
1
federal program efforts." In the words of sunset's major
mum deficit ceilings on future outlays,
ditures.
III dealt with the "Review of the Effectiveness of and Con-
year scheQu1e for review and reauthorization of all federal
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94th
been
required
the
no program
Senate. Any
Sunset permits the
finally, describes the
"sunset oversight" on
or contracts would be ruled out
Title IV,
to function after the review date fixed in
borrowing,
Title II delegated these responsibilities to
sunset concept has five distinct advantages:
to check whether the Executive has adhered to
it allows Congress to look back.
specifically reauthorized by Congress,
Although none of the proposed bills has yet
Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976." Since
shall continue
the schedule.
presented an almost identical version to the 95th Congress,
5
called the "Sunset Act of 1977." Title I set out a five-
the authorizing committees of the House and
Congress adjourned without acting on the legislation, Muskie
programs according to budget function and subfunction. Un-
less
appropriations,
authorization allowing new budget authority in the form of
sunset review provisions.
of order unless it had been scrutinized under the
tinuing Need for Government Regulation Review Authorized."
enacted, the
special rules which apply to the sunset review of tax expen-
In 1979, Senator Kennedy ( D-Mass.), proposed the "Admini-
6
strative Practice and Regulatory Control Act" whose Title
regulatory agencies.
Legislature
The bill was conceived to impose
First,
However, there are two constitutional concerns inherent in
nistrative policies.
programs were carried out in accordance with the congressio-
to
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major
inter-
whether
Executive
five
"starve" pro-
natural resour-
restrictions,
threatening executive
finance (federal banks,
but only
Fifth and most importantly,
Third, indefinite and multiyear
social security;
and cohesive review of
First, legislative oversight might vio-
policy making by
interpret and apply the law according
of
Fourth, the Muskie bill would not suddenly ter-
and whether they were carried out at all. Second,
ceilings and other spending
comprehensive
role
commerce and transportation;
officials
reauthorize an activity - would motivate the
deficit
budget areas in a five-year cycle, e.g., foreign and
the 19 budget functions could be grouped in a way to provide
the mere threat of sunset - the peril of Congress's refusal
grams through funding cutoffs.
to
ces, technology, research, and education; foreign and inter-
nal security and defense;
interest on national debt).
authorizations which render about three quarters of the
7
federal budget uncontrollable (especially entitlements)
the idea of sunset.
proper
these
a more
state
to preview the effectiveness and justifiability of its admi-
legitimacy.
nal will,
minate entire agencies or statutes,
lative the separation of powers, if Congress goes beyond its
officials with the termination of particular programs unless
would have to face an automatic and periodic review of their
a pending divestiture case intervened in the Commission's
issues holding that comments of a Senate subcommittee which
the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit addressed these two
of
of
few
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This
right
to an
the due
Transpor-
Congress had
calculus
unconstitutional.
Secretary of
Secretary's decision was
standing alone, to invalidate
the
Particulary when
The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
intruded into the
which
interference might be
on
that repeated public threats by a
pressure
functions and deprived Pillsbury of its
congressional intervention may violate
such
rights of private parties who are entitled
found
fair and impartial trial according to the maxims
9
process
procedural due process.
granted broad discretionary powers of adjudication to an
legislative directions.
directly questioned the correctness of the FTC's approach in
Secondly,
Court
tation's approval of a bridge construction project.
and was "sufficient,
12
the Secreatry's action."
agency,
considerations
11
based"
unbiased administrative decision free from legislative
8
pressures. In Pillsbury Company v. Federal Trade Commission
Circuit applied a similar rationale to the "Three Sisters
10
Bridge" case, D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'n v. Volpe. The
Congressmen had influenced the
to a
adjudicative
"extraneous
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veto would call for a constitutional amendment.
veto power is expressly granted by the Federal Constitution.
to
no
the
The
they
Senate
is
protect
to
and
however,
the
presidential
policy - are
There
subsection or
and
the
presented
line-item veto.
be
encroachments
a
impoundment
law,
the establishment of an item
a
"Its initial purpose was to
states that "[e]very bill which shall
a broader
becomes
he shall return it .•. " This general veto
an item veto or
send back to Congress any
or
from congressional
Consequently,
it
to the impoundment power,
or
the House of Representatives
permit
if not,
before
ground.
is uncontested.
delete
approval or total refusal of the bill.
item veto
contrast
passed
not
but
presidency
In
Even a broad interpretation of the Constitution,
1. The item veto and the line-item veto
Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2
power
we now turn to the question whether new presidential powers
The item veto can be defined as the presidential power "to
- an
D. New Presidential Powers to Cut Federal Spending
constitutional and appropriate to curb federal expenditures.
Having analysed Congress's "arsenal" to balance the budget
it,
shall,
the
have
total
permit presidents an opportunity to block measures
1
deemed unconstitutional."
President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign
does
language of Art. I leaves only two choices to the President:
veto,
middle
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in the budget.
veto constitutional amendment .•• is probably the single most
1876, moreSince
appropriation levels
allowing the President
form of an item veto,
i.e.,
All Presidents from Truman to
welcome this aggrandizement of
Either
most recently President Reagan in
"I am convinced that adding an item
State of the Union Address: "I ask you to
in Congress.
150 constitutional amendments to create this new veto
a) The item veto would help eliminate waste and extravagance
presidential powers:
of a presidential item veto:
important action we could take if we really wanted to end
5
the deficit nightmare."
6
Four major reasons are advanced to support the adoption
Senator Alan Dixon (D-IIl.),
his Feb. 4, 1986,
give me what 43 Governors have - give me a line item veto .•.
2
portion of an appropriation bill passed by Congress." The
people approve a presidential item veto.
however, would so significantly increase presidential
authority that the two alternatives will be considered
together without further distinctions.
3
A 1985 Gallup poll showed that 71 percent of the American
Reagan have sought it,
than
in appropriation bills.
only to veto line-item figures,
were proposed
line-item veto is more restrictive,
(Applause). Give me the authority to veto waste, and I'll
4
take the responsibility •.• " Even Democrat Congressmen like
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a cluster of unrelated issues.
simply change sides. The President could announce in advance
of
In
Thus,
he may
if the
spending:
section
the President can
it is doubtful whether
Second,
if Congress does not pass program B.
waste only in this small
influence should be strengthened by a new item
the substance of these alleged advantages? A
both programs are likely to be implemented.
legislative items he deems unnecessary or wasteful.
is
reduce
item veto would ironically boost spending,
What
b) It would be an effective tool to reduce federal deficits
c) It would stop the congressional practice of "logrolling,"
d) It works well in most states and is favored by a majority
since an item veto would allow the President to disapprove
and to balance the budget.
single provisions of omnibus appropriation bills containing
of the American public.
closer look at the item veto reveals its limited benefits.
presidential
he may use his general veto power more vigorously,
controllable budget functions.
defer or rescind appropriations (the two forms of impound-
8
ment), or he may address the public in order to campaign
the
could
the end,
to veto program A,
already avail himself of powerful means to limit
against
With this array of possibilities,
veto. Third, the practice of "logrolling" would not stop but
First, given the small percentage of discretionary spending
7
(about 25 percent of the budget) the President's item veto
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and budgetary processes.
reasons or structural flaws in the present system of checks
the
the
the
Unless
does not
(low per
Congressional
The Executive
only compelling
therefore,
two thirds majority,
than the states with an item veto
State experience,
the item veto would run the risk of severely
($1,091)
to give a precise and uniform definition of
from 1 (high per capita spending) to 50
existing constitutional and statutory law,
"item" and "line-item." Moreover,
In summary,
expenditure
a scale
capita spending).
the item veto also entails fundamental risks:
support the thesis that the item veto reduces spending.
($1,141). As an average, the former group ranks only 31st on
Not only are the above-mentioned advantages unpersuasive,
states without a governor's item veto had a lower per capita
President used it to trade votes for his favorite objec-
9
tives. Finally, a 1981 investigation showed that the seven
self-restraint in the appropriation phase would be weakened,
difficult
since the President would make the final corrections anyway.
10
State litigation proved that courts would find it
terms
under
and balances should lead to a constitutional amendment. Yet
President already plays an important role in the legislative
disturbing today's system of checks and balances.
President's budget decisions would be final.
Congress in Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1 and sec. 9, cl.7 of the
overridden by a legislative
would then exercise the power of the purse reserved to
withholding their disbursement. Thomas Jefferson declined to
cut deficit spending.
years restraint was replaced by abandon, precedent stretched
by
The
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pushed
to the
Roosevelt
impoundment.
the substance of
on
authority
"[D]uring the Nixon
Franklin D.
silent
manipulated
This "selective enforcement of
This danger of an intrusion on
President
and statutory
13
intent."
impounded congressional appropriations
by the
breaking point,
a presidential item veto appears inappropriate to
Federal Constitution is
by the New York Constitutional Convention:
the
The
1915
United States Constitution.
past
executive ·of the priceless legislative function of holding
1 1
the purse." Thus, for efficiency and constitutional
item veto "has nearly resulted in an abandonment
the principle of separated powers was recognized as early as
tutional conflict between Congress and the Presidency.
efforts of his predecessors far behind:
2. Broader impoundment powers
reasons,
beyond legislative
14
the laws"
rous congressional appropriations that deviated from the
12
priorities and spending levels set in his budget proposal.
impounded congressionally approved funds in order to control
legislative policy choices and led to a crucial consti-
Nevertheless, since the early days of the United States Pre-
spend an appropriation for gunboats.
inflation. Most recently, Richard M. Nixon, impounded nume-
sidents have
His aggressive impoundment policy left the rather modest
spent because a cheaper contractor was found or because the
efficient management by saving the money which could not be
spending priorities for those enacted by Congress.
a
as
The
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these
crisis,
implied
16
clause
threaten
than do
Here the
executive
foreseen.
impounded
For
programs •••
to enhance
priorites •••
impoundments
impoundments
"reflects
be
congressional
this
Nixon
of
distinguished.
power.
express or
seriously
degree of discretion
therefore
toward
substitute
This second group, the
a
to
Other routine
impoundments,
the [spending]
Their purpose is
impoundments
full dimensions
foreign affairs
"policy"
prerogatives more
the
the president
impoundments are generally considered
Policy
powers like the Commander-in-Chief
acts 'with prejudice'
Congress was that President
interfere with
15
by Congress."
of a military conflict could not
budget
administration retains
types of impoundment must be
routine
presidential
not
end
controversial
upset
group comprises the so-called "routine"
understand
the
for purely political reasons.
do
based on statutory authority or on
the
respond to changing events.
To
What
different
established
to
first
and
constitutional
determination by
reasons,
sudden
funds
which "do not by themselves restrict authorized
highly
or
administration
17
preferences."
legislative
routine impoundments.
constitutionally permissible.
are
Thus,
that Congress at the last minute scuttled the entire
argument and invalidated President Nixon's impoundments:
reached its peak when Nixon directed the Administrator of
133
of
"Dis-
endanger
to spend
seemingly
even the less
constitutes an
commitment
heavily
We cannot believe
to be expended and,
item veto represents
however,
firm
An
to achieve an early solution of
impoundments can
EPA officials asserted that the Water
to provide a
routine
intended
to administer the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
rather ceilings on the amounts
substantial sums •.•
was
effort by providing the Executive with the
what was deemed an urgent problem.
In comparison to the item veto,
congressional budget control.
intrusive
decision silently directed to governmental agencies?
The controversy between Congress and President Nixon
how can one fight the inaction of an unpublished impoundment
presidential action with the opportunity to override it. But
As conceived and passed in both Houses, the legislation
cretionary impoundment of funds therefore
item veto without the concomitant congressional ability to
18
overrule presidential judgment."
than $2 billion of the $5 billion authorized for fiscal year
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency to allot no more
1973
Amendments of 1972.
but
Pollution Act's appropriations were not mandates
therefore, subject to executive discretion. In Train v. City
19
of New York (1975) the Supreme Court rejected this
presidential rescission proposals shall be made available
to stretch out the realization of anti-pollution measures.
or expenditure of budget authority for one fiscal year,
to
All
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it
Despite
Congress
both Houses
implementation
procedure.
The Act distinguishes
22
deferrals and
approval
impoundments:
to withhold funds from allotment and
of
to draw the often narrow line between
to these executive delay tactics,
congressional
the new Act required the administration to
Whereas deferrals merely delay the obligation
Because Congress did not want to leave
constitute a final cancellation of budget
Whenever the President determines to defer or to
the "Impoundment Control Act of 1974" as title X of
litigation had lasted for two years,
any impoundment to Congress.
categories
23
Executive
stricter
limitless power
20
obligation.
In response
rescind the obligation of funds, he must transmit this
decision to Congress in a special message stating amounts,
24
reasons, and estimated effects of the impoundment. Because
deadlines mandated by Congress could not be met.
Since
passed
the
losing in court the administration achieved its prime goal
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of the
21
permissible routine impoundments and controverisal policy
same year.
two
impoundments,
report
rescissions.
a
rescissions
authority.
for obligation unless, within a 45-day period,
of their farther-reaching impact, rescissions are subject to
135
action in the United States District Court for the District
stop presidential deferrals.
veto.
informs
impounded
frequently
He
In Chadha the
Congress
he can bring a civil
disburse the delayed
surveys presidential
28
Finally,
the President refuses to makeif
impoundment resolutions,
As deferrals withhold budget authority only
impoundment power to the President.
In addition to introducing a notification process for
every impoundment, the 1974 Impoundment Control Act narrowed
of Congress pass a rescission bill affirming the President's
25
cancellation of budget authority. Hence, rescission can be
deferrals.
compliance with these reporting provisions.
Supreme Court struck down a one-house legislative
one-house
stopped by mere congressional inaction. This is not true for
obligations available.
includes deferral disapprovals in appropriation legislation
30
passed by both Houses. Thus it becomes more difficult to
Congress about executive failures to notify the Legislature,
The bicameralism requirement articulated in the recent
29
landmark case of INS v. Chadha (1983), however, shifted
more
and forces the administration to
27
funds. The Comptroller General
of Columbia,
temporarily, at least one House of Congress must pass an
26
"impoundment resolution" which disapproves the impoundment
Fearing an extension of the Supreme Court's rationale to
and he is entitled to reclassify conclusively deferrals into
rescissions and vice versa.
In the absence of a true market value, officials, therefore,
impoundment power as restricted by the 1974 Act serves as a
E. Closing Budgetary Loop-Holes
the
the
Pro-
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1960s
demand.
presidential
to circumvent
the
in supply or
amendment allowed
that
1950 amendment to
One way is
a
1950
or other developments. The 1974 version
the administration's most powerful routine
Deliberate underestimation of shadow prices
the same end. Many governmental services are
regardless of changes
to establish reserves for contingencies and to
savings made possible by a change in requirements,
overall evaluation shows
scope of
An
provided
can serve
contracts.
took over the role of the General Accounting Office.
impact of federal spending.
independent auditing procedures, as occurred in the
There are various ways to disguise the true amount and
when the newly created Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
defense Congressmen had sponsored this move which resulted
in an increasing lack of auditing precision for defense
1
deleted the "other development" clause "to remove from the
greater efficiency,
valuable institution to make Congress review wasteful appro-
33
priations and lower federal spending.
effect
the
act any excuse for withholding funds for such policy reasons
32
as combating inflation."
President
impoundment tool based on
31
Antideficiency Act. The
yield the money necessary to cover administrative costs.
Backdoor spending creates budget authority not approved
mandate annual federal transfer payments to eligible persons
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Since
savings
however,
and thus
law that
the budgetary
for example, was
For 1982 a one
Entitlements and
todangerous threat
Frequently these shadow prices do not
They do not have to be funded by additional
to varying economic conditions.
Entitlements may be described as provisions of
"Backd00 r. spen din g" and 0 ff-bud get act iv itie s ,
entitlements entitle a person to a certain benefit,
percentage point increase in unemployment,
estimated to effect a $5.1 billion rise in spending.
ments contained in the permanent authorization - a lengthy
can be achieved only by tightening the eligibility require-
subject
authorizations.
like social security, medicare, and unemployment insurance.
appropriation bills. Permanent authorizations cover programs
They are tied to the consumer price index (Cpr)
through the regular appropriation process.
or groups according to fixed formulae spelled out in the
3
legislation authorizing the program. These federal benefits
are therefore merely based on - usually permanent
tax expenditures represent the most common forms.
constitute the most
1. Backdoor spending
principles of completeness and clarity.
create shadow prices.
Thus, they include a hidden subsidy to the user of these
2
services which is not evident from the budget totals.
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accompanying the concurrent resolution on the budget shall
the 1974 Budget Act they represent "those revenue losses
all
three
fiscal
3(a) of
special
proposes
a preferen-
amount and
entitlements
The report
taxpayers in
sec.
are
the tax code's
or deduction from
First,
Committee
They
itself amounts to
for about two thirds of
exempt'ion,
evaluation of the
7
expenditures.
spending.
Authorization
can be regarded as
annual
or a deferral of tax liability." For the
of tax
an
As the fastest growing part of the federal
direct
that allow tax relief to encourage certain
if
of
impact
take effect prior to the start of the next
Second, their amounts can be cut by the Appropriation
rate of tax,
requires an
"Tax expenditures
quarters of federal expenditures.
interest groups.
provisions .••
the growth of entitlement outlays.
The 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended by G-R-H,
5
contains two provisions in title IV which help slow down
procedure which must overcome the pressures of numerous
cannot
budget, entitlements account
4
uncontrollable spending which
entitlements which exceed its maximum budget authority.
Committees,
tial
equivalent
possible
gross income or which provide a special credit,
R-H,
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which
year.
allow a special exclusion,
first time in budget history, the 1974 Act, as amended by G-
kinds of economic activity or to benefit
6
particular circumstances." In the language of
annual report estimating the tax expenditures for the next
regular appropriation process were more severely restricted
and borrowing authority to take loans from the Treasury or
the
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contract
functionalby
include
The 1974 Budget Act
"all applications of money
backdoor spending has become
that new contract and borrowing
types of budget authority outside
7 of the Federal Constitution holding that
These
Committee proposals providing for new tax
cl.
estimates of tax expenditures
forms of backdoor spending
Finally, the Congressional Budget Office issues an
Jefferson argued that
9 ,
Over the last few decades,
Other
sion:
priation process.
sec.
Jefferson agreed upon the central importance of this provi-
one has ever asked whether this practice violates Art. I,
quence of appropriations made by law .•. " Despite their dif-
9
fering philosophies of fiscal control, Hamilton and
n[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse-
such an entrenched feature of American fiscal policy that no
contracting and borrowing at least de facto into the appro-
than entitlements and tax expenditures.
the public.
expenditures must contain a projection of the legislation's
as amended prescribes
authority will be effective only to the extent provided for
8
in appropriation Acts. This novelty reintegrates
effects.
include
five fiscal years.
authority to enter into obligations prior to appropriations
categories.
conditions create an uncertain number of beneficiaries which
periodic review of eligibility standards would ascertain the
The present practice of backdoor spending does not violate
A
to
at
the
the
Tax
the
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in a-
foresee
are
economic
from
it
they
authority are
fiscal year.
"drawn"
provision was ...
appropriations.
However,
the Framers could not
and borrowing
- that the purpose, the limit,
subsequent
constitute money
by
Contract
Secondly,
of clarity and control envisioned by
Entitlements, in contrast, fall within the
not
Constitution in this
are merely potential revenues which were
the appropriation or transcending
do
the Constitution since they are funded by
the
They
of
in amount
from
should be disallowed. Hamilton conceded that "[t]he
based on (permanent) authorizations which give them a
Constitution.
needs of modern welfare states where changing
design of
varying
10
mount"
the
expenditures
that the appropriation requirement "induces a caution and
12
integrity" in congressional spending revision.
and the fund of every expenditure should be ascertained by a
1 1
previous law." Justice Story wrote in his commentaries
secure these important ends,
limited
legal foundation.
the
can not be determined at the start of the
never collected.
Framers.
language
least
Treasury without an appropriation.
Treasury.
necessary degree
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Government-sponsored enterprises are privately owned and
many off-budget agencies ran into deficits which did not
It either
the budget,
Certain additional
The fees charged for
contrary to the constitutio-
Because of these miscalculations
from the Treasury.
Their loans thus include a subsidy which allocates
guarantee are often lower than the amount necessary to
six federal off-budget agencies back into
nal mandate that "a regular statement and account of the
receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be
14
published from time to time. " Finally, in 1985, G-R-H put
13
The principal activity of off-budget agencies is to lend
2. Off-budget agencies and government-sponsored corporations
preferences and tax exemptions enable them to borrow at
thus eliminating a popular instrument for shifting or dis-
15
guising deficits.
money on more favorable terms than would the private mar-
guaranteed by the federal government.
resources to the borrowers. The Federal Financing Bank (FFB)
this
operates as the most important off-budget agency.
the
debt securities or it purchases loans that are 100 percent
lends money to federal entities raised by issuing ordinary
Submitting government-supported enterprises to budget review
cover expected defaults.
therefore off-budget by their nature. Fiscally most relevant
16
are seven credit corporations which are granted favorable
appear in the budget document,
lower rates than non-government-sponsored credit institutes.
lines of credit
kets.
lacked the orientation required to establish a means-ends or
ther cuts by Congress or the President are not needed.
So far Chapter V. has dealt with Congress's and the Presi-
142
They
Johnson
supplies,
system of
government
followed a
One commenta-
and
of
legitimate andas
the present
Kennedy
e.g., personnel,
in particular the doctrine of
The
The following short analysis will
last year's budget
suggested that
analysis.
provide a clearer pictureto
however,
internal budget preparation to a point at which fur-
Until the early 1960s agency budget planners
tor,
would interfere with shareholders' rights.
17
scheme
invol v emen t.•
18
F. Enhancing Administrative Efficiency
constitutional requirements,
diffused linkages should be replaced by an explicit subsidy
separation of powers.
dent's opportunities to balance the budget without violating
their
consider whether the several federal agencies could improve
1. The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
system of incremental budgeting on a line item basis.
simply "accept[ed]
calculated on an item basis,
concentrat[ed] their attention on marginal or incremental
19
changes from that budget." Furthermore, budget needs were
equipment, etc. The objectives or purposes to be attained by
these means were not taken into account. This blind approach
cost-benefit
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President Carter introduced ZBB first as Governor of
ble program alternatives.
the
is a
goals,
and the
"It
the special
to fulfil a
Consequently,
fails if program
and
these comparisons
budget "through
21
rankings." Like
entire
however,PPBS,
PM determines the agency's
is almost impossible to compare
the program financial plan,
technique called Planning-Programming-
It
PPBS relies on three documents: the prog-
to examine the
tank models is most cost-effective
ZBB operates as an executive program management
decision packages and priority
developed
transcend the possibilities of PPBS.
three
Budgeting (PPBS).
programs which can achieve these goals,
vative management
ram memorandum (PM),
special analytic study.
of a particular program.
benefits of an aircraft carrier with those of a new highway.
But setting national priorites requires
of
analytic study explains the reasons underlying the adoption
benefits are hard to measure. It is easy to decide which out
administrations eliminated this flaw by introducing an inno-
the financial plan indicates the funds necessary to develop
limited function.
which
2. Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB)
Georgia and then as United States President.
discrete
programs,
device
PPBS should be restricted to readily measurable and compara-
technique designed to help budgeters avoid the pitfalls of
20
mindless incrementalism." Whereas sunset legislation is a
congressional tool to review the functioning of legislative
144
pressures of interest groups, constituencies, and reelection
innovation and efficiency.
the
data
innovative
Output and
"logrolling," and
ZBB was not very
Because of the tremen-
with broad authority to investigate
This incentive alone furthers administrative
ZBB could then still yield some
A reasonable compromise could combine PPBS and
His/her powers should permit to investigate both
hold an independent office unaffected by
legislature,
proposals with alternative levels of spending.
and affirmed.
dous amount of paperwork involved,
up a list of decisional preferences.
costs of the several packages are compared in order to set
An ombudsman is a "public official, usually responsible to
sunset legislation, ZBB thus reverses the traditional
22
presumption of budgetary continuity. The mere existence of
cancelled unless their legitimacy is constantly reexamined
The above-mentioned decision-packages consist of budget
ZBB admonishes officials that last year's programs may be
successful.
ideas without overloading the agencies with permanent
year of ZBB.
ZBB in a three-year cycle with two years of PPBS and one
gathering.
the
G. A Budgetary Ombudsman
individual complaints of administrative misconduct, to
23
report on them, and to make recommendations." He or she
executive and legislative "trade-offs",
should
concerns.
would suffice to fulfil this task since the pure existence
step into· the right direction was taken by G-R-H which
scorekeeping rules and practices of the House and advising
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effect and
may appoint a
time on the[ir]to
A staff of half a dozen employees
flexible budget watchdog would makean independent,of
provides that "[t]he Speaker of the House •.•
the Speaker from time
24
impact ... "
Member User Group for the purpose of reviewing budgetary
legislators and officials afraid of public disclosures. A
"pork-barrel" spending.
VI. A Comparative Approach
Each State jurisdiction imposes its own taxes and passes its
scope of the services regarded as a responsibility of State
2
and local governments account[ed]" for an unprecedented
to
of
and
and
new
their
second
years.
market-
of
a
therefore
20
and Walter
is
"experimental
education,
It
the States had
federally structured
particularly in the fields
fiscal consequences
transportation,
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As Professors Jerome
How did other democratic,
"the broadening of the nature
the
Switzerland, or the Federal Republic
at how they managed or averted
industrialized,
testing new concepts.
look
States have always served as
for
to
highly
The
in State budget totals over the last
federal nature of the United States opens
similar challenges to budgetary restraint as the fede-
approriation bills.
Germany deal with
The
governmental functions?
countries like Canada,
of
comparative perspective.
reasonable
oriented,
environmental protection,
ral .government experienced,
Apart from the area of national defense,
fiscal crises.
research.
increase
laboratories"
face
own
The federal system of the United States consists of fifty
1
member States with fifty separate fiscal jurisdictions.
Hellerstein pointed out,
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A. Solutions Found by Member States of the United States
it was an exercise in direct or do-it-yourself democracy by
The
First,
The new Art.
limitations.
Second, the new concept did not
to public spending
to the California Constitution.
State approaches
renowned Proposition 13 was novel in a double sense.
means of referendum voting.
function as a ceiling on spending legislation but as a
reduction of tax rates.
In June 1978, two out of three voters accepted Proposition
13, also called the Jarvis-Gann referendum-initiative, as an
1. California
California is a particularly suitable focus for a study of
amendment
XIIIA limits State and local taxes in four different ways:
a) Any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one
percent of the 1975 full cash value except for changes of
ownership or new construction.
b) The annual increase in assessing the property's market
value is limited to two percent.
c) The State may not levy new ad valorem taxes on real
property. The raising of other State taxes is subject to the
approval by a two thirds majority in both Houses of the
California Legislature.
d) Municipalities may not impose any ad valorem property or
property transfer taxes. Again, other local taxes may be
increased only by a two thirds vote of the qualified voters
of the district.
ture sides of State and local budgets.
a particularly heavy dependence on property taxes.
priations to the tax proceeds in 1978-79 adjusted every year
it
by
the
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taxes
sudden
First,
the
California,Thus,
Art. XIIIB of the amended
between 1973 and 1978,
Second, due to inflation and
families had to pay a constantly
in 1979, the California people went
Finally,
further by adopting a second referendum-
than other levies like income or sales
in cost of living or change in statewide per capita
respectively.
in revenues and to "bailout" local jurisdictions with
Only one year later,
Many reasons can be cited for this tax revolt.
personal income, whichever is less.
even one step
by the jurisdiction's change in population and United States
popular vote, had "frozen" both the revenue and the expendi-
price,
California Constitution limits annual State and local appro-
drop
burdensome
change
public sector size in general.
initiative called Proposition 4.
growing share of their income for living in the same house
rising real estate prices,
State of California had accumulated a surplus of $7 billion
on the same lot. Third, "the property tax became an identi-
4
fiable evil around which political action could coalesce."
which could be used as a reserve to "cushion"
mirrors a widespread "frustration with government as an
3
effective and efficient social agent" and with the booming
which are generally withheld from salaries or added to the
Property taxes are more evident and are perceived as more
traint mandated by Propositions 13 and 4. Federal assistance
Reagan reduced federal aid to state and local governments.
programs were curbed drastically. On the local level, zoning
out
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User
local
Local
On the
capital
did not
services
President
functions
of
of
Municipali-
fiscal res-
costs
contrary,
and minority support
revenues
conducted prior to the
The remedy turned
The
6
and the redevelopment of
to the
cultural,
(2) private sector capital, (3)
a survey
own-source
and (4) long term bonded debt.
in
in order to reduce a $7 billion surplus,
fire protection.
educational,
could no longer count on state funds to help
imposed for essential governmental
Ironically,
in the self-imposed mechanism of
and
capital construction,
(1) user fees,
decrease
5
assessments,
level,
not be expected either;
police
caught
on Proposition 13 had shown that the public
After two years the $7 billion reserve was used up.
The consequences of the tax revolt were soon felt.
compensate for their revenue losses.
to be too severe:
governments.
percent
property tax proceeds were cut by 57 percent equalling a 37
jurisdictions
except for welfare and administrative expenses. Californians
like
blighted areas suffered from tightened budgets.
vote
special
favor any decreases in most local public goods and
charges were
could
ties adopted "four alternative methods to maintain govern-
7
mental services and still comply with" the constitutional
amendments:
State
management,
were
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California tax rebellion had grown to a nationwide movement.
improvement and municipal infrastructure were largely passed
a
to
the
and
The
owners
owners
impress
abolis-
13,
actions.
although
constitu-
California
old
assessments.
than
hasty
corrective
in California.
1975-76
they "approved an initia-
for
their
state income tax and
8
gift taxes."
estate
the two Propositions entail
13 burdens new property
however, could not be appropriated
real
thirteen States other
in June 1982,
flexibility
experience proves that
cuts were not drastic enough to
treatment,
to profit from
Proposition
1978,
to puchase
urgently needed to support land development
service
taxed at present market value whereas
unequal
of the spending limit in Proposition 4,
sufficient
rigidity on the tax and expenditure sides and do not
amendments can become very costly if they amount
Califorania
permanently indexing the
continue
are
Furthermore,
The
Within months after the adoption of Proposition
voted on measures designed either to cut taxes or slow the
9
growth rate of government spending. Only two
2. Massachusetts
hing the State inheritance and
tive
California voters:
tional
In November
because
allow
Besides
fiscal
businesses
social welfare programs.
they were
However,
strange paradox: the low one percent tax rate encouraged new
on to the developer.
additional tax revenues,
will
who
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States, however, Idaho and Nevada, passed amendments similar
with the adoption of Proposition 2 1/2 by 59 percent of the
in
in
tax
this
remained
times
to change
limit was
the annual tax
(4)
This statutory
Third,
The City of Cambridge,
they decided (1) to undertake
Massachusetts followed in November 1980
Communities exceeding that figure at the
to cut appropriations;(3)
Chapter 59 of the General Laws of Massachusetts
to raise alternative sources of revenue as
local governments may tax property at a rate no
the original bill was amended three
tax limit went into effect had to reduce the
severe as in California.
for approval of a one percent payroll tax on the
(2)
the
that
time;
Cambridge;
variety of accommodations:
mandated full market value assessment revaluation at
lature
The main thrust of Proposition 2 1/2, however,
employees of the city's largest tax-exempt institutions,
10
Harvard University and MIT. Local jurisdicitions made a
Despite the above-mentioned amendments, the repercussions
facing a 25 percent budget cut had to ask the State Legis-
growth rate is also limited to 2.5 percent.
were as
time
levy by 15 percent a year until the 2.5 percent
reached ("roll back" or "phase-in").
fair market value.
greater than 2.5 percent (Proposition 2 1/2) of full and
1981, 1982, and 1984.
unchanged:
fact
electorate.
was amended by inserting section 21C.
approach allowed more flexibility as can be seen form the
to Proposition 13.
of budget reserves and the courage to implement Zero-Base
The State of Georgia offers an instructive example of
rare case of budgetary creativity.
as
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Eleven
indebtedness.
Georgia,
constitutional,
A refined system
of
like 42 other State
or (5) to seek increased
Georgia is respresentative of
Furthermore,
Constitution
the importance the people of Georgia
the
as the first Member State makes Georgia a
legislation,
restraint mechanisms on the
and agency level. With its strict limitations on
(ZBB)
Constitutions,
or by additonal taxes.
States, Georgia shares the constitutional requirement of a
15
balanced budget. Supplementary appropriations may be fun-
ded only by an unappropriated surplus in the State Treasury
16
collection and general obligation debts for infrastructural
12
Like the constitutions of 30 other States, the Constitu-
paragraphs underline
A limitless public debt may be incurred only to "repel
and eductional projects are limited to 5 and 10 percent of
14
previous year's net revenue, respectively. With 39 other
invasion, suppress insurrection, and defend the state in
13
time of war." Temporary deficits created by a delay in tax
tion of Georgia contains ceilings on the State debt.
Budgeting
the majority of the Union's Member States.
budgetary
attributed to a detailed regulation of public
dependence on the capital market,
appropriations
statutory,
3. Georgia
state aid.
1985. Hence, Georgia can easily meet the $100 million cut in
June 30 of each fiscal year, the State Auditor shall reserve
equalization account to cover the deficiency. Finally, as of
the
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income
shall be
gives
to Gramm-
allotments
Should a later
the authorized
surplus
19
the
to meet
This wise contingency policy,
in Title 45 of the Official Code
each year's General Appropriations
the State government has designed an
First,
the State Office of Planning and Budget, an arm
in a $350 million surplus for Georgia in fiscal
tax proceeds from a flourishing State economy,
shortfall reserve.
the Governor, may utilize any balance in the
On the statutory level,
17
interpreted by the Georgia Attorney General,
Governor an item veto power over appropriation bills.
budget deficits.
interesting precautionary system of security funds to avert
of Georgia Annotated,
credited to an income equalization account.
Act contains a specific sum as an emergency appropriation.
of
for each appropriation account,
monthly State income exceeds the approved budget
resulted
combined with conservative revenue estimates by the Governor
three percent of that year's net revenue collection as a
20
from any available State budget surplus an amount equal to
federal aid expected for fiscal year 1986 due
allotments,
monthly income be insufficient
This money can be allotted at the Governor's discretion to
18
agencies with unexpected financial needs. Second, if the
Rudmann-Hollings.
revenue
and the
in 1982, amounted to about one third of federal expenditures
was in a more serious financial position, since its deficit,
burden of financing the Canadian national debt.
- an
same
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most
Pro f .
the annual
data,
the United States.
particularly in the
available
Ten thousand decision
the
Canada encountered the
a new administrative management
failure.
as
Governor Jimmy Carter introduced
basis of
total government spending (federal and
73 percent faster than the Gross National
the
to bear the prime share of
ran considerable surpluses. Ottawa, however,
last decade,
conclude that ZBB was at least a disappoint-
On
22
whereas certain provinces,
difficulties as its neighbor,
if not a complete
During the
On the agency level,
government had
oil-rich west,
deficits,
provincial) rose
economic
compared to one sixth in the United States for the same
Expenditure (GNE) and reached over 40 percent of GNE in the
24
1980s. As in the United States, the federal Canadian
fiscal year. Additionally, high interest rates increased the
B. The Canadian "Envelope System"
From 1947 to 1977,
redistribution of resources within program units
packages transcended the Governor's review capacity.
asumption still to be analysed in more detail.
ment
commentators
Lauth argues that although ZBB did not "result in widespread
23
program elimination" it might have led to a more efficient
Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB)
21
technique.
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The first comprehensive effort at fiscal restraint was
lasted only
In the late
developed by
because Ottawa's
federal budget.
the Liberals started
further
in contrast to his United States
In 1976,
called for a reevaluation of governmental
This 1974 tax reform, however,
reports to the Executive, not to the Canadian
early criticism wasthis
limit was unsuccessful in the long run,
anti-inflation campaign.
policy which linked the increase in federal spending to the
and California Proposition 4. Like tax reform, the spending
another promising initiative. They committed themselves to a
growth rate of real GNP, an approach similar to those of SJR
the Bank of Canada. Struggles over growing tax expenditures
25
and the Finance Minister's "budget secrecy" further de-
The Parliament's expenditure "watchdog", Auditor General
58 _ the United States Balanced Budget Amendment proposal -
tax brackets.
until 1982, when Mr. Trudeau de-indexed taxes as part of his
layed a radical overhaul of the Canadian budgetary system.
overall fiscal stance collided with the monetary policies of
Government under Prime Minister Trudeau to index the income
undertaken on the revenue side of the
Pressure by the conservative opposition forced the Liberal
Parliament.
counterpart,
Comptroller General, who,
the Royal Commission on Financial Management and by Canada's
1970s,
programs in order to find the administration's "bottom line"
with a new "value for money" auditing approach.
James Macdonnell,
Minister and his staff allot the limited resources to agency
operations.
restrictions imposed by the envelopes.
the
the
156
their
1979,
ES was
cabinet
only the
level,
for
called the
each minister was
The committees then
to different
the lowest
It was maintained by
Prior to ES,
for complying with
at
"The system assigned nine
(ES).
(envelopes)
Finally,
the long-term overall priorities by
System"
the Central Planning Committee and the
Under the new system,
held responsible
during their brief nine-months tenure in
Envelope
the medium-range fiscal strategies
ES works on three administrative levels. At the top
thus making the short-term decisions for the daily
to reform both the tax and the expenditure sides of
spending limits were allocated to the committees by
Thus,
Finally,
heads,
respective envelope.
determining the size of the envelopes.
of the hierarchy,
define
president of the Treasury Board and/or the the Minister of
budget cuts.
individually
Prime Minister set
the central Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning
the Canadian federal budget.
blocks of expenditure
chaired by the Prime Minister.
committees [consisting of groups of several ministers], each
26
of which had both annual and rolling five-year ceilings."
Finance had an institutional responsibility to suggest
the Clark Tories enacted a new budget concept
"Ottawa
These
meant
Trudeau's Liberals on their return to power in 1980.
In practice, however, ES is still confronted with numerous
envelopes do not give sufficient guidance to committees and
tion among committees. Secondly, it is still unclear to what
in
loan
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follo-
Iim its;
into the
and
regulation,
This technique
and expenditure
spending,
tax,
equity financing,
comparison of old programs with new
Each envelope consists of an "operatio-
direct and tax expenditures
establishment of expenditure
the medium and lower decision level,
decentralization of authority to ministe-
But despite these initial practical problems,
At
to simplify and clarify budgetary choices
integration of policy,
to private enterprises should be charged against
Different choices in timing and in applying the
instruments - taxation,
tax expenditures,
entire ES philosophy can be summarized in the
committees;
- may result in a standstill due to lacking coordina-
The
the envelope.
Canada.
ES promises
ect.
degree
guarantees
difficulties.
flexibility and overview for budget officials.
development and publication of long-range fiscal planning;
available
ministers.
allows a permanent
decision making;
requirements and - like sunset and ZBB - it provides more
inclusion of both
27
various envelopes.
nal planning level" for existing programs and a "policy
rial
reserve" to implement new budget priorities.
wing terms:
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C. Switzerland
diversified trade nation like Switzerland survive with such
its
any
virtually
four ethnical
The executive
thus audits
the
linguistically and ethnically
in the habit of making
the Federal Constitution directs
is not
fiscal decision making was
Instead,
of
rudimentary system of fiscal checks and balan-
the National Council representing the people and
in expenditures .•. The budget debate is normally
28
occasion for much argument." The two federal
Too many powers of one governmental branch over the
"parliament
How could a democratic,
groups.
national unity.
broad national consensus to integrate
an archaic,
the government to consult a wide range of local and national
others could create tensions and conflicts detrimental to
interest groups at the preparatory stage of economic and
social decisionmaking. "At this [administrative levell ..• the
rence.
ces? The main reason is found in the Swiss concern for a
relevant choices are made with the participation of all the
branch, headed by the Federal Council,
the Council of States representing the 25 cantons, may only
fiscal operations without substantial parliamentary interfe-
approve or disapprove the national accounts.
chambers,
not the
that
changes ..•
nonexistan~. American OMB officials would read with jealousy
supervision
for a very special reason. Until the late 1960s, legislative
Budgetary control in the Swiss Confederation merits analysis
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of 500 Swiss Francs million to cover certain modifications
Parliament had appropriated 870 million Swiss Francs to
is
"the governing
the Legislature
it is not subject to
Finally, since fiscal legis-
"Mirage Affair" shook thisthe
The responsibility for a particular
1960s,
Parliament suspected an executive maneuver
It became obvious that neither the nonprofes-
least one Federal Councillor,
the Federal Council as the Chief Executive
late
the Mirage.
In the
ted by at
great difficulty at the parliamentary stage, where indeed
29
most of the same participants are to be found again."
interested parties so that they can only be reviewed with
usually supported by a 80 percent majority in both chambers.
individual Federal Councillor.
purchase 100 Mirage fighter aircraft. Three years later, the
of
Moreover,
as a collegiate organ.
Since all four majoritarian political parties are represen-
coalition [has] little tendency to disapprove of the [Execu-
30
tive's] actions." This Federal Council acts "in corpore,"
the uncertainties of the frequent popular referenda.
unusual balance of fiscal consensus and early compromises.
in the Defense Department were able to deal with complex
lation is not of general application,
spending decision can therefore hardly be traced back to an
a criticial separation-of-powers conflict,
high-technology acquisitions of far-reaching importance. In
and refused.
sional Swiss Legislature nor the outmoded planning systems
Defense Department asked for a supplementary appropriation
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of national defense.
D. Federal Republic of Germany
of
to
New
from
There
finally
totally
Germany
units.
Second, the
Among other
purchase
of
new process
was used
evidence
The government,
The
the
therefore
"Wirtschaftswunder"
The conflict was
First, the defense adminis-
concerning
and was
post-war
Federal Republic
Parliament assumed a more active
of
rates
the
granted the right to hear
to narrow the information gap between the
to the debate
the legislative branches.
decades
growth
decentralized into more efficient
gained more investigative rights.
was
wonder),
Executive under German terminology,
and
two
the outset. Increased legislative scrutiny,
led to a substantial delay in this urgent question
it
civil servants without executive permission.
applied
expertise
from
the
pendence of the executive branch.
tration was
i. e •
and a cost-efficiency approach were introduced.
relied on the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy for clai-
ming broader powers of control and more informational inde-
resolved by two reform efforts.
had been no such power before the Mirage affair! Parliamen-
tary work was professionalized and provided with more out-
double-digit
management tools like system analysis, operational research,
tactical support aircraft.
executive
side
later
Legislature
things,
federal
encountered its first recession in 1966-67.
role
however,
After
(economic
addressed first.
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Federation and the Laender shall take due account in their
in
the
"The
overall
for
of
sec. 2,
sec. 1,
"exceptions
of
109,
110,
interpreted as
restriction:
Art.
Art.
clause:
can be
requirements
spending
the
The first,
only to avert a disturbance
vaguerather
"Revenue obtained by borrowing shall not exceed
a
administration of
constitutional provisions
be permissible
total of expenditures for investments provided
Three
economic equilibrium."
fiscal
prescribes
overall economic equilibrium." Finally,
the budget •.. " But there is an escape
shall
the
investment:
limits on federal spending.
1. Constitutional reform
requires a balanced budget: "The budget must be balanced as
2, imposes a deficit limit linked to the size of government
regards revenue and expenditure." The second, Art. 115, sec.
passed the "Law for the Promotion of Stability and Economic
34
Growth" (Stability Law) and a new "Law on Budgetary Proce-
35
dure" (Budget Law). The constitutional amendments will be
Federal Parliament ("Bundestag" and "Bundesrat") implemented
several reforms on the constitutional and statutory levels.
31
From 1967 to 1969, three amendment bills restructured the
32
entire financial section of the Basic Law, West Germany's
33
temporary constitution. During the same period, parliament
unprepared for counter-cyclical measures. In order to estab-
lish a set of tools for fighting future economic crises, the
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mandated by the Stability Law.
Both Art. 109 and the escape clause in Art. 115 refer to a
in
imposes a
technical
Court
effect. The
110 intends
to pay back
is inherent in
issue was almost
in contrast,
In order to keep their
however,
that the
115,Art.
government may not borrow more than it
One weak point,
the Federal Constitutional
is an investment?
not a substantive budget balance. Borrowing,
this behavior,
constitutes a legal revenue source to cover the
what
before
taxpayer generation which will have
115 :
balanced budget requirement, clearly has no
36
prevailing construction suggests that Art.
only a formal,
therefore,
to finance long-term capital investments which benefit the
invests. This simple formula follows the "generation fraud
37
theory" which holds that public deficits may be used only
Do these provisions have a real impact on public budgeting
annual budget deficits.
real deficit limit:
or do they merely recommend financial caution? Art. 110, the
today's deficits.
term "investment." The parliamentary opposition grew so
term called "overall economic equilibrium." This
future
brought
budgets within the constitutional limit, former Ministers of
38
Finance applied a broader, more liberal definition of the
Art.
the 1967 Stability Law. Art. 109 and 115 will, therefore, be
resentful of
expression cannot be understood without an explanation of
Karlsruhe.
further analysed in connection with the budget restraints
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stimulus programs and investment subsidies. Once these funds
2. Statutory reform
the
("Kon-
follows:
budget sur-
the maximum
federal counter-
high employment, foreign
and local budget experts
in recession times,
Otherwise,
state,
115 of the Basic Law,
and steady and appropriate economic
price stability,
the Federal Minister of Finance is authorized
flow into this reserve;
equi,librium,
levels of government.
According to Art.
trade
mic equilibrium:
panel consists of federal,
Paragraph one of the Stability Law cites the four factors -
three
growth. The means to achieve these goals are debated in the
39
newly created Economic Council ("Konjunkturrat"). The
cyclical measures would run the risk of being nullified by
the "magic quadrangle" - which determine the overall econo-
economic cycles by means of a compensatory reserve
whose prime task is to coordinate fiscal policies on these
pluses
is paragraph 6 which authorizes the Executive to regulate
local pro-cyclical policies. The statute's central provision
junkturausgleichsruecklage"). In boom times,
reserve helps finance deficits resulting from governmental
are expended,
plus 5 billion Deutschmarks (if the exception clause trigge-
to borrow additional money not exceeding DM5 billion.
ring the Stability Law is held applicable). A well respected
40
German commentator, Professor v. Arnim, rejects this
federal investments (general rule) plus compensatory reserve
deficit amount must therefore be calculated as
Ie and hence effective federal constitutional deficit limit.
stun the American reader is that the German Parliament needs
spending level.
the
Ar-
with
they
164
but given the
In Professor v.
Although the Executive,
A final observation which may
the administration may require
115 prescribes a ceiling which may be
109. sec. 2 the Federal Constitutional
Art.
These propositions are arguable,
He argues that Art. 109, sec. 2 - requiring the
spending increase,
in compliance with the new standards set both in the Basis
executive consent to increase the expenditures proposed by
41
the administration, a constitutional spending limit almost
The 1969 Budget Procedure Act establishes a budget process
unknown to the German public.
very few exceptions, has always approved the legislative
42
This opportunity often results in a compromise on a lower
Legislature to postpone the vote on higher expenditures.
those of the government in order to confirm a violation of
broad terms of Art.
Law and the Stability Law.
reached only under an extreme economic depression or dise-
quilibrium.
Court would have to substitute its own fiscal policies for
Art. 109. Consequently, Art. 115 remains the only enforceab-
conclusion.
that deficits are not automatically in order because
imposes a spending limit in addition to Art. 115. That means
necessitated by an economic imbalance.
nim's opinion,
range below investment expenditures; instead they must be
overall economic equilibrium to be duly taken into account -
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VII. Comparisons and Conclusions
foreign nations which are politically and economically com-
parable with the United States.
fact
through Amendments to the United States
Constitution
The role of legal provisions, therefore, is prin-
in light of solutions found by the States and by
Improvements
The Federal Constitution owes its influence to the
process
A.
that its basic principles and values have remained unchanged
over two centuries. The 1987 bicentennial of the world's
oldest unrepealed constitution should not be celebrated with
amendments designed to avert a budget crisis. A balanced
budget amendment, if held justiciable at all, would entangle
the Supreme Court in the evaluation of fiscal priorities and
cipally to encourage a lower level of public expenditures
through the establishment of a procedural framework that
favors budgetary restraint over deficit spending. This final
chapter will suggest improvements of the federal budget
sponsors.
Budgetary thrift and efficiency cannot be mandated by
legal rules. It is political courage that is required to
withstand the temptations of short-term spending programs
that please certain interest groups and constituencies and
that are designed largely to ensure the reelection of their
demonstrated that all deficit limits short of explicit maxi-
mum amounts can be undermined by redefining the terms of the
limit, e.g. the expression "investments." A concrete maximum
ways been regarded as a prerogative of the political bran-
ches of government. It may be easier to find justiciable
standards to determine the constitutionality of presidential
B. Improvements on the Statutory Level
1. Reform of the 1974 budget process as amended by G-R-H
The 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act has mended many flaws
of the new congressional budget process implemented in 1974.
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item
The German example
The frequent exercise
would so severely alter the
runs the above-mentioned risk of
the kind of discretion which has al-
however,
however,
forced to levy user charges which finally
to the original tax burden.
economic assumptions,
item vetoes and policy impoundments.
existing system of checks and balances that both the
budgetary rigidity.
deficit amount,
of these two powers,
nistration is
amount
veto and the impoundment power are not compatible with the
separation of powers laid down in Art. I, II, and III of the
Constitution.
The cases of California and Massachusetts have proved that
constitutional tax limitation amendments do not work either.
They deprive governments of the fiscal flexibility needed to
fight unexpected recessions. To avoid the unwanted
consequences of constitutional tax limitations, the admi-
167
tax- and tax expenditure legislation ought to be broken down
months before the start of the new fiscal year - and more
Further-
must lapse after three
set forth in the concurrent resolution.
This reform imposes early spending limits - six
especially entitlements,
regardless of their annual increase factor. Thirdly,
for reconciling appropriations exceeding these limits.
budget.
time
G-R-H's most important achievement was the binding nature of
the first (and now only) concurrent resolution on the
tion
ceilings
However, there are still some shortcomings to be eliminated.
The continuous budget resolution which is passed in order
to appropriate additional funds after the start of the new
fiscal year represents the most dangerous threat to budgeta-
ry integrity and clarity. A two thirds instead of the
existing three fifths majority should be required to pass a
continuous resolution which departs from the expenditure
years,
more, two weeks after the beginning of the new fisal year,
any motion for a continuing resolution should be out of
order except for war times. Secondly, Congress, supported by
the Congressional Budget Office, should study the programs
with the highest growth rates. The authorizations and appro-
priations funding these activities should be subject to an
annual sunset review of their legitimacy and efficiency. The
programs with the lowest growth rates, by contrast, should
be set on a biennial budget cycle with two-year appropria-
tions. However, every permanent authorization and appropria-
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taxpayers would thus become more aware of the relations
The Chief Justice relied mainly on the District Court's
that
"[a]
Court's
reduction
concurred;
impeachment
sequestration
Legislators and
[the
the
District
deficit
This would increase
speaking for four other
Two Justices
D.C.
future of
the
process
In order to strenghten their respect
His analysis reiterates the inquiry of
G-R-H's automatic
the opinion.
affirmed
both parties should assign experienced and
Synar - the
two Budget Committees are still considered as
of
wrote
Chief Justice Burger,
the
Court
until recently, were regarded as isolated issues.
the execution of the laws beyond
influence,
Bowsher v.
these revenues are supposed to fund.
It would be advisable to indicate even the purposes
between the revenue and the expenditure sides of the budget
in the same degree of specificity as spending legislation.
the chance of bipartisan support of budget resolutions on
Finally,
and
which,
legislative newcomers.
the floor.
2 .
moderate members to these Committees.
process.
In Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States v.
1
Synar, Member of Congress, decided on July 7, 1986, the
invalidation
2
per curiam opinion.
the lower court. He started with the proposition that
Supreme
direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged
Justices,
Justices White and Blackmun filed dissenting opinions.
with
Comptroller General performed executive functions. For Chief
to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions.
concluded that "the powers vested in the Comptroller General
the
its
and
Con-
Chadha
legislative
6
the law." He
thorough
by Congress. In
in which Justice
most
once Congress makes
its participation ends.
the
implement the
'execution' of
the Chief Justice held that
was distinguished on the ground that
contained
as the Comptroller General,
251 [of G-R-H] violate the command of the
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3
inconsistent with the separation of powers."
4
Executor v. United States (1935), relied upon
by the Court's recent decision in INS v.
joined,
is the very essence of
"[A]s Chadha makes clear,
in enacting legislation,
second analytic step,
Justice Steven's concurring opinion,
breadth of "the removal powers over the Comptroller
General's office dictate that he will be subservient to
5
Congress. " The remaining question was whether the
power] is
Humphrey's
heavily by appellants,
President not,
his
it dealt with a Federal Trade Commissioner removable by the
law enacted by Congress to
mandate
Justice Burger there was no doubt that "[i]nterpreting the
under sec.
Congress can thereafter control the execution of its
9
enactment only indirectly - by passing new legislation."
stitution that the Congress play no direct role in the
7
execution of the laws." The Chief Justice found that result
choice
The judgment was stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days
Marshall
supported
8
(1983):
not be entrusted with binding policy decisions of "transcen-
sufficient to exclude any separation-of-powers concerns. As
the Comptroller General is subservient to Congress and that
in
He
the
170
form
"[T]he
There-
that
issues.
power
perspective:
"The notion that the remo-
concerns not the manner
the Comptroller General may
of the Comptroller General under
16
labeled 'legislative.'"
case
distinguishes executive
Justice Stevens concluded
however,
function
discussion of the relevant legal
inquiry in this
He rejected the majority opinion's contentions that
definite
comprehensive
critical
saw the case from a totally different
cess."
he performs executive functions:
ration of powers but was "simply one of congressional pro-
1 1
Justice Stevens the essential question was not one of sepa-
which Executive officials or agencies may act, but the
10
manner in which Congress and its agents may act." For
val power ..• creates some kind of 'here-and-now-subservien-
12
ce' •.. is belied in history." Second, because "one of the
no
Comptroller General's primary responsibilities is to work
13
specifically on behalf of Congress" and because "there is
line that
14
power,"
15
"chameleon-like"
legislative
Congress according to "the procedures mandated by Article I
G-R-H "may appropriately be
fore, the concurrence characterized the Comptroller General
1 7
as an "agent of Congress" with a degree of independence
dent importance" that determine the "economic destiny of the
18
Nation." These far-reaching decisions must be made by
an agent of Congress,
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separation of powers" on "one of the most novel and far-
to remove [the Comptroller General) would constitute a real
this
that he
for
it would be able to evade
G-R-H was approved by theSecond,
the power of the purse belongs to Con-
Justice White criticized the majority for
the Legislature does not deprive the Presi-
First,
Justice White named several reasons
to one of its agents,
its policymaking authority to one of its compo-
the possibility that the Comptroller will perceive
Thus,
or
In his dissent,
delegate
nents,
having "interpose[d) its distressingly formalistic view of
of powers should be whether an asserted congressional power
'the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Consti-
20
tution. '"
of the Constitution - through passage by both Houses and
19
presentment to the President:" "If Congress were free to
and substantial aggrandizement of congressional authority at
22
the expense of executive power ••• " The dissent argued that
reaching legislative responses to a national crisis since
21
the New Deal." "[T)he test for a violation of separation
proposition:
23
such a threat to the principle of separation of powers did
gress.
not exist.
dent of any power when it authorizes the Comptroller General
to cut appropriations.
President. Third, presidential consent and bicameral passage
obviates
would be needed to remove the Comptroller General by joint
24
resolution. This "requirement of presidential approval
himself as so completely at the mercy of Congress
Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction consisting of
suggested that appellees were not entitled to the requested
relief. Any incompatibility of the 1921 removal statute and
If
its
his
172
sum,
former,
If both
Blackmun
In
Then, a
procedure
Synar?
abolishing
the Comptroller
Justice
byor
Congress could threaten
and personnel
Finally,
To invalidate Congress's removal power and
this Joint Committee would have to submit
Only five days after the receipt of the reports of
his
are Congress's choices after Bowsher v.
second dissenting opinion by
two Budget Committees would replace
the latter.
his removal for cause would
27
subjec~ to post-termination judicial review.
What
The
OMB and CBO,
the
Congress does not act at all, the fallback
31
established by G-R-H will come into operation.
the Comptroller General to be "subservien[t] to Congress,
30
but rather .•. independen[t] from the President."
salary
26
position altogether.
the Comptroller with more drastic though legal means as
General.
be
own report to the floors of House and Senate.
balance of authority among the branches of government as to
to leave G-R-H intact would have caused a lesser "disruption
29
of congressional objectives," since Congress did not want
G-R-H should have been cured by striking down the
not
pose a genuine threat to the basic division between the
28
lawmaking power and the power to execute the law."
25
will function as a tool." Fourth,
reducing
Justice White concluded that G-R-H did not "so alter[] the
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Houses, within another five days, pass a joint resolution
mandating spending cuts, the resolution would be presented
administrative accounts and to review the soundness of these
assumptions, Congress would face des faites accomplis.
The
the
would
audit
General's
Given
the head of
sequestration
Congress
or veto.
it is hard to imagine
Comptrollerthe
Stevens' objections,
the Comptroller General starts to
would be to vest
when
Justice
in compliance with the Supreme Court judgment.
cure
later,
Cong~ess will vote for substantial reductions within a
Despite
year
therefore be well advised to abandon its power to remove the
Comptroller General. Even a Comptroller removable for cause
by the President would possess the necessary degree of
independence to uphold Congress's power of the purse.
the Office of Managment and Budget, an arm of the President.
All Supreme Court Justices agreed that this move would raise
no delegation-of-powers concerns. Congress, however, would
lose considerable power in the oversight of the budget. The
budget Director might manipulate his economic assumptions in
order to favor certain presidential spending priorities. One
process
easiest
functions under G-R-H into the Budget Director,
ten-day time-frame.
Congress could consider an amendment of the
that
to the President for his approval
imminence of the 1986 fall elections,
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ethical standards and to the same degree of public scrutiny.
3. Other reform proposals
all
"The
These
American
to the same
the
even in a highlythat,
should be subject
shows
it
pressures from lobbies and constituen-
already forms part of
fish and monster vast,/To which from
32
cast."
more federal funds should be disbursed to the
State of Georgia and the Federal Republic of
the Federal Government should employ a budget pro-
strange
lobbying
the
Swiss experience
that provides for a system of annual reserves.
Like
The
States in association with block grants which have proved to
34
be more efficient and innovative than categorial grants.
Finally, Congress should consider turning over those fede-
ral programs to the States which benefit mainly the local
33
taxpayer and, therefore, should also be financed by him.
Otherwise Victor Hugo's phrase would always hold true:
budget,
Furthermore,
pluralistic society,
tions.
sides the hook is
legislative process,
interests do not endanger long-term national priorities.
Since
Germany,
funds wou~d increase the ability to respond to sudden needs
cies can be channelled in a way that individual and local
and would end the unfortunate practice of continuing resolu-
cess
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C. Improvements on the Agency Level
number of conflicts with Congress and allow the Legislature
to spend more time on long-range strategies to balance the
budget.
an alternating use of PPBS and ZBB,
the agency level would reduce theon
Combined with
"pre-filter"
programs.
this
The federal administration should study the Canadian
"envelope system." This new approach to executive budget
planning makes each department individually responsible for
adhering to the spending limits imposed by the envelope. The
resulting increase in competition among the several agencies
induces budget planners to weed out unnecssary and wasteful
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24) G.B. Doern, Canada's Budgetary Dilemmas: Tax and Expen-
diture Reform, in Comparative International Budgeting and
Finance 23 (A. Premchand & J. Burkhead 1984).
25) Id. at 22.
26) Id. at 31.
27) Id. at 32-33.
28) P. Urio, Parliamentary Control over Public Expenditure
in Switzerland, in The Power of the Purse - The Role of the
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Coombes 1976).
29) Id. at 318.
30) Id. at 317.
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Budget Act of 1974",
297, 306 (1974):
"Congressional
Pub. L. No. 93-344, sec. 300, 88 Stat.
Timetable according to the
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Action to be completed
Current services budget submitted
President's budget submitted
Reports of congressional committees submitted to budget committees
Report of Congressional Budget Office submitted to budget com·
mittees
Budget committees report first concurrent resolution on the budget
to House and Senate
Committees report bills authorizing new budget authority
First concurrent resolution on the budget passed by Congress
All appropriation bills passed by Congress
Final action on second concurrent resolution on the budget com-
pleted by Congress
Final action on reconciliation for second concurrent resolution
completed by Congress
Fiscal year begins
Budget
April 15
Deadline dale
October 1
September 25
May 15
May 15
7th day after
Labor Day
September 15
November 10
15 days after
Congress meets
March 15
April 1
Append ix A·:,
Table I:
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Table II: First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget - Fiscal
Year 1976:
Resolved by the House of Respresentatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress hereby determines, pursuant
to section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
that for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 1975 -
(1) the appropriate level of total budget outlays is
$367,000,000,000;
(2) the appropriate level of total new budget authority is
$395,800,000,000;
(3) the amount of the deficit in the budget which is appro-
priate in the light of economic conditions and all other
relevant factors is $68,820,000,000;
(4) the recommended level of Federal revenues is $298,180,-
000,000, and the amount by which the aggregate level of
Federal revenues should be decreased is $3,400,000,000; and
(5) the appropriate level of the public debt is $617,600,-
000,000 and the amount by which the temporary statutory
limit on such debt should accordingly be increased is $86,-
600,000,000.
Source: House Committee on the Budget, The Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974: A General Expla-
nation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
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Table III: Senate Joint Resolution 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
"ARTICLE '"
Section 1. Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall
adopt a statement of receipts and outlays for that year in
which total outlays are no greater than total receipts. The
Congress may amend such statement provided revised outlays
are no greater than revised receipts. Whenever three-fifths
of the whole number of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
Congress in such statement may provide for a specific excess
of outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to that
actual outlays do not exceed the outlays set forth in such
statement.
The Congress and the President shall ensure
the statement adopted pursuant to this article
that
shall not
Total receipts for any fiscal year set forth inSection 2.
subject.
increase by a rate greater than the rate of increases in
national income in the last calendar year ending before such
fiscl year, unless a majority of the whole number of both
Houses of Congress shall have passed a bill directed solely
to approving specific additional receipts and such bill has
become law.
Section 3.
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The Congress may waive the provisions of this
article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is
in effect.
Section 4. The Congress may not require that the States
engage in additional activities without compensation equal
to the additional costs.
Section 5. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the
United States except those derived from borrowing and total
outlays shall include all outlays of the United States
except those for repayment of debt principal.
Section 6. This article shall take effect for the second
fiscl year beginning after its ratification."
Source: W.C. Stubblebine, SJR 58, A Balanced-Budget and Tax
Limitation Amendment to the Constitution of the United
Taxing and Spending 28 (Oct. 21-23 1981).
States, Manuscript, Conference on Constraining Federal
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Appendix B:
Table I:
TRANSACTIONS BY FUND GROUP
1985
ac1llil
IIcIipts:
Qn.lludgel:
Federal funds 459.5
Trusl funds · · 1977
Ialllrfund transactions -109.4
Total, on-budgel receipts 547.9
Oft-tJud&et (trusl funds) 186.2
Tolal, Federal GMrMll!llI receipls 734.1
1986
estimate
485.2
207.2
- 113.1
579.2
197.9
777.1
1987
estimate
5333
216.7
-1139
636.1
214.3
8504
1988
estimate
583.5
228.8
-122.0
6904
242.8
933.2
1989
estimate
6228
240.7
-131.0
732.5
263.7
9961
Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for the
United States Government - Fiscal Year 1987 6a-20 (1986).
0IlIIIys:
On-budgel:
federal funds 726.1
Trust funds 152.7
Interfund transacllons -109.4
Total, on-IIudgel outlays 769.5
Oft~ (trust funds) 1768
Tolal. Federal Government oullays 946.3
s.w- or lIIficit (-):
Ql.budeel:
federal funds - 2666
Trust funds 45.0
Tolal. on-IIudgel surplus or deficil (-) - 221.6
Oft.-. (trust flllds) 9.4
TIUI, , ••• &Ill..-t urpIus or dlficit
(_) - 212.3
750.9 751.8 773.1 799.2
157.4 157.5 166.0 175.6
-1131 -113.9 -122.0 -131.0
795.2 795.4 817.1 8438
1847 1986 209.6 219.9
979.9 994.0 1,026.8 1,063.6
- 265.8 - 218.5 -189.5 -1764
49.8 59.2 62.8 651
- 216.0 -159.3 -126.8 I -111.3
13.2 15.7 33.2 43.8
- 202.8 -143.6 - 93.6 -675
Table II:
SUMMARY or TOTAL fEDERAL INVESTMENT-TYPE OUTLAYS, 1914-17
(Ill IloIlIansaldIllIars)
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Loans and fillancial investments .
Construttion and rellabilitalion:
National deIense .
Nandelense
Grants 10 Stale and local governments .
OIlIer .
SdIlotaI .
Acquisition 01 majw equipment
~ defense ······· ·· .
JIaIldeIense .
SubloUl .
CIMICt 01 researdl and development:
~ delense · ·· ..·········· .. ··.. · .
JIaIldeIense .
SublotaI .
Conduct 01 edlation and training:
Grants 10 Stale and local governments .
Olller .
Subtotal .
OIlIer (including CllIIlIllOdityinventories).
NaIiaRal delense .
JIaIldeIense .
WIIotal .
TolaI .
Source: see supra p. 207, at D-2.
1984 1985 1986 1987esllmIle estllllllle
5.2 32.5 20.5 9.1
4.1 5.4 5.8 5.9
22.1 244 260 24.1
6.8 8.1 8.6 9.0
34.1 38.0 404 38.9
63.8 72.6 78.1 79.2
2.6 36 3.9 3.8
66.5 76.2 820 83.0
25.8 30.4 32.1 35.3
15.2 16.9 164 16.3
41.0 47.2 48.5 51.6
10.6 11.4 11.9 11.2
11.5 11.6 12.0 10.5
22.1 23.0 24.0 217
11 1.2 1.0 1.2
6.0 6.4 4.9 0.8
7.2 7.6 5.9 20
1761 2245 221.3 2069
Table III:
Cl£DIT IUDGET: NEW DIRECT LOM OIU6AnOllS AJIID GUARAN'TE£D LOAN COMMITMENTS
IY MENCY
(••••• " 1IaIIn)
Dnd
t.. ___
~1.llIII~
•••••••• allW ••• 1915 li'- 1!lI7 1!lI5 I. 1!lI7IdIII •••• IIIilIIIt ICIUIl IIlJmIlI IStImIlI
Funds Appropriated to the President ...........•...... 6,339 6,532 7,260 310 282 ISO
~ ......................................................... 21,256 23,805 14,425 3,910 7,231 5,500
FfB cIrett loans ............................................ 2,063 2,019 1,815 ................. .................
Commert2 ................................................•..•...... 106 20 16 53 57 3
Defense: FfB direct loans ............................•..... 1,533 495 ................. ................. ................. ...............
EWtion .........•.....•........................................... 1,315 1,261 1,567 8,888
......~:~~~..~......~::.~Energy ........•....................................................... 12 33 20
Health and Human Services ............................... 10 21 22 271 389 I 100
HDusinI and Urban DMlapment 1 .................... 15,072 2,013 2,046 47,441 49,336 37,164
FfB cirect loans ............................................ 133 50 ................. ................. ................. ...............
Interior ........•...•..•.................................... - .....•... 74 66 66 42 60 30
I.Jbor .......•..........................•............................... 1 2 3 ................. ................. ...............
State .........................................................•...•.... 1 1 1 ................. ................. ...............
Transportation ........•.......................•................... 443 570 168 38 67 ...............
FfB direct loans ............................................ 2 4 ................. ................. ................. ...............
Treasury ..........................•...•.............................. 60 ................. ................. ................. ................. ...............
Environmental Protection Agency ...................•... 31 32 2 ................. ................. ...............
Small business assistance ............................•..... 1,017 962 751 2,810 2,950 ...............
FfB direct loans ......•.............................•....... 525 514 300 ................. ................. ...............
Veterans Administration ............•........................ 1.090 1,126 1.166 12,140 12,299 14,715
Olher independent agencies;
bport ·Import Bank ................................•...... 660 1,062 ................. 7,849 11,484 12,000
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ........... ................. 130 110 ................. ................. ...............
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpl>-
ration (AlLSB) ........................................ 783 500 500 900 426 350
National Credit Union Administration ...•...••.... SO 102 81 • ................. ...............
Tennessee Valley Authority ...................•.•...•.. 63 66 69 ................. ................. ...............
FfB direct loans .......•.........•...................... 206 248 167 ................. ................. ...............
United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation ..... ................. ................. ................. 60 ................. ...............
Talii ....................................................52,147 41.&34 30,555 14,711 93,150 79,761
ADDENDUM
SecondaIy guaranteed loans 1 ........................... ................. ................. 54,597 60,463 55,357.................
Source: see supra p. 207, at 6e-13.
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Tables IV and V:
SUMMARY Of ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
(fa fIllS)
1~ 1!lI6 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Grass utioRal praduct (Mi billions of cur·
IIIIt dDIIars) .............................................. 3.937 4.192 4,538 4,903 5,269 5.623 5,955
CIIInee Mi ClIIliUIlt dollar GNP (percent
•••• ,.. •• year) ............................ 2.9 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6
IIftatiDII -- (percent c:ban&e. year"wear):GII' dllftalllr ......................................... 3.6 3.4 4.1 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.3
c.s... Price Index ........................... 3.6 3.4 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.3
ftdefal ClIIISInICtiandllftalof ................. 2.9 3.5 4.4 4.2 3.7 3.1 2.5
State and IDcaIpurdlases deflator ........ 5.9 3.5 4.5 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.5
~ rate (pert:IIl~ annual aver·
.) .......................................................... 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.6
IIItInsI rail. 91_ TIUSIlIY bills (per.
cent) ......................................................... 7.9 7.3 6.8 5.8 5.0 4.3 4.0
lIIIrest rail, IG-wear TIII5lIIY notes (per-
CIIII) ......................................................... 11.1 9.2 8.6 7.7 5.8 4.8 4.5
ADDDtDUIl
hderal PlY raise (pert:IIlt): 1
Clmnt services:
IIiIitaIy ................................................. 4.0 13.0 4.0 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5
CMlian .................................................. 3.5 0.0 4.0 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5
I'IIsilIent's BudIel:
IlillIiIy ................................................. 4.0 13.0 4.0 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5
CMIian I ...............................................3.5 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
CURRENT SERVICES TOTALS
(1Il1llllllllll alllDlW1)
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1985
IdIIII
1986 1987 1. 1119 1. 1991
Budget authority ."" 1,074.1 1,066.4 1,142.4 1,220.7 1.285.4 1,351.0 1.423.6
(On-budget) " (889.7) (879.1) (928.4) (978.1) (1,022.7) (1,064.9) (1.117.2)
(Off-budget) " (184.3) (187.3) (214.0) (242.6) (262.8) (286.2) (306.3)
Receipts 734.1 776.5 844.1 927.3 989.2 1.053.0 1,120.2
(On.budget) (547.9) (578.5) (630.1) (684.7) (726.4) (766.9) (813.9)
(Off.budget) (186.2) (197.9) (214.0) (242.6)" (262.8) (286.2) (306.3)
Outlays 946.3 982.0 1,025.9 1.077.3 1.128.1 1.179.3 1.224.1
(Qn.budget) (769.5) (797.3) (827.4) (867.6) (908.1) (947.4) (984.4)
(Off-budget) (176.8) (184.7) (198.6) (209.7) (220.0) (232.0) (238.6)
Surplus or deficit (-) -212.3 -205.6 -181.8 -150.0 -138.9 -126.3 -103.9
(Qn.budgel) (-221.6) (-218.8) (-197.2) (-182.9) (-181.7) (-180.5) (-111.6)
(Off-budget) (9.4) (13.2) (15.4) (32.9) (42.8) (54.2) (67.7)
Source: see supra p. 207, at A-2 and A-5.
1,0437
-138.6
392.1
104.1
607
3483
9052
3727
(289.4 )
(83.3)
407.9
(393.8)
(14.1 )
939
1461
23.1
Source for Table VI: see supra p. 207, at B-2.
s.~ IIwIpt of,1w Ura,. S, •• ,,~, F~ y_ 19&4. pp. 2·11. 9-S); SpKilll Allllly •••. Fi,clIl/984.
l'. fI.-I~;and au,IIar', lilli__
a. Hiab-cm~' dcticilS arc cala"ated a'a _,t! rm:en' uneml'ln"'!<nl ,.:e and. trend ,ate "I" I,owtb of ,eal
ON' 01 2.9 ...- • ,..r bqitIai •• ia liocal 1979.
II. lacl'" projol:led Ollila,. under tile presidcIIt., dcf_ proaram.
c. TMI& Iip_ dilFer from ,lie •• blislled eatimata ;11 .wI"" of ,Iw U"lt.d 5,"", GCW1'fUfI#"'. F;!<II/ Y...,. /964
(p. %-11) •••• _lhq achodc 1MolI'.bucIpt dcficiL
Tables VI and VII:
Table B-1 FEDERAL SECTOR RECEIPTS AND £XPENDITURES IN THE NIPA
~1Ol' i 1985 actual I 1986 estimate 1\ 1981 estm\3f'
, 'I .'
RECEIPTS \: I
Personal wand nontax receipts \ 3452 I 360.1 \
Corporate'profits tax accruals 67.6 : 84.8 i
Indirect business w and nontax accruals ' 564 I 55.8
Contributions for ~I insurance \ 3040 I 3225 I
Total receipts ·' 7731 I 8232 I
£XPENDITURES 1 \ I
Pur~~:e Of..g.~s.a.~ ..~~.~.::::::: ..:::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::.:::::::-.1 (~~;~)! (~~~;):
T-=:~J;.:;:I ••••••• •••••••••••••••••1 (m!~i (m;~
Gr:::':~~aid"t~si~i~'a~d'iocig~~~;~~'~t~::::::: ::::.:.:\ (~~:~). ~~~:~)'
Net Interest paid :· ..· · .. 1 1287 i 1398
Subsidies less current surplus of Government enterpnses 1 21.4 i 210 ~
Wage disbursements less accruals 1 .1 \ .i...
:. ~\ - :::: I ~':;::.
, I
!lote Tho estlPlate for 198£ anlI 1981 Ife pr!lmunar; _S WIll be p&mIlSheC~, \tlf ftlIrua') 198£ ISSlJO!01 \tlf SuMy t1I ()mrnl
/JIISJ1IeSS
Actual ud High-Employmellt Deficits ill tile ClIfftIlt Serrices ud Proposed
Rnla. BWlets Assuming Poteatial Growtla Rate or 1.9 Perce ••• FlICllI Year! 1979-88a
Billions of dollars
R,QfQII budg,/
ActuQI At high ,mploymm/
Cunrnt s,rvinsb
Withou/ Wi/II Wi/hout With
Fi#Q/ CyclicQI At hip SllUII/by s/QN/b)'
SIIuulby IIQndby
YN' Ac/uQ/c compolWlII 'mplo.~_1II
IflUS I1I1"S tax,s IQ)(,S
1979 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7
27.7 27.7
1980 59.6 20.8 38.8 59.6 59.6
38.8 38.8
198\ 57.9 41.4 16.5 57.9 57.9
16.5 \6.5
1982 110.6 86.3 24.3 110.6 110.6
24.3 24.3
1983 208.5 131.5 77.0 207.7 207.7
76.1 76.1
1984 231.5 129.7 \01.8 \88.8 188.8
59.1 59.1
1985 253.1 122.5 130.6 194.2 194.2
71.7 71.7
1986 270.8 115.8 155.0 193.7 147.7
81.5 31.9
1987 291.7 101.6 190.1 191.1 142.1
93.0 40.5
1988 3004 82.4 2180 168.1 116.7
890 34.3
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Appendix c:
TERMS USED IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
Note: This is intended to be a glouary of only the most common terms
ueed in the cOllp'el8ional budget process. For a complete glOlll8ry, see "A
Glouary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Procell" published by the
U.s. General Ac:c:ounting Office.
Appropriation Act
A statute, under the jurisdiction of the HoWIe and Senate Appropriations Commit-
tees, that generally provides authority for Federal agencies to incur obligations and
to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation act
is the most common means of providing budget authority. Currently there are 13
regular appropriation acts for each fiscal year. From time to time, Congress also
enacts supplemental appropriation acts. (See "Appropriations" under Budget Au-
thority; Continuing Resolution; Supplemental Appropriation.)
Authorizing Committee
A committee of the HoWIe or Senate with legislative jurisdiction over laws that
let up or continue the operations of Federal programs and provide the legal basis
for making appropriations for those programs. Authorizing committees also have
direct control over spending for entitlement programs since the Government's obli-
gation to make payments for such programs is contained in the authorizing legisla-
tion. (See Entitlements.)
Authorizing Legislation
Legislation enacted by Congress that lets up or continues the operation of a Fed-
eral program or agency indefmitely or for a specific period of time. Authorizing leg-
ialation may place a cap on the amount of budget authority which can be appropri-
ated for a program or may authorize the appropriation of "such sums as are neces-
ll8ry." (See Budget Authority; Entitlements.)
Baseline, Current Policy
A let of projections showing the levels of spending and revenues that would occur
for the upcoming fiscal year and beyond if existing programs and policies are con-
tinued unchanged, with all programs adjusted for inflation 80 that existing levels of
activity are maintained. (See Current Services Budget.)
Budget Authority
The authority Congress gives to Government agencies, permitting them to enter
into obligations which will result in immediate or future outlays, ezcept that budget
authority does not include authority to insure the repayment of loans held by an-
other person or government.
Budget authority may be classified in leveral ways. It may be classified by the
form it takes: appropriations, borrowing authority, or contract authority. Budget au-
thority may also be classified by the determination of amount: defmite authority or
indefinite authority. Finally, budget authority may be classified by the period of
availability: I-year authority, multi-year authority, or no-year authority <available
until used).
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To"", 0'S"'t A.tIIOrlfll
APPaoPlUATIONS.-Anact of Congress that permits Federal agencitlll to incur obli-
ptions and to make payments out of the Treasury for lpeCified purpoees. An apprG-
priations act is the moet common means of providing budget authority.
BouOWDfG AUTHOJUTY.-Statutoryauthority that permits a Federal agency to
incur obligations and to make payments for specified purpoees out or money bor-
rowed from the Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, or the public. The Budget
Act in moet C8ItlIIrequires that new authority to borrow must be approved in ad·
ftDce in an appropriation act.
CoNTRACTAUTHOJUTY.-Statutoryauthority that permits a Federal agency to
enter into contracts in advance of appropriations. Under the Budget Act, most new
authority to contract must be approved in advance in an appropriation act.
~,.".;""tilJlI 0'A ••• ."t
I>DnoTZ AUTHOJUTY.-Thedollar amount or budget authority is contained in the
law.
hmD'lNITE AUTHOJUTY.-Thedollar amount or budget authority is not contained
in the law; instead the law would provide "wch sums as may be necell8ry."
PeriDd 0'A DfJiIGblUfII
ONB-Y&AJlAUTHOJUTY.-Budgetauthority that is available for obligation only
during a apecified fUlC8lyear.
MULTI-Y&AJlAUTHoJUTY.-Budgetauthority that is available for a specified period
of time in excess of 1 fiscal year.
N~Y&AJlAUTHOJUTY.-Budgetauthority that remains available for obligations for
an indefmite period of time (until the objectiVtlllfor which the authority was made
available are attltined) ..
Budlet Deficit
The amount by which the Government's outlays exceed its revenues for a given
fiscal year. (seeOutlays; Revenues.) .
Budret Resolution
A resolution passed by both chambers or Congrell setting forth, reaffirming, or
revising the congrellional budget for the U.S. Government for a fiscal year. A
budget resolution is a concurrent resolution or CongreII. Concurrent resolutions do
not require a preBidential signature because they are not laws. Budget resolutions
do not need to be laws because they are a legislative device for the Congrell to regu-
late itlleIf as it works on spending and revenue bills.
The budget resolution for the upcoming fiscal year is to be adopted by the Con-
IreI8 by April 15. Additional concurrent resolutions revising the previously tlIItab-
lished budget levels may be adoptee:!by Congress at any time before the end of the
fiscal year. It is the usual practice for Congrell to revise budget levels for the cur-
rent fiscal year as part or the budget resolution for the upcoming fiscal year.
Budlet Surplus
The amount by which the Government's revenu. exceed its outlays for a given
&cal year. ($ft Outlays; Revenues.)
Conpeulonal Budret
(See Budget Resolution.)
Contlnulnr Resolution
Appropriations lecislation enacted by Conpeu to provide temporary budget au-
thority for Federal agenci. to keep them in operation when their regular apprG-
priation bill bas not been enacted by the start or the fiscal year. A continuing re8()-
lution is a jrint resolution, which bas the same l.alstatus as a bill.
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A continuing resolution frequently specifies a maximum rate at which obligations
may be incurred, based on the rate of the prior year. the President's budget request.
or an appropriation bill passed by either or both chambers of the Congress.
A continuing resolution is a form of appropriation lict and should not be confused
with the budget resolution.
Credit Authority
Authority to incur direct loan obligations or to incur primary loan guarantee com-
mitments. Under the Budget Act, new credit authority must be approved in advance
in an appropriation act.
Crosswalk
Also known as "committee allocation" or "section 302 allocation." The means by
which budget resolution spending totals are translated into guidelines for committee
action on spending bills. The Budget Committees allocate the budget resolution
totals among the committees by jurisdiction. Those committees, in turn, subdivide
their allocations among their subcommittees or programs. Cr086walk allocations to
the committees appear initially in Budget Committee reports on the budget resolution
and rmally in the Joint explanatory statement accompanying a conference report on
the budget resolution.
Current Services Budget
A section of the President's Budget, required by the Budget Act, which sets forth
the level of spending or taxes that would occur if existing programs and policies
were continued unchanged through the rl8Cal ,ear and beyond, with all programs
adjusted for inflation 60 that existing levels 0 activity are maintained. (See Base-
line.)
Deferral of Budget Authority
An action by the executive branch that delays the obligation of budget authority
beyond the point it would normally occur. Pursuant to the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President must provide advanced notice
to the Congress of any proposed deferrals. A deferral may not extend beyond the
end of the rl8C81year in which the President's message proposing the deferral is
made. Congress may overturn a deferral by pa88ing a law diaapproving the deferral.
(See Impoundment Resolution.)
Entitlements
Programs that are set up in a way that obligates the U.S. Government to make
specific payments to qualified recipients.
Expenditures
(See Outlays.)
Federal Debt
Consists of all Treasury and agency debt issues outstanding.
Fiscal Policy
Federal Government policies with respect to taxes, spending, and debt manage-
ment, intended to promote the Nation's macroeconomic goals, particularly with re-
epect to employment, IroII6 national product, price level stability, and equilibrium in
balance of payments. The budget proceu is a major vehicle for determining and im-
plementing Federal rlllCllIpolicy. The other major component of Federal macroeco-
nomic policy is monetary policy. (See Monetary Policy.)
FilCal Year
A fiac:al year is a 12-month accounting period. The rlllCllIyear for the Federal Gov-
ernment begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. The rl8Cal year is designat-
ed by the calendar year in which it ends; for example, rlllCll!year 1986 is the year
beginning October I, 1985, and ending September 30, 1986.
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Functional C•••• ific:ation
A II)'IItemof clusifying budget reIOW'Cll8by major purpose 80 that budget author-
ity~~U:~, and credit activities can be related in terms of the national needs being
adl (e.g., national defeDle, health) regardless of the agency administering the
program. A function may be divided into two or more IUbfunctions depending upon
the complexity of the national need addreeled by that function. (SeeBudget Author-
ity; Out~ys.)
Impoundment
A generic term referring to any action or inaction by an officer or employee of the
U.S. Government that precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority
in the manner intended by Congress. (See Deferral of Budget Authority; Rescission
of Budget Authority.)
Impoundment Retolution
Section 1013(b)of the Congrel8ional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
permits either chamber of Congress to adopt an impoundment resolution to veto a
deferral of budget authority proposed by the administration. However, in 1983 the
Supreme Court held that a one-HoUle legislative veto is unconstitutional because it
constitutes a legislative action without having been pused by both chambers of Con-
gress and signed into law by the President. <INS v. Chadha, U.S. (1983).)AB a result,
Congress now disapproves deferrals in appropriations laws.
Mark-Up
Meetings where congressional committees work on the language of bills or resolu-
tions. At Budget Committee mark-ups, the HoUle and Senate Budget Committees
work on the language and numbers contained in budget resolutions.
Monetary Policy
Management of the money supply, under the direction of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, with the aim of achieving price stability and full
employment. Government actions in guiding monetary policy, include currency re-
valuation, credit contraction or expansion, rediscount policy, regulation of bank re-
serves and the purchase and sale of Government !leCUrities.(SeeFiscal Policy.>
Oft'HUiDl Receipts
Income from the public that results from sale of products or services rendered
(such as sale of timber from Federal lands or entrance fees for national parks). Off-
letting receipts are deducted from total budget authority and outlays rather than
added to Federal revenues even though they are deposited in the Treasury as mis-
cellaneous receipts.
Outlays
Outlays are disbursements by the Federal Treasury in the form of checks or cash.
Outlays flow in part from budget authority granted in prior years and in part from
budget authority provided for the year in which the disbursements occur.
The term "expenditures" is frequently used interchangeably with the term out-
lays. (Set Budget Authority.)
President's Budret
The document sent to Congress by the President in January or February of each
year, requesting new budget authority for Federal programs and estimating Federal
revenues and outlays for the upcoming rUlCalyear.
Revenues
Collections from the public arising from the Government's sovereign power to tax.
Revenullll include individual and corporate income taxes, IOcial insurance taxes
(auch as IOcial IeCUrity payroll taxes), excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs
duties, and the like.
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Reconciliation Process
A process in which Congress includes in a budget resolution "reconciliation in-
structions" to specific committees, directing them to report legislation which
changes eciatiTIII laws, usually for the purpose of decreasing spending or increasing
revenues by a specified amount by a certain date. The reported legislation is then
consi~red as a single "reconciliation bill."
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings provides for an accelerated form of reconciliation in the
Senate as the method for developing a congressional alternative to a presidential
reduction order.
Rescission of Budret Authority
Cancellation of budget authority before the time when the authority would other-
wise cease to be available for obligation. The rescission process begins when the
President proposes a rescission to the Congress for fiscal or policy reasons. Unlike
the deferral of budget authority which occurs unless Congress acts to disapprove the
deferral, rescission of budget authority occurs only if Congress acts within 45 days
of continuous _ion to enact the rescission. (See Deferral of Budget Authority; Im-
poundment.)
Scorekeeping
Procedures for tracking the status of congressional budgetary actions. Scorekeep-
ing data published by the Congressional Budget Office include status reports on the
effects of congressional actions and comparisons of these actions to targets and ceil-
ings set by Congress in budget resolutions.
Sequester
That element of a presidential spending reduction order that occurs by reducing
defense and non-defense spending by uniform percentages.
Supplemental Appropriation
An act appropriating funds in addition to those in the 13 regular annual apprcr
priation acts. Supplemental appropriations provide additional budget authority
beyond the original estimates for programs or activities (including new progams au-
thorized after the date of the original appropriation act) in cases where the need for
funds is too urgent to be postponed until enactment of the next regular appropria-
tion bill. (See Appropriation Act.)
Tax Expenditures
Revenue lOIl&e8attributable to a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or to a special credit, preferential rate of tax, or deferral of tax liabil-
ity.
Unified Budget
Describes the way the Federal budget is currently. displayed. This display includes
revenues and spending for all regular Federal programs and trust funds except
lOCial security which was removed from budget totals beginning with f18C8lyear
1987. Prior to the creation of the unified budget in 1969, all trust funds were ex-
cluded from budget totals.
o
Source: Senate Committee on the Budget, Gramm-Rudman-
Explanation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-36 (1986).
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